Suffering and survival: considering trauma, trauma studies and living on by Dawson, Mark
  
 
 
SUFFERING AND SURVIVAL:  
CONSIDERING TRAUMA, TRAUMA STUDIES AND LIVING ON 
 
 
 
 
MARK DAWSON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
The University of Leeds 
School of Fine Art, History of Art and Cultural Studies 
 
September, 2010 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit 
has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. 
 
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that 
no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2010: The University of Leeds and Mark Dawson. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
What remains beyond this thesis are the others to whom it is indebted; though it is 
impossible to name them all, I would like to acknowledge the sustained and 
indispensable guidance of my supervisors, Dr. Ashley Thompson and Professor 
Griselda Pollock. I would also like to acknowledge the support of Dr. Barbara Engh and 
Dr. Rowan Bailey, as well as note the unique and stimulating environment of the School 
of Fine Art, History of Art and Cultural Studies at The University of Leeds.  
I would also like to thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council for  
their financial assistance. 
 
I want especially to thank my mother, for her love as well as her unwavering support,  
and Sarah, for her love, belief, and the remarkable capacity to welcome the uncertainties 
of this process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Referring to the academic phenomenon of ‗Trauma Studies‘, this thesis argues that if it 
is possible to ‗speak about and speak through‘ trauma (Caruth, 1996), such a double 
operation can only occur through a writing which, paradoxically, touches on what 
exceeds it. To structure this argument, the thesis proposes a distinction between 
‗Trauma Studies‘ – as a discipline or field of academic study – and a trauma study; the 
latter being a writing (on) trauma which suffers and survives as an inscription of the 
traumatic event, an event which nevertheless remains irreducible to the text ‗as such‘. 
Moreover, by referring to Jacques Derrida‘s consideration of the term ‗survivre‘, a 
quasi-originary textual dimension which ‗survives‘ or ‗lives on‘ the border between life 
and death, I suggest that if a trauma study is to ‗take place‘, it must affirm this 
essentially ‗spectral‘ dimension as its very condition.  
 
Following Derrida‘s suggestion that all events are in a sense traumatic, I further argue 
that a trauma study must write (on) the traumatic event in terms of the force and 
potentiality of the future – what I refer to as the ‗might‘ of what remains to come. This 
thesis, therefore, considers a trauma study in terms of ‗living on‘, a textual dimension 
which suffers and survives the ‗might‘ of what remains to come. Chapter One reads 
Chris Marker‘s film La Jetée, Chapter Two Roland Barthes‘s reading of Stendhal, and 
Chapter Three considers Hélène Cixous‘s Le jour où je n‟étais pas là. These chapters 
read how a trauma study remains a possibility of the im-possible, an experimental 
writing which survives or lives on the precarious border between experience and study.  
The thesis concludes by suggesting that, in order to write (on) what remains traumatic, 
the (im)possibility of a trauma study is determined by a certain feminine ‗might‘.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
‗So the loss of son or brother, or of property, or anything 
else of the kind, will hold the least terrors for the good 
man.‘ 
  ‗He will be least affected by them.‘ 
  ‗So when any catastrophe of the kind overtakes 
him, he will lament it less and bear it more calmly then 
others.‘ 
  ‗He will.‘ 
  ‗Then we should be quite right to cut out from our 
poetry lamentations by famous men. We can give them 
to the less reputable women characters or to the bad men, 
so that those whom we say we are bringing up as 
Guardians of our state will be ashamed to imitate them.‘ 
  ‗You are quite right.‘ 
Plato.
1
 
 
 
Writing (on) trauma 
 
The word ‗trauma‘ comes from the Greek ‗τραύμα‘, which means ‗wound‘, and is 
usually experienced as a painful marking of the body. The notion of trauma has featured 
extensively in many intellectual traditions; in terms of western aesthetics this can be 
traced at least from the work of Plato (with the notion of trauma or suffering having no 
place in his phallocentrically ideal state, constitution, or ‗Republic‘). Though trauma is 
currently the preserve of discourses/disciplines such as psychoanalysis and psychology, 
the study of trauma has also found a home in the modern humanities. This particular 
consideration of trauma, referred to as the discipline or field of ‗Trauma Studies‘, has 
manifested itself most clearly in the (comparative) literature departments of the North 
American university. 
 
Trauma Studies divides many as to its place in the university, the term ‗trauma‘ 
recalling for many the impasse of ‗identity politics‘, as well as the all too easily 
appropriable ‗survivor narrative‘, a narrative which might found a certain claim to 
                                                 
1
 Plato, The Republic, trans. Desmond Lee (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2007), pt.III, bk.III, §1, 387e-
388a (p.79). 
 2 
moral, political and/or subjective agency.
2
 Deriving in part from the Yale School of the 
mid 1970s, and thus a certain amalgamation of literary theory, psychoanalysis and 
deconstruction, the now seminal work on trauma by Cathy Caruth and Shoshana Felman 
– which emerged from the late 1980s – asks how intellectual culture and practice might 
engage with catastrophic history. In terms of Trauma Studies, then, Caruth‘s first book, 
Unclaimed Experience, is central. In it Caruth reads Freud‘s Moses and Monotheism, a 
text which identifies a traumatic departure as the mark of both the impossibility and 
possibility of Jewish history:  
 
In [Freud‘s] rethinking of Jewish beginnings […] the future is no longer 
continuous with the past but is united with it through a profound 
discontinuity. The exodus from Egypt, which shapes the meaning of the 
Jewish past, is a departure that is both a radical break and the establishment 
of a history.
3
  
 
With his supplementary claim that the Hebrews murdered the Egyptian Moses who led 
them to freedom, Freud suggests that a traumatic event also marks the origin of Jewish 
monotheism. It is, therefore, a traumatic event which both ruptures Jewish history, and 
marks its beginnings. As Caruth states, ‗[t]he most significant moment in Jewish history 
is thus, according to Freud, not the [Hebrew‘s] literal return to freedom, but the 
repression of a murder and its effects.‘4 What it is necessary to point out here is that 
what is at once a creation myth both of and for the Jewish people, is read by Freud as 
the after-effect of a traumatic past. According to Freud, the deferred action of these 
traumatic events is both acknowledged and denied with every affirmation of Jewish 
monotheism. In turn, Caruth suggests that ‗the central question, by which Freud finally 
inquires into the relation between history and its political outcome, is: What does it 
mean, precisely, for history to be the history of a trauma?‘5 
  
The possibility that Jewish monotheism may be both driven by, as well as that which 
generates, this traumatic effect, enables Freud to read the history of the Jewish people 
through the prism of psychoanalysis. Doing this also allows him to align the traumatic 
                                                 
2
 See: John Mowitt, ‗Trauma Envy‘, Cultural Critique, no.46: Trauma and Its Cultural Aftereffects, 
(Autumn, 2000), pp.272-297. 
3
 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience Ŕ Trauma, Narrative and History (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996), p.14. 
4
 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, p.14. 
5
 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, p.15. 
 3 
history of a people with the traumatic history of the individual through the notion of a 
deferred action or belated effect of trauma (what he refers to as ‗Nachträglichkeit‘). 
Theorizing the implications of deferred action, Freud suggests that traumatic excitation 
is experienced by the ego only after the event, during a similar but subsequent 
experience. The experience of traumatic excitation, then, is first of all an effect of 
deferral and delay, always-already folded into a secondary or supplementary experience. 
The deferred action of traumatic memory means that, though imposed upon the 
individual, what is experienced as traumatic will be partly informed by an unprocessed 
previous experience, as well as being too overwhelming, and thus await its affective 
discharge via a subsequent and similar experience.   
  
One of Freud‘s early engagements with the deferred action of traumatic memory is his 
recounting of the ‗Emma‘ case in the ‗Project for a Scientific Psychology‘: 
 
Emma is subject at the present time to a compulsion of not being able to go 
into shops alone. As a reason for this, [she produced] a memory 
[Erinnerung] from the time when she was twelve years old (shortly after 
puberty). She went into a shop to buy something, saw the two shop-
assistants (one of whom she can remember) laughing together, and ran away 
in some kind of affect of fright. In connection with this, she was led to recall 
that the two of them were laughing at her clothes and that one of them had 
pleased her sexually.
6
 
 
Freud suggests that Emma‘s reluctance to go into shops alone is due to a ‗proton 
pseudos‟, an originary – yet ‗false‘ – event which a supplementary experience will 
charge with traumatic affect. There is no accurate memory of this ‗originary‘ event, 
only its impression as the mark or wound of what remains to come. Freud suggests that 
Emma‘s ‗proton pseudos‘ would be the experience of going into a shop aged eight and 
being sexually assaulted by the shopkeeper, an earlier memory ‗which she denies 
having had in mind at the moment of Scene 1 [the scene at age twelve]‘, but only recalls 
belatedly. Freud refers to this earlier event as a proton pseudos not because it didn‘t 
occur, but because Emma had not yet taken cognizance of it, nor experienced it as 
traumatic affect. As Freud states, it is only through deferred action that what has 
                                                 
6
 Sigmund Freud, ‗Project for a Scientific Psychology‘ [1895], The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol.I (London: Vintage, 2001), p.353; ‗Entwurf einer 
Psychologie‘, Gesammelte Werke: Nachtragsband Texte aus den Jahren 1885-1938 (Frankfurt am Main, 
Fischer, 1999), p.445. 
 4 
occurred can be experienced as traumatic, and a memory of this traumatic experience 
repressed: ‗We invariably find that a memory is repressed which has only become a 
trauma by deferred action [nachträglich].‘7  
 
Neither of the scenes in the shop – neither at age eight nor at age twelve – can be 
comprehended in their entirety. The former occurs without the affective force that the 
latter will trigger, whilst the latter experience is in part that of an affective force 
inherited from the former. In effect, the movement of deferred action rends both events 
from any full comprehension. Both of these events occur, or are marked, but only 
happen later. Of course, this also means that the first scene is the processing of an 
affective force from an even earlier event, and the latter scene is also the mark of what 
remains to come. Indeed, the logic of Nachträglichkeit suggests even the very earliest of 
traumatic events inform our experiences long after the fact, and that anything 
resembling their full traumatic force remains in a certain sense ‗to come‘. Moreover, 
and as Freud‘s relating of the traumatic history of a people with that of the individual in 
Moses and Monotheism perhaps demonstrates, the inherent incalculability of the event – 
in that one cannot account for it on the basis of fully experiencing it at the instant of its 
occurrence – renders it impossible to definitively assign the cause or origin of what 
nevertheless creates a certain traumatic effect. This incalculable experience of the 
traumatic event means that trauma is suffered as the force and potential of what remains 
to come. 
  
As the temporal aporia which structures both Freud‘s speculation on the formation of 
Jewish monotheistic religion, and his conceptualisation of the traumatized individual, 
Nachträglichkeit can be seen as the hinge upon which the study of trauma sways 
undecidably between psychoanalysis, literary theory and deconstruction. As the 
mechanism of deferral and delay with which traumatic memory is inscribed, 
Nachträglichkeit also concerns a writing of trauma. As Jacques Derrida has often 
demonstrated, however, the effects of delay and deferral are at work in all writing, and 
thus the notion of Nachträglichkeit also marks a point at which the text can be seen as a 
structuring dimension of traumatic experience. In his essay ‗Différance‘, Derrida refers 
to Nachträglichkeit when demonstrating how the notion of the trace cannot be thought 
                                                 
7
 Sigmund Freud, ‗Project for a Scientific Psychology‘, p.356; ‗Entwurf einer Psychologie‘, p.448. 
 5 
‗on the basis of the present‘.8 It is this supplementary play of the trace which ‗maintains 
our relationship with that which we necessarily misconstrue, and which exceeds the 
alternative of presence and absence‘; thus ‗there are no ―conscious‖ traces‘, and the 
unconscious can only be thought of as a weave of differences which ‗sends out 
delegates, representatives, proxies; but without any chance that the giver of proxies 
might ―exist‖.‘9 In terms of traumatic experience, this would suggest that there can be 
no ‗conscious‘ experience of the event, and that what is thought of as its deferred action 
– or inscription – is rather the supplementary delegate, representative, or proxy of an 
event which cannot be said to ‗exist‘ as such, but which remains irreducible to, or in 
excess of, its trace. As Nachträglichkeit functions according to the logic of deferred 
action, traumatic experience can be thought of in terms of the – paradoxical – return of 
what nevertheless remains to come, a ghost of/from the future. 
 
Marking a confluence between the structural movement of the text and the experience 
of a traumatic event, Freud‘s notion of Nachträglichkeit suggests that the study of 
trauma has a particular relation to deconstructive reading practices, in that when Freud 
describes the deferred action of a traumatic event he recalls the incalculable, 
supplementary and spectral textuality with which deconstruction engages. As Derrida 
suggests that the concepts of Nachträglichkeit and Verspätung [delay] ‗govern the 
whole of Freud‘s thought and determine all his other concepts‘10, the relation between 
deconstruction and psychoanalysis might provoke a writing on, and of, trauma in which 
the experience of violent and disabling affect is not grounded on a metaphysics of 
presence and absence, or life and death, but is considered in terms of a textuality which 
problematizes those oppositions.  
 
                                                 
8
 Jacques Derrida, ‗Différance‘, Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1982), pp.1-27 (p.21); ‗La Différance‘, Marges de la philosophie (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972), 
pp.1-29 (p.22). 
9
 Jacques Derrida, ‗Différance‘, pp.20-21; ‗La Différance‘, pp.21-22. In Of Grammatology, Derrida also 
refers to Freud‘s notion of Nachträglichkeit as he deconstructs Saussure‘s Course in General Linguistics. 
Here he states that Freud‘s term suggests a temporality which ‗cannot be that which lends itself to a 
phenomenology of consciousness or of presence and one may indeed wonder by what right all that is in 
question here should still be called time, now, anterior present delay, etc.‘, see: Jacques Derrida, Of 
Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1976), p.67; De La Grammatologie (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1967), p.98. 
10
 Jacques Derrida, ‗Freud and the Scene of Writing‘, trans. Alan Bass, Writing and Difference (London: 
Routledge, 2002), pp.246-91 (p.255); ‗Freud et la scène de l‘écriture‘, L‟écriture et la différence (Paris: 
Éditions du Seuil, 1967), pp.293-340 (p.303). 
 6 
Caruth‘s Unclaimed Experience is undoubtedly an attempt to engage with trauma at the 
level of the text. It is as if she reads the enigma of Freud‘s Moses and Monotheism to be 
that a certain traumatic after-effect lives on through its writing, a writing the full impact 
of which has yet to be understood; an uncanny telegraphing of or from what remains to 
come. There remains, then, a necessity to keep returning to the texts which attempt to 
write (on) trauma. Although Caruth does not follow this logic through in her text, she 
begins to approach this unconventional thinking of trauma when she states that the texts 
which she will address in Unclaimed Experience ‗both speak about and speak through 
the profound story of traumatic experience.‘11 It is no coincidence, then, that in an 
impassioned defence of Caruth‘s work in 2002, Shoshana Felman chooses to highlight 
this double gesture of speaking about and speaking through trauma.
12
 In a footnote to 
her text The Juridical Unconscious, Felman takes up Ruth Leys‘ attack on Caruth‘s 
work for being littered with aporia, omissions, gaps and faults, as well as Leys‘ 
resistance to Caruth‘s reading of a ‗literal‘ instance of trauma as that which cannot be 
experienced as such, but which nevertheless returns in the texts which address it. 
Felman‘s retort likens Leys‘ consideration of the ‗literal‘ to that of the police in Edgar 
Allan Poe‘s The Purloined Letter: ‗If Ruth Leys fails to see or grasp the nature of the 
letter and the nature of the signifier‘s literality in Caruth‘s text, it is because she looks 
for it positivistically and literal-mindedly, as the police precisely do in Poe‘s tale.‘13 In 
Poe‘s tale it is a certain excess the police do not recognize. As his protagonist, Dupin, 
states: ‗Perhaps the mystery is a little too plain [... a] little too self-evident.‘14 The police 
cannot acknowledge what exceeds their regular tactics for searching, as meticulous as 
they are. There is an order of excess which marks the scene, a scene marked by what is 
yet to arrive à la lettre.
15
  
 
In a sense Leys finds the notion of a literal inscription of trauma – as the marker of what 
is yet to be experienced – as something uncomfortably or uncannily ambiguous, as 
something which marks or ghosts an excess which may never return as such. As Felman 
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 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, p.4 (my emphasis). 
12
 See: Shoshana Felman, The Juridical Unconscious (London: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp.173-
182 (fn.3). 
13
 Shoshana Felman, The Juridical Unconscious, pp.179-180. 
14
 Edgar Allan Poe, ‗The Purloined Letter‘, in: Edgar Allan Poe: The Complete Stories (New York: 
Everyman‘s Library, 2002), pp.684-701 (p.685).  
15
 To contextualise this text in terms of psychoanalysis and deconstruction see: John P. Muller & William 
J. Richardson (eds.), The Purloined Poe: Lacan, Derrida, and Psychoanalytic Reading (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988). 
 7 
notes, omissions and gaps in Caruth‘s text are ‗persistently detected‘ and ‗triumphantly 
restored [by Leys] through an obsessively positivistic, self-congratulatory gesture of 
filling in the gaps‘, though, as with the police in Poe‘s text, ‗the letter (at once 
traumatizing and encapsulating the significance of trauma) is not found.‘16 For Felman, 
Leys‘ critique marks a ‗barrenness of insight […a] lack of human depth‘; in contrast, 
Caruth‘s text has a certain ‗vitality and force.‘17 Felman sees, then, a certain life to 
Caruth‘s text, a vitality and force – the might of the future perhaps – which is marked by 
the very gaps, omissions and aporia which confound Leys. It is as if Caruth‘s readings 
are themselves wounded by the events described in the texts it considers, that the text 
marks, suffers and endures the traumatic event as an experience of what nevertheless 
remains in excess of it. Felman‘s footnote is a re-affirmation of Caruth‘s text, itself a 
collage and re-articulation of its enigmatic, irreducible, incalculable formulations. In a 
sense, then, Felman is trying to sustain these impossible figures or phrases against the 
staid academic rivalry and institutionalisation of trauma as demonstrated by Leys: ‗I 
venture to propose that it is precisely the vitality and force of Caruth‘s vision, and, more 
generally, the radicality of trauma itself – the way in which (precisely) the event of 
trauma destabilizes the security of knowledge and strikes at the foundation of the 
institutional prerogatives of what is known – that is experienced as a threat and needs 
thus to be tamed, contained and censored.‘18  
 
Of course, Caruth‘s – and indeed Felman‘s – work on trauma is overdetermined with 
institutional politics, in that it cannot escape attempts to reduce it to the bandwagon that 
it has undoubtedly given rise to. Jumping on that bandwagon might then be seen to 
stabilize or secure one‘s position within an academic field or university department. 
Moreover, as Caruth and Felman‘s work on trauma is indebted to a certain legacy of the 
Yale School, the accusations against de Man‘s wartime collaboration – and in turn 
against the role of deconstruction in the North American humanities – must certainly 
have overdetermined their texts. Indeed, this anxiety can be read in Caruth‘s text:   
 
Recent literary criticism has shown an increasing concern that the 
epistemological problems raised by poststructuralist criticism necessarily 
lead to political and ethical paralysis. The possibility that reference is 
                                                 
16
 Shoshana Felman, The Juridical Unconscious, p.180. 
17
 Shoshana Felman, The Juridical Unconscious, p.177; p.181. 
18
 Shoshana Felman, The Juridical Unconscious, p.181. 
 8 
indirect, and that consequently we may not have direct access to others‘, or 
even our own, histories, seems to imply the impossibility of access to other 
cultures and hence of any means of making political or ethical judgements.
19
 
 
As if to defend deconstruction against what is a massively misguided accusation against 
it, the ‗concern‘ that deconstruction renders all ethical, political and epistemological 
decision impossible provokes Caruth‘s proposal for an engagement with trauma: 
 
To such an argument I would like to contrast a phenomenon that not only 
arises in the reading of literary or philosophical texts but emerges most 
prominently within the wider historical and political realms, that is, the 
peculiar and paradoxical experience of trauma.
20
 
 
On the one hand this can be read as a problematic and unnecessary defence of 
deconstruction. On the other hand, Caruth‘s work on trauma is also an affirmation of the 
necessity of deconstruction if we are to learn how to write (on) trauma as the mark or 
wound of what cannot be experienced as such. What Felman will reaffirm several years 
after the fact as the ‗vitality and force‘ of Caruth‘s text, is perhaps what Caruth is 
alluding to in her suggestion of an engagement with trauma as defence against 
misguided accusations against deconstruction. Though Caruth‘s positioning of her work 
on trauma in relation to an accusation against deconstruction might seem to be a 
problematic attempt to return the possibility of ethical and political decision to 
poststructuralist literary studies, Caruth is also affirming that it is at a certain level of 
the text that the possibility of addressing history as the experience of what remains to 
come – whilst avoiding the reduction of this future to the status of a definitive, or pre-
programmed knowledge – is approached. In the same way that Caruth reads the 
traumatic departures in Freud‘s Moses and Monotheism to be overdetermined by his 
own traumatic departure from Nazi occupied Vienna, what this writing might promise –
 both Freud‘s and Caruth‘s – is not a return to certainty and knowledge, but rather the 
possibility that both life and writing begin (again) with a textuality which always-
already suffers the might – the force and potentiality – of the future.  
 
Considering some of the implications of the essentially paradoxical formulation of 
writing (on) trauma (as both the study and experience of what remains to come) will be 
                                                 
19
 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, p.10. 
20
 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, p.11. 
 9 
the central concern for this thesis. As a knot which will tie these implications together, 
as well as a guiding thread for the thesis, I want to make a distinction between ‗Trauma 
Studies‘ – as a discipline or field of academic study – and a trauma study; the latter 
being that which would suffer and survive trauma as the impression or inscription of 
what remains to come. A trauma study, divided from the beginning by the mark or 
wound of the future, would destabilize any attempt to consolidate or capitalize upon 
trauma through academic and non-academic encounters. Intervening at a point when 
‗Trauma Studies‘ is being put to work as an academic discipline, as the 
institutionalization of a trend, this thesis attempts to affirm an essential relation between 
trauma and textuality, in turn arguing that a trauma study is the very thing which makes 
it impossible to circumscribe or situate a field or discipline of Trauma Studies once and 
for all. 
 
The ‘might’ of suffering and survival 
In ‗Typewriter Ribbon‘, an essay given at a conference ‗à propos‘ Paul de Man‘s 
Aesthetic Ideology, Derrida suggests a certain unconventional notion of ‗trauma‘, one 
which links it to the ‗event‘. Derrida is considering de Man‘s readings of Rousseau‘s 
Confessions, and a particular event which informs them: the theft of a ribbon committed 
when Rousseau was sixteen, the blame for which he allows to be assigned to the woman 
to whom he wanted to give the ribbon, Marion. As Derrida states: 
 
this theft, which is […] confessed in Book 2 of the Confessions, was, by 
Rousseau‘s own admission, a determining event, a structuring theft, a 
wound, a trauma, an endless scarring, the repeated access to the experience 
of guilt and to the writing of the Confessions.
21
 
 
As that which drives Rousseau‘s subsequent attempts at confession, Derrida stresses 
that the ‗eventness of the event‘ must somehow insist ‗on the arbitrary, fortuitous, 
                                                 
21
 Jacques Derrida, ‗Typewriter Ribbon: Limited Ink (2)‘, trans. Peggy Kamuf, in Without Alibi, ed. 
Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), pp.71-160 (p.82). Derrida has indirectly 
worked on the notion of trauma in several texts, see for example: Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen (eds.), 
Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005); 
Jacques Derrida, Glas, trans. John P. Leavey, Jr., and Richard Rand (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1986); Jacques Derrida, ‗Circumfession‘, trans. Geoffrey Bennington in: Geoffrey Bennington and 
Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida (London: The University of Chicago Press: 1993); Jacques Derrida, 
‗Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides‘, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas in: Giovanna 
Borradori (ed), Philosophy in a Time of Terror (London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp.85-
136; Jacques Derrida, ‗Let us not Forget – Psychoanalysis‘, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel 
Bolwby, Oxford Literary Review, vol.12, nos. 1-2 (1990), pp. 3-7. 
 10 
contingent, aleatory, unforeseeable‘.22 If the event – in this case, the theft – is to retain 
its possibility as a singular occurrence, as well as the possibility of confessing to it, 
absolving oneself of its effects, or of writing (on) it as such, it should also remain 
impossible or unforeseeable, the very thing which cannot be reduced once and for all to 
its inscription. Referring to de Man, Derrida suggests he  
 
associates this feeling of arbitrariness with the experience of threat, cruelty, 
suffering in dismemberment, decapitation, disfiguration, or castration (the 
abundance of whose figures he isolates in Rousseau).
23
 
 
Indeed, de Man writes that this arbitrary threat ‗more than warrants the anxiety with 
which Rousseau acknowledges the lethal quality of writing‘, as writing ‗always includes 
the moment of dispossession in favour of the arbitrary power of the play of the 
signifier‘.24 The threat of arbitrary detachment, the detachment from a text one might 
attempt to author, would make any intention to confess one‘s guilt – or innocence – a 
precarious act from the beginning.  
  
De Man, then, reads an anxiety in Rousseau, an anxiety concerning the power of what 
de Man refers to as a ‗textual event‘ – that which may decapitate, dismember or castrate 
the author at any moment, a writing which may be cut from the control of the author, 
indeed a writing which cuts or interrupts the author. For de Man, the text‘s capacity to 
welcome the unforeseeable, its ‗arbitrary power of the signifier‘, is the very possibility 
of deconstruction, the potential of the text to exceed the intentions or desires of the 
author or authority as such. As Derrida states, de Man ‗wishes to describe what it is in 
deconstruction-dissemination, in what ―is disseminated‖, he says, as ―textual event‖ and 
as anacoluthon ―throughout the entire text‖, that operates independently of and beyond 
any desire.‘25 For de Man, ‗deconstruction-dissemination‘ occurs or happens despite or 
beyond any intention or desire on the part of the author; the text castrates the author, 
and it is this disconnection from any authority figure which conditions the possibility of 
deconstruction. 
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For Derrida, the notion of a ‗textual event‘ being ‗independent of any subject or any 
desire‘ has ‗something irrefutable about it‘:  
 
 If, on the one hand, the event supposes surprise, contingency, or the 
arbitrary […], it also supposes, on the other hand, this exteriority of this 
irreducibility to desire. And therefore it supposes that which makes it 
radically inappropriable, nonreappropriable, radically resistant to the logic of 
the proper. What I have elsewhere called exappropriation concerns this 
work of the inappropriable in desire and in the process of appropriation.
26
  
 
Though de Man sees such a ‗process that takes place independently of any desire‘27 to 
mark the possibility of deconstruction, Derrida suggests there remains another 
conclusion to be read in the text‘s capacity to touch on what cannot be appropriated. 
This other conclusion would maintain a relation between desire and nondesire, a space 
where ‗nondesire haunts every desire and there is between desire and nondesire an 
abyssal attraction rather than a simple exteriority of opposition or exclusion.‘28 Rather 
than de Man‘s reading of deconstruction as that which concerns a ‗textual event‘ – or 
play of the signifier – which is independent of desire, Derrida asks if we might instead 
think of the ‗radically inappropriable, nonreappropriable, radically resistant‘ element of 
the text as taking place in an ‗abyssal attraction‘ between desire and nondesire.  
  
In terms of the subject of desire and the subject of experience (both the ‗subject‘ who 
desires or experiences, as well as the subject or topic of ‗desire‘ and ‗experience‘), and 
in terms of the possibility of the unforeseeable which the text might welcome, this 
provokes ‗another consequence that no doubt goes beyond what de Man himself says or 
would say.‘29 Derrida suggests this further consequence would be that ‗[b]y reason of 
this unforeseeability, this irreducible and inappropriable exteriority for the subject of 
experience, every event as such would be traumatic.‘30 It is the suggestion that every 
event must in some way be traumatic that I want to explore with this thesis. Derrida‘s 
suggestion proposes a notion of trauma which is beyond its more conventional 
reception; if the event as such is traumatic, this would include even ‗an event 
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experienced as a ―happy‖ one‘.31 Derrida is aware of the problems in which such an 
unconventional notion of trauma and the traumatic might result, but he also suggests the 
necessity of thinking the unconventional in light of the burgeoning academic and non-
academic appropriation of trauma:  
 
This does, I concede, confer on the word ―trauma‖ a generality that is as 
fearsome as it is extenuating. But perhaps we have a double consequence 
that must be drawn in the face of the speculative inflation to which the word 
is today subject. Understood in this sense, trauma is that which makes 
precarious any distinction between the point of view of the subject and what 
is produced independently of desire. It makes precarious even the use and 
the sense of all these words.
32
 
 
Derrida‘s suggestion extends a ‗fearsome‘ generality to the term ‗trauma‘. It is the event 
‗as such‘ which is traumatic; traumatism is the condition of the event‘s ‗happening‘: 
‗An event is traumatic or it does not happen, does not arrive [Un événement est 
traumatique ou il n‟arrive pas].‘33 At the same time, trauma renders precarious the 
distinction between the subject (of desire and experience) and the unforeseeable event. 
What might be desired or experienced as desire might also be wholly other to desire; 
thus it is the border between desire as what one might want to happen or arrive 
(arriver), and nondesire – or what remains beyond a logic of desire – which is uncertain 
here. 
 
Derrida suggests that on the precarious border between desire and nondesire ‗even the 
use and the sense of all these words‘ are rendered unstable. The suggestion that an 
‗event is traumatic or it does not happen‘ makes it impossible to reduce the event to the 
subject‘s point of view, or, that the subject‘s point of view – their intention, or what 
they might experience or desire – is impossible to define in terms of an event which 
might disrupt that experience or desire in advance. Of course, this also makes the very 
notion of the ‗subject‘ – as a unified entity organised by its experiences and desires – 
precarious. For Derrida then, the event  
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injures desire, whether or not desire desires or does not desire what happens. 
It is that which, within desire, constitutes it as possible and insists there 
while resisting it, as the impossible: some outside, irreducibly, as some 
nondesire, some death, and something inorganic, the becoming possible of 
the impossible as im-possible. Inappropriability of the other.
34
 
 
The event always ‗injures‘ or wounds desire. The event occurs ‗within desire‘, whether 
it is desired or not, but it remains an ‗outside‘, wholly other to desire, ‗some nondesire, 
some death, and something inorganic.‘ Irreducible to the organism, to the organic or 
organised body of the subject, to their ‗point of view‘, the beyond desire ‗within desire‘ 
makes desire possible whilst resisting it. This element of nondesire within desire, the 
wholly inappropriable which makes desire possible and resists it, remains the very 
possibility of the future for Derrida. It is the possibility that something might happen, an 
element of potentiality, of difference or différance which is folded into everything 
which might seem pre-programmed, predictable, appropriable or calculable.
35
 
 
This is how Derrida can say that the event ‗injures‘ desire, ‗whether or not desire desires 
or does not desire what happens.‘ The event wounds desire as the mark of what cannot 
be desired in advance. The event is thus a threat, to desire, to the notion of the present or 
the past, and to the notion of the subject; hence ‗the event is traumatic or it does not 
happen‘. Moreover, if the event must remain somehow unforeseeable, then it must 
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always come from an unpredictable future, thus what will be, or more (and less) 
precisely, what might be traumatic, must also come from the future. In a dialogue with 
Giovanna Borradori, ostensibly concerned with the event referred to as ‗9/11‘, but more 
generally the notion of global terror, Derrida discusses this unconventional chronology 
of trauma: 
 
The ordeal of the event has as its tragic correlate not what is presently 
happening or what has happened in the past but the precursory signs of what 
threatens to happen. It is the future that determines the unappropriability of 
the event, not the present or the past. Or at least, if it is the present or the 
past, it is only insofar as it bears on its body the terrible sign of what might 
or perhaps will take place, which will be worse than anything that has ever 
taken place.
36
 
 
It is not the present or the past which determines the traumatic event, or if it is, the 
present or the past must somehow bear the ‗terrible sign‘ (perhaps a mark or wound) of 
an uncertain potentiality of the future, of ‗what might or perhaps will take place [my 
emphasis]‘. On the one hand, the event always comes from the future as wholly 
unforeseeable and singular. On the other hand, such a future has already left its mark. 
What is wholly unforeseeable and singular, and what must therefore come from an 
unforeseeable future, could also be the repetition of something that has already 
happened. The condition of the future – the wholly unpredictable and singular event to 
come – is also a consideration of what might have already occurred. Again, a 
paradoxical chronology infiltrates the notion of the event: it is that which might have 
occurred, as well as being what is yet to happen, thus both a repetition and a singularity.  
 
When Derrida speaks of the ‗worst‘ here, he is on the one hand speaking in the context 
of the aftermath of ‗9/11‘, but on the other hand, as he will go on to explain, he is 
referring to a logic that has been apparent since at least the ‗Cold War‘. A traumatic 
event would suggest that the worst remains to come, but the present or the past 
somehow bears the wound of this worst to come, and thus the worst to come might also 
be the paradoxical or mechanical return of what has not yet happened. Such a 
contradictory logic would complicate the work of mourning: 
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Imagine that the Americans and, through them, the entire world, had been 
told: what has just happened, the spectacular destruction of the two towers, 
the theatrical but invisible deaths of thousands of people in just a few 
seconds, is an awful thing, a terrible crime, a pain without measure, but it‘s 
all over, it won‘t happen again, there will never again be anything as awful 
as or more awful than that. I assume that mourning would have been 
possible in a relatively short period of time. Whether to our chagrin or to our 
delight, things would have quickly returned to their normal course in 
ordinary history. […] But this is not what happened. There is traumatism 
with no possible work of mourning when the evil comes from the possibility 
to come of the worst, from the repetition to come – though worse.37  
 
The work of mourning is complicated when traumatism remains to come; we cannot 
―get over‖ what has not yet happened. But this also suggests the possibility of an ‗im-
possible‘ work of mourning. As noted above, the injurious event remains an outside 
within desire, it is the ‗becoming possible of the impossible as im-possible‘.38 Derrida 
hyphenates the word ‗impossible‘ to render what he terms a ‗non-negative im-
possible.‘39 This would be an ‗im-possibility‘ which survives the opposition between 
possibility and impossibility. Rather than the possibility of a completed work of 
mourning, or alternatively, an infinite melancholy, Derrida‘s suggestion that the worst 
remains to come seems to call for an im-possible mourning, an im-possible mourning 
for what remains to come, and thus a certain im-possible vigilance towards the future. 
The traumatic event, either a ‗happy‘ one or ‗the worst‘, marks the might of the future – 
as both force and potentiality; a ‗might‘ inscribed on the body of what we term ‗present‘ 
or ‗past‘. What we think of as present or past, therefore, would paradoxically be marked 
by the after-effects (the wounds) of an event which remains to come. Such wounds 
would remain open, open towards the future as the possibility of the im-possible. 
  
When Derrida speaks of a ‗body‘ he is referring to that which might ‗bear‘ such an 
uncertain future. In a sense this presupposes a more conventional notion of the event, 
that which is registered as a singular experience by a certain organic or organised body:  
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 It is difficult […] to conceive of a living being to whom or through whom 
something happens without an affection getting inscribed in a sensible, 
aesthetic manner right on some body or some organic matter. 
  Why organic? Because there is no thinking of the event, it seems, 
without some sensitivity, without an aesthetic affect and some presumption 
of living organicity.
40
 
 
And yet, as suggested above, the event may also be a repetition; what may be wholly 
singular and incalculable might also be the duplicate or return of what has already 
occurred. We are concerned here with the structure of memory and/or the archive. In 
order to think or recall what may have already occurred, the body must bear its 
repetition to come. The body, therefore, provides the organic matter upon which the 
might of the event is inscribed, but it must also operate as a certain inorganic archival 
technology, an archival-mechanism capable of reproducing or recalling the event in its 
unique singularity. The body and the event are inextricably entwined here. A body 
which could bear the repetition of a ‗unique‘ event must suffer the ‗might‘ of an event 
which has both already occurred and is yet to come. Such a body/event would live on as 
an im-possible interconnection of matter and potentiality, of organic aesthetic sensitivity 
and inorganic mechanical reproduction – an im-possible figure:  
 
the new figure of an event-machine would no longer be even a figure. It 
would resemble nothing, not even what we call, in a still familiar way, a 
monster. But it would therefore be, by virtue of this very novelty, an event, 
the only and the first possible event, because im-possible.
41
 
 
The body is marked by an unforeseeable ‗to come‘, the body bears the scars of the ‗to 
come‘ as the coming of the event as such, even the ‗happy‘ event. Thus we are dealing 
with a paradoxical body, a body which is hospitable to both the organic and the 
inorganic (mechanical), a body/event which is haunted by the might of what remains to 
come.   
 
––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 
This thesis sets out to explore the relation between writing, trauma, and a ‗body‘ which 
suffers and survives. As noted above, this involves making a distinction between 
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Trauma Studies and a ‗trauma study‘. The thesis will consider this distinction through 
the following themes:  
 
 The spectrality of trauma: Trauma is from the beginning a double operation; it is 
inscribed on the body as the mark of what remains to come. Trauma, therefore, 
can be thought of as divided from the beginning, a ghost effect as the mark of 
what is never present ‗as such‘ – a memory of the future. Trauma is generated 
through the ‗abyssal attraction‘ between desire and non-desire, intention and the 
unforeseeable. That which is wholly undesirable, non-appropriable and wholly 
incalculable haunts intention and desire as the possibility or might of the 
traumatic event. Spectrality is a key figure for deconstruction as it describes the 
inability to reduce the text to the conditions of presence and absence, or figures 
predicated upon that binary opposition. As the notions of presence and absence 
are irreducible to themselves – that is, always-already structured by the other – 
spectrality describes a paradoxically ‗essential‘ textual dimension. Moreover, 
spectrality recalls the supplementary and textual structure of Freud‘s 
Nachträglichkeit. Such an ‗essential‘ textual dimension is, therefore, a key 
figure for questions concerning the possibility of writing (on) trauma. 
 
 A suffering of ‘might’: If the event as such is traumatic, then the body which is 
marked by what remains to come always-already suffers the potentiality and 
force, or the might of the future. Again, the notion of suffering can be read as a 
double operation. The Latin sufferre is comprised of the prefix suf- (sub-), which 
is a taking up or away from – to subduce or subduct – so as to subsist or even 
subvert, whilst ferre means ‗to bear‘.42 Sufferre would thus allude to a taking up 
or enduring of a present state in order to substitute, subvert or overturn it for the 
future. Suffering is thus both passive and active; the passive bearing or enduring 
of a mark or wound in order to actively subvert or substitute that state for one to 
come. Thus to suffer would be to both passively and actively bear the might of 
the future. 
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 Survival as ‘living on’: To suffer would be to survive the wound for the sake of a 
future ‗to come‘. A traditional notion of survival would perhaps be the notion of 
living on after an event, of surviving it. But by following Derrida‘s use of the 
term, it is possible to consider survival or ‗living on‘ as the promise of the 
future. Such a future would not bring an end to the work of mourning, where the 
past would be survived in order to live fully in the present. Rather, survival as 
‗living on‘ would be the endurance, bearing or suffering of the mark or wound 
as the very possibility of the future. Although I discuss this notion of survival in 
more detail in Chapter One, a late interview in Le Monde stresses the importance 
of the term for Derrida: ‗[a]ll the concepts that have helped me in my work, and 
notably that of the trace or of the spectral, were related to this ―surviving‖ 
[―survivre‖] as a structural and rigorously original dimension.‘43 For Derrida, 
‗living on' is a quasi-originary textuality, a textual dimension which survives the 
opposition between life and death as the condition of possibility for both.  
 
 Historical and structural trauma: An enduring question, not least for the notion 
of trauma, is how to think the relation between the historical and the structural. 
Again, this is a question of the inorganic and organic, the machine and the event, 
or how to ‗think together the machine and the event, a machinelike repetition 
and what happens? What happens to what? To whom?‘44 How to think together 
the ‗who‘ and the ‗what‘ remains an intriguing question for Derrida.45 In terms 
of the subject of trauma this would be the question of how to think the relation 
between the traumatic historical event as what happens to the individual as their 
particular experience, and – in terms of the individual as theorized by 
psychoanalysis – the structural trauma of events which mark the formation of 
the psyche.
46
 The traumatic event would thus mark the entwinement of the 
‗who‘ and the ‗what‘, the particular and general. The body would suffer and be 
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marked by the experience of a particular traumatic event, but subjectivity as 
theorized by psychoanalysis would be a general structure, infinitely repeatable 
and thus retaining a certain mechanicity. The body which suffers and survives 
the ‗might‘ of the future would, therefore, bear or endure a ‗machinelike 
repetition and what happens‘. 
  
Chapter One reads Chris Marker‘s 1962 film La Jetée. Marker‘s film concerns the story 
of a man who, as a child, witnesses a traumatic event. That event was his own murder, 
the trauma of which is both marked and deferred by the image of a woman seen 
moments before. From the film‘s opening scene, then, this image haunts the man as the 
mark or wound of what remains to come (his death). Patrick Ffrench suggests that 
‗[f]rom the start, [La Jetée‘s] narrative programmes the death of the protagonist as the 
encounter with a memory in the form of an image which is as if inflicted upon him.‘47 
Chapter One argues that the film also resists this pre-programmed future. In both its 
structure and its narrative, La Jetée suffers the mark of the future as what remains 
irreducible to a conventional narrative or plot, as well as conventional structures of film 
(La Jetée is constructed by filming ‗still‘ images). Considering both its plot and its 
structure, this chapter suggests that La Jetée experiences the traumatic event as that 
which inscribes and exceeds it. Chapter One explores this ‗essential‘ dimension of the 
film in terms of the paradoxical structure of the traumatic event as elaborated above. As 
the image of woman is a central theme of the film, indeed, that which marks it from the 
beginning, this chapter also explores the relation between the traumatic event and 
questions of sexual difference. 
 
As La Jetée shares many aesthetic and thematic motifs with the work of Alfred 
Hitchcock, and in particular his film Vertigo, Chapter One‘s consideration of La Jetée 
takes in Hitchcock‘s film, and the critical readings of it, in order to suggest a certain 
ghostly incorporation of Marker and Hitchcock‘s texts – each film in the other. This 
extension of each into the other is a recurring theme in this chapter, a structural motif 
which I develop by concentrating on a particular scene which occurs in both films: a 
scene involving the cross-section of a Sequoia tree. Reading Derrida‘s comments on 
film, and his notion of a theoretical ‗jetty‘, as well as his consideration of survival, or 
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living on, allows me to discuss these scenes as sites where the films are marked by what 
remains to come. Moreover, by referring to Tom Cohen‘s ‗spectrographic‘ reading of 
Hitchcock in his two volume Hitchcock‟s Cryptonymies, I suggest the Sequoia scenes 
can be thought in terms of Hitchcockian ‗signature effect‘, a mark which suffers or 
survives the might of the other, or the mark of an irreducible future. In turn, Chapter 
One reads an essential ‗living on‘ or incorporation of the other to be the very condition 
of the La Jetée, as well as the possibility of reading it in terms of a trauma study.  
  
Thinking the notion of the traumatic event in terms of a (textual) body marked by what 
remains ‗to come‘, suggests the centrality of a certain imminence. Chapter Two reads 
the notion of imminence in terms of how the text inscribes the promise of what remains 
to come. It situates this in terms of a trauma study by considering the work of Roland 
Barthes, and more precisely, how his later work attempts to affirm what remains wholly 
other, without reducing that otherness to the platitudes of literary/critical theory and 
analysis. I focus on Barthes‘s late essay on Stendhal, a text overdetermined by the loss 
of Barthes‘s mother. In this essay Barthes describes the ‗romanesque lie‘ of Stendhal‘s 
later novels, a lie ‗which would be – miraculously – both the detour of truth and the 
finally triumphant expression of his Italian passion‘.48 I argue, therefore, that Barthes is 
describing how the novel manages to express or write (on) an event which remains to 
come, to happen, or to arrive as such. In order to figure this relation between expression 
and imminence, Chapter Two argues that Barthes takes up and re-reads the notion of the 
imaginary, and that it is through this re-reading of the imaginary that both Barthes‘s and 
Stendhal‘s writing can be thought of in terms of a trauma study. This chapter suggests 
that, in his re-reading of the imaginary, Barthes describes a position from which to 
await the otherness of the event without pre-programming its thinking or reception, a 
place from which what must remain imminent can also be expressed, or written (on). 
  
A central term for Chapter Two is ‗transference‘. It might be useful, therefore, to give a 
brief resume of this enigmatic notion. Laplanche and Pontalis state that ‗[a]s a rule what 
psycho-analysts mean by the unqualified use of the term ‗transference‘ is transference 
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during treatment.‘49 In psychoanalytic treatment the relation between analysand and 
analyst mirrors an earlier relation for the analysand and, through counter-transference, 
for the analyst. This occurs to such a degree that ‗infantile prototypes re-emerge and are 
experienced with a strong sense of immediacy.‘50 The analytic situation provokes the 
transference of unconscious affect from an earlier relationship to a current one. What it 
is important to note here is that transference also seems to be structured by a certain 
deferred action. In terms of how this thesis considers writing on, and the writing of, 
trauma, it is with transference that the ‗effects‘ of what remains to come are reactivated, 
where a body inscribed by what returns from the future will suffer those essentially 
spectral returns. Transference, then, is an operation in which the body experiences what 
nevertheless remains wholly other. Chapter Two reads how Barthes follows Stendhal‘s 
transferential search for a loved and lost other in his relation to the figure of ‗Italy‘, and 
how what began as a naïve search for the loved and lost object in his early travel 
journals, becomes a writing whose ‗triumphant‘ expression of ‗Italian‘ passion is 
structured by the return of what must nevertheless remain imminent.  
  
Whilst Chapter Two focuses on the notion of imminence, Chapter Three reads Hélène 
Cixous‘s Le jour où je n‟étais pas là in order to consider the notion of arrivance. 
Arrivance is a term Derrida explores in H.C. pour la vie, c‟est à dire…, a text which 
reads Cixous‘s work. In this text Derrida refers to the way in which Cixous ‗makes/lets 
come‘ the arrivance of the arrivant. Whilst the arrivant refers to the wholly other ‗to 
come‘, Derrida uses arrivance to describe the coming of what remains ‗to come‘; the 
tracing, expression and experience of what remains imminent. Reading Totem and 
Taboo, Derrida considers Freud‘s fleeting reference to ‗animatism‘ [‗Belebtheit‟], a pre-
animistic general theory of life. Akin to the notion of survivre, Derrida reads Belebtheit 
as an originary ‗livingness‘ which survives the opposition between life and death. It is 
as an affirmation of such a dimension that Derrida considers Cixous‘s texts as having 
the power to make/let arrive – indeed, give life to – what remains irreducible to 
knowledge (I refer to this as a certain arrivivance).  
 
Derrida reads Cixous‘s texts as the experience of an irreducible otherness, an excess of 
the text which, paradoxically, her writing makes/lets arrive. For him, Cixous‘s writing 
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experiments with this experience in the most intimate of analyses, to such an extent that 
what appears to be the most vivid of experiences is also the most serious of studies. 
With its reading of Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, then, Chapter Three considers the 
traumatic event in terms of a writing which is both its experience and its study. Derrida 
describes a certain power of Cixous‘s texts to effect such a paradoxical or aporetic 
manoeuvre. He reads her uncanny ability to make/let the other come as a certain ‗might‘ 
or ‗puisse‘. Though passim in this thesis, Chapter Three considers the notion of ‗might‘ 
– as the force and potential of what remains to come – in most detail. In terms of a 
trauma study, this chapter suggests that Le jour où je n‟étais pas là is the active/passive 
making/letting happen of the traumatic event, that this ‗essentially‘ ambiguous ‗might‘ 
makes what might arrive, arrive. I argue that this incalculable entwinement of activity 
and passivity means the text suffers and survives as the making/letting come of what 
remains ‗to come‘. It is with this essentially unstable structure that Cixous‘s text 
demonstrates how a trauma study must remain the possibility of the im-possible. 
Chapter Three concludes with the suggestion that the inscription of what remains to 
come, the making/letting arrive of what remains to arrive ‗as such‘, or the arrivance of 
the arrivant, requires the might of a certain feminine writing, the irreducible power 
Cixous generates through what Derrida refers to as the ‗writing of her language‘.51  
 
As experiments in the ‗im-possible‘, I will argue that the texts considered in this thesis 
are written both ‗on and through trauma‘. Traumatically unstable, both an experience 
and the study of what remains irreducible to them, such texts affirm a writing which 
survives the binaries of life/death, study/experience, and fiction/theory. Such an 
experimental writing would be marked or wounded by the might of the traumatic event. 
Inscribed, traced, or spectralized by what remains to come, these texts suffer, survive or 
live on as memories of the future. As Derrida‘s unconventional suggestion that all 
events as such are traumatic, this thesis alludes to a certain unconventional notion of 
suffering and survival. By demonstrating how suffering and survival – or living on – is 
effected through a ‗body‘ which bears the might of what must remain a wholly 
unforeseeable future, this thesis will argue that because there could be no definitive 
status of the traumatic event, or a body which experiences it, the inscription of trauma – 
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as the wound of what remains to come – is divided from the beginning. A trauma study 
must affirm this force and potentiality of and from the future, this essentially spectral 
dimension, ensuring that we could never be done with thinking, studying and 
experiencing the traumatic event. Chapter One begins by taking this essentially unstable 
platform as its point of departure. 
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1. 
 
LA JETÉE: 
SUFFERING AND SURVIVAL… ‗AVEC UN PEU DE VERTIGE‘ 
 
 
It is for me a question, rather, of what remains to be 
thought, done, lived, suffered, with or without bliss, 
but without alibi, beyond even what could be called 
a horizon and a task, thus beyond what remains not 
only necessary but possible. 
Jacques Derrida
1
 
 
 
And it ‗starts‘ only with living on. 
Jacques Derrida
2
 
 
In Chris Marker‘s short film La Jetée,3 the word ‗jetée‘ is perhaps most clearly 
associated with the long corridors which house the arrival and departure gates at 
airports, as it is on the observation deck of one of these satellite arms that the film both 
begins and ends.
4
 A ‗jetée‘ is the French word for what English speakers might call a 
‗jetty‘, or perhaps a ‗pier‘. Stemming from the Old French ‗getee‘, which refers to ‗the 
action of throwing‘, a ‗jetée‘ or ‗jetty‘ can mean a form of harbour defense, that which 
negotiates with the stronger currents of the water in order to protect a particularly 
vulnerable part of the bank. As a fortified extension to the bank, a ‗jetty‘ is often used as 
a supplementary shore, a space which is both essential to and in excess of the shore; 
both part of the shore and no longer the shore. But a ‗jetty‘ can also precede itself; 
synonymous with an ‗outwork‘, ‗starling‘ or ‗mole‘, a ‗jetty‘ can refer to the timber or 
stone which protects its main structure – a pier for the pier, so to speak.5 A ‗jetée‘ or 
‗jetty‘, therefore, might both supplement the coast (as that which extends it whilst 
keeping it in reserve) and – as an ‗outwork‘ – precede and protect the protection: a 
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supplement of the supplement. A ‗jetty‘ would both defend and extend the shore, 
through a consolidation which is at the same time a projection. Extending into sea and 
shore, whilst defending each from the other, this supplementary construction would 
make precarious the border between the spaces it purports to keep apart, as well as the 
status of those very spaces. 
  
In an essay which reads La Jetée in terms of ‗the memory of the image‘, Patrick Ffrench 
suggests that Marker‘s film might be seen to take place  
 
as if between the beginning and end of a single sentence; it begins: ‗Ceci est 
l‘histoire d‘un homme marqué par une image d‘enfance [This is the story of 
a man, marked by an image from his childhood]‘, and ends with what we 
might imagine as a subordinate clause of this sentence, ‗cet instant qu‘il lui 
avait été donné de voir enfant, et qui n‘avait pas cessé de l‘obséder, c‘était 
celui de sa propre mort [this moment he had been granted to watch as a 
child, which had never ceased to obsess him, was the moment of his own 
death]‘.6 
 
Ffrench is referring to the protagonist of the film, a man who, as a child, witnesses his 
own death. The film opens with the scene of the child witnessing the murder, and closes 
with the man realising that this murder was his own. For the duration of the film then, 
the man is marked, wounded or traumatised by an image of what has both occurred and 
is yet to happen; he is marked by an event which he has experienced, and yet remains to 
come. With this in mind, there seems to be a conflicting structure to the film, one which 
we can describe in grammatical terms. On the one hand the word ‗jetée‘ marks an 
unstable, double platform, extending into what remains beyond it, whilst protecting 
itself from that beyond: the man has both experienced and is yet to experience his own 
death, which is also not his own as he witnesses it as the child. On the other hand we 
have the conventional sentence structure which neatly brackets the film, a relatively 
stable platform from which the film takes off and to which it returns. La Jetée, 
therefore, resembles both an avant-garde, with its aesthetically sensitive and organic 
surface the impression of an unforeseeable future, as well as the mechanical, and 
indeed, capitalist, economy of expenditure and return. Both organic originality and 
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inorganic repetition, the film marks the return of the non-desire (an inappropriable 
otherness) which haunts every desiring, intentional or experiencing body.
7
  
 
This chapter argues that it is the impossibility of resolving these two contradictory 
structures which allows for the possibility of a certain study of trauma, the study of an 
event of which there is an impression, but of that which also remains to come. 
Following Jacques Derrida‘s suggestion that the event must remain ‗traumatic‘ for it to 
be possible at all, this chapter will demonstrate how La Jetée suffers the traumatic event 
as the impression of what remains to come, and in turn how it survives or lives on as the 
possibility of the impossible. Moreover, by suggesting that the suffering and survival of 
what remains to come is the very condition of a trauma study, this chapter will 
demonstrate that a trauma study must itself resemble the possibility of the impossible.   
 
 1.1 An art/science/séance of the spectral 
Haunted by an inappropriable otherness, La Jetée is marked by what has never been 
present. This would suggest a ghostly return, but because it would be the return of what 
has never been fully lived or experienced in the present, or a past present, such a return 
would always come from the future. Before reading Marker‘s film in more detail, it is 
necessary to outline some of the reasons why this thesis begins with a chapter 
considering film, or more precisely, why a particular approach to film might help 
elucidate the structures, logics or dimensions with which we must engage if we are to 
think La Jetée in terms of that which is haunted by the future. 
 
Derrida refers to the particular relation between film and the ghost in Ken McMullen‘s 
film Ghost Dance; he suggests that cinema – ‗when it‘s not boring‘ – is the ‗art of 
ghosts, a battle of phantoms‘, that cinema concerns ‗the art of allowing ghosts to come 
back [un art de laissez revenir du fantôme].‘8 What it is important to note here is that 
Derrida is talking about a general spectral dimension with which film has a particularly 
important engagement. Cinema does not produce the spectral as such, but allows what is 
already spectral to return. Indeed, though discussing the art of cinema Derrida is also 
talking about the ghost in general. When asked if he believes in ghosts, Derrida states 
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that the interviewer – and by implication the film – is ‗asking a ghost whether he 
believes in ghosts‘.9 Self and other entwine here: Derrida has been asked to play 
‗himself [mon propre rôle]‘ in Ghost Dance (a film intended to be at least partly 
‗improvised‘). He must, therefore, believe he is speaking in his own voice. Yet it is with 
this attempt to play himself that a ghost – a certain other – returns: 
 
Since I‘ve been asked to play myself, in a film which is more or less 
improvised, I feel as if I‘m letting a ghost speak for me. Curiously, instead 
of playing myself, without knowing it, I let a ghost ventriloquize my words, 
or play my role […].10 
 
In believing that he is playing ‗himself‘, Derrida lets – without knowing it – the other 
speak for him. Thus it is difficult to answer a question which asks a ghost if he believes 
in ghosts, as in believing one is actually being oneself, one lets the other speak. For 
Derrida, an art of cinema would be one which engaged with this enigmatic 
question(ing) of the ghost. 
 
Another way to think film‘s particular relation to a general spectral dimension is 
discussed in Robert Smith‘s essay on deconstruction and film. One of the questions 
Smith is concerned with is ‗what is a camera recording when it is recording something 
supposedly present?‘11 He suggests that  
 
whether the present gets recorded or not, its recordability belongs to it, a 
state of affairs which puts the present into relation with itself in the ‗future‘. 
This can only mean that the present is divided from itself: in order to relate 
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to itself over ‗time‘ or whatever this strange new medium is, there must be a 
break, division, space, time, fissure for the present to relate to itself across.
12
 
 
Thus the ‗so-called present fails to be entirely present to itself; it is both deferred from 
itself and divided from itself into a ‗future‘.13 Film, then, could be that which reveals 
this crisis in the state of presence. Indeed, as Smith points out, the very condition of 
recordability is the fact that the present could never be present to itself:  
 
The present recorded by film not only is not present, that is, not fully present 
to itself, but becomes recordable only if it isn‘t… The present has to be 
something other than itself for film to be possible; film depends upon the 
non-identity of the present with itself.
14
 
 
Derrida has discussed this essential division of the present in an interview with Bernard 
Stiegler.
15
 In the context of discussing the possibility of a ‗live‘ interview, as well as a 
particular case of tampering with what appeared to be ‗live‘, Derrida makes a more 
general statement about the possibility of the recorded image being conditioned by the 
impossibility of ever reducing the present to itself: 
 
We see, here, how our present divides itself: the living present is itself 
divided. From now on, it bears death within itself and reinscribes in its own 
immediacy what ought as it were to survive it. It divides itself, in its life, 
between its life and its afterlife, without which there would be no image, no 
recording. There would be no archive without this dehiscence, without this 
divisibility of the living present, which bears its specter within itself. 
Specter, which is also to say, phantasma, ghost [revenant] or possible image 
of the image.
16
 
 
At work here is the same logic Derrida discusses in Ghost Dance: in order to ‗play 
itself‘, so to speak, the present must be divided from the beginning. Such an essential 
division is the condition of a belief in the present, in the live, or in the living. Being 
haunted or marked by itself as other, bearing the mark of its own death, is the very thing 
which makes a belief in the living present possible.  
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Smith demonstrates the notion of an ‗essentially‘ spectral present with a reading of the 
film Jurassic Park, a film which is already concerned with the return of what people 
believed were long dead, the dinosaurs. Smith suggests that should a camera have been 
invented early enough, the dinosaurs would have been filmed: ‗Had a camera been 
trained on them they could and would have been recorded.‘17 Yet by following the 
suggestion that a certain spectrality is the condition of the recordable, ‗the recordability 
of dinosaurs implies they were never fully present.‘18 Although ‗they ‗existed‘ in a 
certain sense‘, it is a sense which gives ‗no reassurance as to their presence‘: 
 
If they were recordable they were non-self-identical and already divided 
from themselves, deferring themselves anachronistically across time. In a 
sense they were already cloned. For all its innovativeness Jurassic Park 
merely tells a story instantiating what was already true. Anachronism 
belonged to the dinosaur in its own time – just as it belongs to every 
‗present‘ thing.19 
 
Smith‘s choice of words is telling here. He states that Jurassic Park ‗instantiates‘ what 
is already true. As Derrida discusses in his text Demeure, to testify to an ‗instant‘ is an 
act essentially divided from itself. To record or archive a singular instant, which is in a 
sense to testify to it in a wholly singular fashion, is at the same time to universalise that 
instant, to make that singular moment repeatable for others. In discussing the 
paradoxical structure of testimony, Derrida describes how: 
 
The irreplaceable must allow itself to be replaced on the spot. In saying: I 
swear to tell the truth, where I have been the only one to see or hear and 
where I am the only one who can attest to it, this is true to the extent that 
anyone who in my place, at that instant, would have seen or heard or touched 
the same thing and could repeat exemplarily, universally, the truth of my 
testimony.
20
 
 
Of course, this structure is also that of the camera, that which records or testifies to a 
singular moment in order to make it available for others through a potentially infinite 
repetition.  
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Returning to Smith‘s argument, what ‗belongs‘ to the dinosaurs, what is proper to them 
(the present as their ‗own‘ time), or even the belief in this present and/or what is proper 
to it, is divided by its very instantiation. Hence it is impossible to say for definite that 
the dinosaurs were ‗already cloned‘, and thus that ‗[f]or all its innovativeness Jurassic 
Park merely tells a story instantiating what was already true‘, as this ‗merely‘ is our 
only possible encounter with this supposedly pre-filmic truth. The belief in the present 
demands as its condition that the present is haunted by what it is not, thus the other 
might always speak in place of the one who believes themselves present. Although this 
haunting is a general dimension, a spectrality as the condition for thinking or believing 
in the present, Jurassic Park is here the particular engagement with this general 
dimension as that which makes it possible. There is no access to a general spectral 
dimension without a particular engagement with it, and there is no general spectral 
dimension – as a universal truth – which pre-exists this particular engagement. As its art 
or technique, the particular and universal are irreducibly entwined in the film. Thus the 
‗merely‘ with which Smith describes Jurassic Park actually signifies the particular art 
of cinema as an art of the spectral, the very art which produces the ‗[a]nachronism 
[which Smith claims] belonged to the dinosaur in its own time – just as it belongs to 
every ‗present‘ thing.‘21 
 
The art of cinema also suggests a curious interaction between what is considered 
conscious and unconscious; the spectrality of cinema means that it is impossible to be 
certain of what is conscious or unconscious at any particular moment. When one 
consciously believes they are playing themselves, they are also letting a certain 
unconscious other speak. Similarly, when a moment or scene seems to be concerned 
entirely with the present, there is also the possibility that at that moment the other has 
returned in its place. Cinema is an art which engages with this spectral dimension, a 
medium which allows the potential return of our unconscious ghosts. Such a return of 
the unconscious suggests a particular relation between film and psychoanalysis, a 
relation which Derrida describes in Ghost Dance:  
 
All this, it seems to me, has to do with an exchange between the art of 
cinema, in its most original, unedited form [plus inouï, plus inédit], and an 
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aspect of psychoanalysis [quelque chose du psychanalyse]. Cinema plus 
psychoanalysis equals the Science of Ghosts.
22
 
 
At its most extraordinary, incredible, unheard-of, original level [plus inouï, plus inédit], 
an art of cinema forms an ‗exchange‘ with an ‗aspect‘ or ‗something‘ [quelque chose] of 
psychoanalysis, an exchange which results in a ‗Science of Ghosts‘. Derrida‘s 
suggestion is enigmatic on several levels. Rather than the simple addition of cinema and 
psychoanalysis, this is an exchange between an ‗original‘ dimension of cinema and a 
certain ‗something‘ of psychoanalysis. It is as though Derrida is trying to leave space 
for that ‗something‘ to return to his calculation, and, similarly, that an art of cinema 
would also leave space for that ‗something‘, a ‗something‘ which cannot be calculated, 
but which remains part of the equation. Moreover, in French the word ‗science‘ is 
almost homophonic with ‗séance‘. When Derrida talks of a ‗Science of Ghosts‘, then, 
he also conjures a ghostly séance, a meeting or session of ghosts, or a performance by 
ghosts. As art, science and séance, an extraordinary and original dimension of cinema, 
and a certain ‗something‘ of psychoanalysis, irreducibly intertwine here.  
 
The enigmatic ‗something‘ of psychoanalysis to which Derrida alludes might be read in 
terms of the very ‗thing‘ psychoanalysis itself attempts to engage: the concept, or logic, 
of the unconscious. The ‗something‘ which Derrida cannot name here, but which forms 
an exchange with an art of cinema, might be the unconscious of psychoanalysis, that 
indefinite ‗something‘ of psychoanalysis which is marked in its interruption of the 
world, but which remains enigmatic. Derrida talks about the necessity – and paradox – 
of remembering what is perhaps irreducible to memory in ‗Let us not Forget – 
Psychoanalysis‘, a brief text given as an introduction to a paper by René Major at a 
conference in 1988. In this text – again, something largely improvised – Derrida talks of 
psychoanalysis in terms of a trauma which interrupted philosophical discourse in the 
60s and 70s, a time when psychoanalysis was ‗in fashion‘, ‗when it had pushed 
philosophy far away from the centre, obliging philosophical discourse to reckon with a 
logic of the unconscious, at the risk of allowing its most basic certainties to be 
dislodged, at the risk of suffering the expropriation of its ground, its axioms, its norms 
and its language.‘23 In this sense psychoanalysis was a traumatic event which happened 
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to philosophical discourse, and which shook the supposedly secure reason upon which 
most of it was based – in a sense psychoanalysis made philosophy suffer.  
 
In ‗Let us not Forget – Psychoanalysis‘ Derrida is concerned with a certain climate of 
philosophy, one which supposes the traumatic interruption of psychoanalysis has been 
survived, where ‗people are starting to behave as though it was nothing at all, as though 
nothing had happened, as though taking into account the event of psychoanalysis, a 
logic of the unconscious, of ―unconscious concepts‖, even, were no longer de 
rigueur.‘24 He is concerned that there has been a restoration of reason, and of the 
‗authority of consciousness, of the ego, of the reflexive cogito, of an ‗I think‘ without 
pain or paradox.‘25 Moreover, such a restoration might also suggest it is legitimate to 
‗accuse of obscurity or irrationalism anyone who complicates things a little by 
wondering about the reason of reason, about the history of the principle of reason or 
about the event – perhaps a traumatic one – constituted by something like 
psychoanalysis in reason‘s relation to itself.‘26 Derrida is concerned that the current 
intellectual climate might believe the event of psychoanalysis, a certain traumatic aspect 
of psychoanalysis, has been survived and/or worked through.  
 
With this in mind, might it be possible to think of that ‗something‘ of psychoanalysis, 
that aspect of psychoanalysis which Derrida suggests forms an exchange with an art of 
cinema, as the very trauma psychoanalysis introduces to thinking, an unconscious 
aspect – or ‗something‘ – of psychoanalysis which cannot be reduced to reason, even if 
that reason takes the form of ‗normal‘ psychoanalytical theory? Thus a particular 
art/science/séance of ghosts – as an art/science/séance of cinema – negotiates with a 
‗logic of the unconscious‘. Cinema would here form an exchange with a traumatic and 
unconscious ‗aspect‘ of psychoanalysis as an event which has occurred to thinking, but 
which remains to be thought or worked though. It might be possible, therefore, to think 
of ‗film‘ as a particular exchange between cinema and psychoanalysis, whilst remaining 
reducible to neither. Film might thus resemble an art/science/séance of ghosts which 
allows the return of – or ‗lives on‘ with – what remains in excess of it. 
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1.2 A ‘theoretical jetty’ 
Film might be a place at which reason is made to suffer, but this would be an 
unconventional suffering, one which occurs at a basic but extraordinary dimension, a 
dimension which bears or lives on with the traumatic event, the unconscious, or the 
other as that which is allowed to return. Film is thus a highly unstable platform from 
which to begin any kind of thesis or study. Neither psychoanalysis nor cinema ‗as such‘, 
but an exchange between aspects of both, film is marked by the ‗might‘ of the future, an 
impression of the force and potential of an other which is allowed to return as that 
which remains divided, and thus also to come. How might we describe this essentially 
spectral place, this place reducible to no place in particular? Well, perhaps as a ‗jetty‘.  
 
In an essay given at a conference aimed at addressing the ‗state‘ or ‗states‘ of ‗theory‘, 
particularly in relation to theory‘s place in the North American University, Derrida uses 
the word ‗jetty‘ whilst referring to a general ‗state‘ of theory: a wholly inappropriable 
‗field of forces‘ comprising ‗libidinal forces, political-institutional or historical-
socioeconomic forces, or concurrent forces of desire and power.‘27 In this field – or 
perhaps ‗sea‘ of uncountable plural forces, Derrida suggests that not only is a ‗state‘ of 
theory impossible to determine ‗as such‘, but also that a table or taxonomy of the 
‗states‘ of theory is equally impossible. For him, there are only ‗theoretical jetties‘, 
where the word ‗jetty‘ would refer ‗to the force of that movement which is not yet 
subject, project, or object, not even rejection, but in which takes place any production 
and any determination, which finds its possibility in the jetty – whether that production 
or determination be related to the subject, the object, the project, or the rejection.‘28 
With the use of this word, Derrida allows us to think of a wholly –  and necessarily – 
unstable notion of theory as that which is reducible to neither subject, project or object, 
but in which the productions and determinations which are related to such terms ‗find 
their possibility‘. I want to think of a ‗trauma study‘ in terms of a ‗theoretical jetty‘, 
with film (as an art/science/séance of ghosts), and in particular La Jetée, providing a 
particularly relevant example. Of course, this also suggests that a ‗theoretical jetty‘ is 
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not confined to its more recognisable manifestations, as movements, schools or 
disciplines within the university for example. 
 
For Derrida, a ‗theoretical jetty‘ is ‗a priori, originally, in conflict and competition.‘29 
This is not ‗an antagonistic confrontation‘ however, ‗for two correlative reasons‘: 
 
The first reason is that each jetty, far from being the part included in the 
whole, is only a theoretical jetty inasmuch as it claims to comprehend itself 
by comprehending all the others – by extending beyond their borders, 
exceeding them, inscribing them within itself. Each jetty is structured, 
constructed, designed in order to explain and account for all the other jetties 
(past, contemporary, and yet to come). And no jetty could escape from such 
a constitutive claim without ceasing to be what it is. This claim is the jetty, 
what the jetty is interested in and what makes it interesting […] 
 
The second reason, which is actually closely related to the first – why the 
competition cannot be a mere antagonistic confrontation and doesn‘t allow 
any jetty to give rise to the reading of a table which would classify the 
totality of the theoretical potentialities – this second reason is that each 
species in this table constitutes its identity only by incorporating other 
identities – by contamination, parasitism, grafts, organ transplants, 
incorporation, etc…30 
 
The jetty ‗is‘ that which is designed to explain and account for all others, for every other 
theoretical jetty. And it has to make this claim in order to ‗be‘ itself. At the same time 
the jetty ‗is‘ itself only because it incorporates the others. It is possible to think this 
essentially paradoxical structure in terms of film; a film can only comprehend itself by 
comprehending all the others, it must affirm and account for all the others in order to 
circumscribe itself. In order to do this, however, the film must incorporate all the others, 
it must ‗inscrib[e] them within itself‘; thus it must be haunted by all the others as itself, 
it is itself only because it incorporates the others as its ghosts. There is a certain 
suffering or living on here; the film – as a jetty – survives by bearing the mark or wound 
of the other. The film-jetty is itself because it is also the space where the other might 
return.  
 
Derrida describes the paradoxical structure of the jetty as follows: 
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[…] each jetty is not both a part and the whole, a part for the whole, 
synecdoche and metonymy, indeed a part larger than the whole, but a jetty 
whose momentum, movement, and structure, both internal and internalizing, 
takes it beyond the whole and folds it back on the whole to comprehend it 
and speak before it. Consequently, each jetty claims to extend beyond the 
borders of the entire state and to reflect it, by means of a fold.
31
 
 
The movement of each jetty takes it beyond the ‗state‘ or status quo in order to ‗speak 
before it‘; each jetty goes out beyond the whole in order to come before it, surpassing 
the whole and preceding it. This description of the jetty‘s structure can be read in 
relation to La Jetée. As noted above, Marker‘s text can be itself, return to itself (literally 
being bracketed ‗between the beginning and end of a single sentence‘32), only because it 
extends beyond itself, because it surpasses itself (an extension grammatically performed 
by the word ‗jetty‘, which can surpass itself – as ‗mole‘ or ‗starling‘ – in order to 
protect itself). Extending beyond itself in order to incorporate or inscribe the other as 
itself, the paradoxical structure of the jetty can be read on at least three levels in La 
Jetée: 1) the film‘s historical and cultural context, 2) its structure/composition, 3) the 
plot/character of the film. As the very structure of the jetty defies the neat separation of 
these levels, however, the reader should note that each of these levels extends into and 
incorporates all the others.  
 
1.3 La Jetée as ‘theoretical jetty’ 
Produced in 1962, La Jetée bears the impression of several historical events, as well as 
the possibility that the worst remains to come. As Catherine Lupton suggests, Marker‘s 
text Ŕ set in a post-apocalyptic Paris Ŕ condenses many residual anxieties concerning 
contemporary France:  
 
The atmosphere and uncertainty that accompanied the ending of the 
Algerian War, combined with outraged awareness of the use of torture 
by the French authorities during that conflict (any mention of which was 
rigorously censored in the French media until hostilities ceased), 
mingled in La Jetée with the memory of the Nazi concentration camps 
and the hovering threat of nuclear annihilation, which was to crystallize 
during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.‘33  
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La Jetée is marked by a traumatic past, as well as an anxiety concerning the future; Cold 
War paranoid anticipation figured through an allusion to the Nazi concentration camps, 
an overdetermination which is in turn informed by the Algerian War. Recalling 
Derrida‘s reading of the traumatic event, La Jetée bears the marks or wounds of events 
which have happened, but remain to come, as well as the possibility that what remains 
to come might be ‗the worst‘. For Ffrench, La Jetée  
 
carries a meaning or has a memory which relates profoundly to that 
historical moment [of 1962] and to the wider history of the twentieth 
century. To this extent La Jetée, Marker‘s sole fiction film, is much closer to 
the documentary than to fiction, and causes the structure of fiction to 
tremble through the interruption of the image as a vehicle of a historical 
memory.
34
 
 
The notion that Marker‘s film ‗carries‘ a meaning or memory which causes ‗the 
structure of fiction to tremble‘, suggests that it is the image which wounds the film, a 
wound that the film then bears, even though it disrupts or renders its fictional status 
precarious. Indeed, the film‘s composition is central here: constructed by the filming of 
still images, it is as if the still interrupts the traditional movement of film, the result 
being a weave of still movement, or moving stillness. The still image, then, can be seen 
to interrupt the film itself, rendering a traditional structure of cinematic narrative 
precarious, as well as the border between fiction and documentary. Following Ffrench, 
the image has a historical memory that interrupts fiction, and yet the film is comprised 
solely of still images; we might thus reverse Ffrench‘s claim and suggest that the film 
extends beyond its fictional status into a non-fictional beyond, only to incorporate that 
non-fiction at the very heart of fiction. 
    
The film takes place in a post-apocalyptic Paris, a historical/fictional Paris figured 
through events which have been experienced but not thought through, as well as the 
might of those which may be forecasted, but could never be calculated in advance. We 
are provided, therefore, with the impression of a disaster, the impression of a certain 
survival of the past as a projection of and into the future. La Jetée‘s plot mirrors this 
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complex condensation of past and future; survivors of what appears to have been a third 
world war now live underground, this is due to the pollution and desolation of what 
appears to be nuclear fallout. Out of the survivors, those who ‗believed themselves‘ 
victors conduct time-travel experiments on those they have designated as prisoners.
35
 
The aim of these experiments is to find someone who is able to travel to a past or future 
and find the necessary resources for the recovery of the world: ‗food, medicine, sources 
of energy‘. The plan, therefore, is to ‗summon the Past and Future to the aid of the 
Present‘. For the victors/experimenters, time is ‗the only hope for survival‘. Space is at 
this point ‗off-limits‘ [fermé].  
 
For the victors/experimenters, the future lies solely in the ability to appropriate another 
time, in the ability to determine the past or future to such an extent that a prisoner can 
be sent there in order to locate the resources for the future. This is a world in which 
space has been forsaken; above ground is off-limits, and those underground are 
confined to a claustrophobic warren of tunnels and bunkers. Yet as the key to the 
success of time-travel lies in finding ‗men given to very strong mental images‘ – the 
assumption that if these ‗men‘ were able to ‗conceive or to dream another time, perhaps 
they would be able to live in it‘ – there remains a necessity for figuration, for the tracing 
– and therefore spatio-temporalization – not only of another time, but of time as other 
(as space). It would seem, therefore, that the victors/experimenters must send someone 
beyond time and beyond the present – into a non-specific spatial dimension – in order to 
survive in the present. The very possibility of the present – as a ‗now‘ where space is 
‗off-limits‘ – is conditioned by the ability to extend beyond that present, and to inscribe 
another dimension – space as other – within itself. The ability to render a dimension 
beyond the present remains, therefore, vital to the experimenters‘ project, and vital to 
the possibility of time-travel as the possibility of the future. To put this in terms of 
Derrida‘s ‗theoretical jetty‘, the experimenters‘ project of determining the future is 
conditioned by the essentially unstable structure of the jetty, the ‗force of that movement 
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which is not yet subject, project, or object, not even rejection, but in which takes place 
any production and any determination, which finds its possibility in the jetty‘.36 
 
In order to find someone capable of time-travel, the prisoners‘ dreams are spied upon, 
and a man who seems particularly attached to a certain dream is selected for further 
tests. This man is experimented upon day after day, and soon ‗images begin to ooze, 
like confessions‘. One of these images – an image of a woman‘s face – appears to have 
made a particularly strong impression on the man, and as he will come to realise, the 
enigmatic effect of this image is due to its relation to the traumatic event which he 
witnessed as a child. It is with this event that the film begins and ends, opening and 
closing scenes which are set on the observation deck at Orly airport (‗la grande jetée 
d‟Orly‘). Here a child witnesses the murder of a man, a man who the child will come 
realise is himself, the man upon whom the experimenters are now working. The 
significance of the woman‘s image comes from the fact that, in the moments just before 
his witnessing of the murder, the child registers a woman standing nearby; thus an 
image of her face becomes a ‗screen-memory‘ of the traumatic event.37   
  
The image of the woman both masks and represents a ‗madness to come‘: ‗the sudden 
roar, the woman‘s gesture, the crumpling body, and the cries of the crowd on the pier 
blurred by fear.‘38 The horror of this event inflects the image of the woman with a 
particular ‗might‘, both the affective force of the murder and – as the image also defers 
that event – its potential as that which is yet to come. The prisoner, therefore, becomes 
obsessed with her image as it both translates and defers an event he is yet to 
comprehend: ‗il ne devait comprendre que beaucoup plus tard la signification.‘39 The 
prisoner‘s vivid dreams are an attempt, therefore, to gain knowledge of that traumatic 
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event, to reconnect the image with the event which it marks, to finally understand the 
‗madness‘ which came after his registering of the woman. The traumatic event, and its 
screening by the image of the woman, thus begins ‗the story of a man, marked by an 
image from his childhood‘.40   
 
The man bears, or is wounded by, the impression of what remains to come; by bearing 
this wound he suffers or lives on with the might of the future. Moreover, it is through 
the strength of this image/wound that the victors find a prisoner capable of surviving the 
movement beyond the present; thus the man‘s personal suffering is mirrored by that of 
what remains of humanity; with their experiments, the victors amplify this man‘s 
suffering in order to find an energy source, an energy source which would secure the 
present by determining the future.
41
 As experiments continue to be carried out on the 
prisoner, he finds himself recalling more and more images. As these impressions 
become stronger, he begins to assume the ability to travel through time, and to return to 
the period in which he first saw the woman: ‗A peacetime bedroom, a real bedroom. 
Real children. Real Birds. Real cats. Real graves. On the sixteenth day he is on the pier 
at Orly. Empty.‘42 This pier situates the event which has marked him since childhood. 
As an adult, the intense strength of that event, combined with the threat of his current 
surroundings, has triggered an attempt to reconnect with it. Moreover, as the image with 
which he is marked allows the return of that event, the man mirrors film in the sense of 
Derrida‘s art/science/séance of ghosts, that is, he becomes a site which allows ghosts to 
return. It is with this return – both his to the pier and that of the event to him – that the 
prisoner begins his attempt to locate the woman of whose image he dreams; an attempt 
to understand the might with which that image is laden. 
  
As he has now gained the capacity for time-travel, the experimenters send the prisoner 
into the future. Encountering a future humanoid race, the prisoner argues that ‗because 
humanity had survived, [this people of the future] could not refuse to its own past the 
means of its survival.‘43 His argument, or what the film describes as ‗sophistry in 
disguise‘, is successful, and the prisoner returns with a power source capable of 
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restarting ‗human industry‘. With his mission complete, the prisoner is certain he will 
be killed, yet, whilst waiting for this to happen, with ‗somewhere inside him, the 
memory of a twice-lived fragment of time‘, the prisoner is himself visited by 
representatives from the future, people who offer to take him to the safety of that future:  
 
They too travelled through Time, and more easily. Now they were there, 
ready to accept him as one of them. But he had a different request: rather 
than this pacified Future, he yearned for the world of his childhood, and 
this woman who perhaps was waiting for him.
44
 
 
The man is granted his request; the people from the future allow him to return to the 
pier at Orly in an attempt to understand once and for all the image with which he is 
obsessed. 
  
Again the man finds himself on the pier at Orly, and this time, at the end of it, he sees 
the woman whose image he has become obsessed with. He also senses a certain 
trembling, however, and ‗avec un peu de vertige‘, has the uncanny feeling that it is at 
this moment that he might also encounter himself as a child, that he might be confronted 
by his self as other. Undeterred, he runs towards the woman, but as he does, he realises 
that one of the experimenters has followed him through time – and that this man is 
about to kill him:  
 
Once again on the main pier at Orly, in the middle of this warm pre-war 
Sunday afternoon where he could now stay, he thought in a confused way 
[avec un peu de vertige] that the child he had been was due to be there too, 
watching the planes. But first of all he looked for the woman‘s face, at the 
end of the pier. He ran toward her. And when he recognized the man who 
had trailed him since the underground camp, he understood there was no 
way to escape Time, and he knew that this moment he had been granted to 
watch as a child, which had never ceased to obsess him, was the moment 
of his own [‗propre‘] death.45 
 
With this scene the film ends, at the moment it began, at the moment the man 
experiences the death he is at the same time witnessing as a boy.  
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At his death the man understands the significance of the image he was marked with as a 
child, that the image of the woman marked and deferred the event of his own death. Yet 
it is also here that the film assumes its curious logic: it is only because the man survives 
his own death – that he witnesses it as a boy, and therefore that such a death cannot be 
‗proper‘ to him – that he can assume his own death at all. Again, we can think of this 
paradoxical structure as the structure of Derrida‘s notion of the ‗jetty‘: the man can only 
assume his own death by surviving or extending beyond that death in order to ‗speak 
before it‘/witness it as the child. In order to assume both the man‘s and plot‘s destiny as 
their own death/end, both the man and the plot must survive themselves by extending 
into the other in order to enfold or incorporate that other as their very condition.  
Moreover, as the scene at Orly opens the film, this paradoxical structure is the place 
where the film ‗finds its possibility‘, the possibility that it might return to where it 
began or come back to itself as itself. Of course, such an end, as a state, status or stasis, 
could never be assumed by the film or the man, because the final scene at Orly stages 
the event which triggers its beginning. The final scene, in order to be the final scene, 
must incorporate the first scene, and vice versa. In this ‗essentially‘ doubled – or 
spectral – scene the man both dies, and, as boy, witnesses that death and lives on.46  
 
1.4 Surviving life and death 
Derrida works on the notion of ‗survivre‘ in an interview with Le Monde from 2005.47 
In this interview Derrida gives a particularly pertinent description of how a dimension 
of living on aligns an ‗essential‘ force or movement of the text with the work of 
mourning: 
 
I have always been interested in this theme of survival [la survie], the 
meaning of which is not to be added on to living and dying. It is originary: 
life is living on, life is survival [la vie est survie]. To survive in the usual 
sense of the term means to continue to live, but also to live after death. 
Concerning translation [A propos de la traduction; translation modified], 
[Walter] Benjamin emphasizes the distinction between überleben, on the 
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one hand, surviving death, like a book that survives the death of its author, 
or a child that survives the death of his or her parents, and on the other, 
fortleben, living on [in English in the French text], continuing to live. All 
the concepts that have helped me in my work, and notably that of the trace 
or of the spectral, were related to this ―surviving‖ [―survivre‖] as a 
structural and rigorously original dimension. It is not derived from either 
living or dying [Elle ne dérive ni du vivre ni du mourir]. No more than 
what I call ―originary mourning‖, that is, a mourning that does not wait for 
the so-called ―actual‖ [―effective‖] death.48 
  
Referencing Benjamin‘s ‗The Task of the Translator‘49, Derrida suggests that the usual 
sense of survivre is aligned with überleben, a survival which implies a living on after 
someone or something has been lost (here, the death of a text‘s author, or the loss of 
someone‘s parents). This definition requires a clear and determined concept of ‗after‘; 
of a life which resumes. In contrast, living on is an ‗originary mourning‘, a ‗structural‘ 
dimension which derives from neither life nor death. Unlike a traditional notion of 
mourning, survivre does not come after death, but instead always-already bears it as the 
other. Resembling an ‗originary mourning‘, ‗living on‘ would not ‗wait for the so-called 
―actual‖ death‘; rather, it would survive death from the beginning. Living on is – as an 
originary structure – irreducible to neither life nor death; it cannot be considered to 
come either before or after those concepts, but rather as that place of possibility from 
which any attempt to think those concepts would be derived. 
 
Derrida works on ‗survivre‘ in more detail in ‗Living On – Border Lines‘50, here he 
considers the term in relation to the (im)possibility of translation. ‗Living On – Border 
Lines‘ are in fact two texts running alongside each other – with ‗Living On‘ sitting 
above ‗Border Lines‘ [in French: ‗Journal de Bord‘ – a kind of ship‘s journal or log]. 
Taking up approximately the bottom fifth of the page, Derrida suggests that ‗Border 
Lines‘ could be seen as, amongst other things, an extended translator‘s note, a note 
considering the problems of how one might translate the text into English. Of course, 
the word ‗translation‘ conjures several associations; as well as referring to the task of 
the translator – the representation of a text in another language (a description already 
problematic enough) – it also functions in the more general sense: that of the movement 
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of effect/force/energy from one spatio-temporal position to another – in the sense of a 
dynamics, an economy, or a topography. Translation can also be thought of as an 
archival technique, the recording of a text in another language; we might say, therefore, 
that translation is an impression of the ‗original‘ textual event, a marking of that event 
which it both experiences and defers. A translation, therefore, might also come before 
the ‗original‘, that which extends into the ‗original‘ in order to ‗speak before‘ it, a body 
which bears the mark of that ‗original‘ as what might remain untranslatable.51  
 
‗Border Lines‘ works on the notion of survivre, a term which is essential to the reading 
of La Jetée attempted in this chapter, as well as to this thesis in general. Derrida 
describes survivre in its relation to translation, but also as a fundamental dimension of 
the text, the very condition of its survival; he describes it here where the border between 
the translatable and untranslatable is made precarious: 
 
A text lives only if it lives on [sur-vit], and it lives on only if it is at once 
translatable and untranslatable (always ‗at once…and….‘: ama, at the 
‗same‘ time). Totally translatable, it disappears as a text, as writing, as a 
body of language [corps de langue]. Totally untranslatable, even within 
what is believed to be one language, it dies immediately. This triumphant 
translation is neither the life nor the death of the text, only or already its 
living on [sa survie] […] The same thing will be said of what I call 
writing, mark, trace, and so on. It neither lives nor dies; it lives on. And it 
‗starts‘ only with living on […].52  
 
As the text/trace/mark ‗starts only with living on‘, living on or survivre is a quasi-
originary dimension, ‗quasi‘ because it ‗lives on‘ from the beginning, and therefore that 
this originary dimension must survive something which exceeds, or came before it. 
Survivre refers, then, to an ‗essentially‘ spectral dimension, a dimension in which what 
‗lives on‘ must extend into or incorporate the other (here this other would be death) in 
order to ‗be itself‘. What ‗lives on‘, therefore, does so only because it survives its own 
death, a death which haunts it from the beginning. For Derrida, a text ‗lives‘ only if it 
always-already survives any clear division between life and death. If the notion of 
survivre is to be aligned with the notion of an ‗after-life‘ (as the ‗sur‘ of ‗survivre‘ 
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might suggest), it would defy a certain temporal ossification of the ‗past‘ – a past 
present – which an ‗after‘ might presume, and allude to a certain notion of futurity 
which questions on the nature of the ‗hereafter‘ might demand (whilst desisting from 
reducing this futurity to the certainty of a determinable eschatology; that is, in 
determining an after-life as the telos of a heaven or a hell). Although temporality, 
eschatology and resurrection remain at stake in the notion of survivre, they remain 
notions to be thought in relation to living on, a living on which, if it is to be thought of 
as life, must always-already extend into and incorporate its other – death. This 
demonstrates the spectrality of survivre, a textual dimension which demands that a 
certain (im)possibility of translation is both conditioned by, and the condition of, the 
text. As what could be thought of as the essentially unstable status of the text, such 
spectrality, or ‗living on‘ [survivre], determines that a text is at once both translatable 
and untranslatable.  
 
Derrida describes the movement of the text as that which lives on; if living on is 
spectral here, it is not because the text is written in an economy of life and death as 
opposing concepts, but because spectrality would be its ‗essential‘ or quasi-originary 
structure. The text ‗lives‘ as a movement of hyper/beyond/over-living – a ‗sur‘-living. 
Such ‗life‘ cannot be reduced to pure presence; rather, ‗living on‘ would figure an 
apparition of life which, in order to appear alive, must also incorporate death.
53
 For 
Derrida, if a text were totally translatable or totally untranslatable, it would not be a text. 
Totally translatable or untranslatable, a text would manifest only itself, perfectly and 
without remainder. Without its other, it would be completely imperceptible to anything 
or anyone, including itself. Total translatability would mean the complete absence of 
text, of itself as a ‗body of language‘. Total untranslatability would result in a similar 
impossibility: ‗being‘ totally untranslatable (a pure singularity or idiom) would in fact 
‗be‘ its impossibility to exist at all, the impossibility of it figuring itself. A totally 
untranslatable text would immediately die, or rather, never live long enough to exist. 
Indeed, to even imagine itself as untranslatable – to figure itself as existing in a single 
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language or form – would necessitate a certain marking or tracing, and it would 
therefore already be in the act of translation and have extended into its other. 
  
Derrida refers to a translation which ‗lives on‘ as a ‗triumphant translation‘. On the one 
hand this might be read as a reference to the movement between ‗Border Lines‘ and the 
text which it could be seen to live on: ‗Living On‘. Both texts can be read as parasiting 
– or para-citing – each other; each living on the other with the possibility that such 
hospitality may not be returned. On the other hand, and perhaps as the more obvious 
association, the phrase ‗triumphant translation‘ might allude to the text Derrida 
professes to read in ‗Living On‘: Percy Bysshe Shelley‘s The Triumph of Life. As is 
echoed by the movement between ‗Border Lines‘ and ‗Living On‘, Shelley‘s The 
Triumph of Life is read by way of Maurice Blanchot‘s L‟Arrêt de mort, a movement 
which stages each text in a para-citical or para-critical, ‗super-imprinting‘ or ‗super-
imposing‘ relation. Indeed, Derrida suggests these relations in ‗Border Lines‘, and in 
doing so, questions the border between one text and the other: 
 
[…] I wish to pose the question of the bord, the edge, the border, and the 
bord de mer, the shore. […] The question of the borderline precedes, as it 
were, the determination of all the dividing lines that I have just 
mentioned: between a fantasy and a ―reality‖, an event and a non-event, a 
fiction and a reality, one corpus and another, and so forth. Here, from 
week to week in this pocket-calendar or these minutes [procès-verbal], I 
shall perhaps endeavour to create an effect of superimposing, of 
superimprinting one text on the other. Now, each of these two ―triumphs‖ 
writes (on [sur]) textual superimprinting. What about this ―on‖, this ―sur‖, 
and its surface? An effect of superimposing: one procession is 
superimposed on the other, accompanying it without accompanying it.
54
 
 
Derrida states that the ‗question of the borderline precedes […] the determination of all 
the dividing lines‘; thus any clear-cut division or decision on division is deferred in 
favour of a process or effect of ‗superimprinting‘. Recalling his notion of the ‗jetty‘, the 
‗question of the borderline‘ as that which precedes ‗determination‘ would align it with 
the movement or force of the ‗jetty‘, the place where determination ‗finds its 
possibility‘. A textual superimposition would be a writing on – sur – the text which 
superimposes the two texts, one with the other – with each recalling the logic of the 
supplement for the other: each for the other both additional (superfluous) and essential. 
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As such, the edges of these texts extend into each other, incorporating each other as the 
movement in which they might find their very possibility.  
 
Derrida speaks here of two ‗triumphs‘, but to what each of these ‗triumphs‘ refer is 
unclear. One might be the triumphant procession of the procès-verbal [where ‗to 
minute‘ – to record proceedings by dividing minutely – might also mean ‗to minute‘ in 
the sense of passing by ‗minute by minute‘]. Such a triumphant recording would mark 
the ‗entrance [or procession] of a victorious commander‘, the act to which the word 
‗triumph‘ historically refers.55 ‗Border Lines‘ – as procès-verbal Ŕ might then be 
thought of as the commanding procession of events, a victorious archive or record of 
what has happened or taken place. Yet there are two triumphs, two processions; this is 
the ‗double band or ―double-bind‖ of double proceedings [procession]‘56 which creates 
an ‗effect of superimposing: one procession is superimposed on the other, 
accompanying it without accompanying.‘ The other ‗triumphant procession‘ might be 
the question which ‗precedes‘ determination, that which precedes as the possibility of 
proceeding: the question of the borderline.
57
 The two superimposed ‗triumphs‘ might 
resemble, therefore, both the precession of the borderline, and the recording of that 
precedence, the procès-verbal. Processions, proceedings, and procedures are 
superimposed here, all lining a rather precarious border as the place where 
determination might find its possibility. 
  
As Derrida reads Blanchot‘s L‟Arrêt de mort (published in English translation as Death 
Sentence, but with the French title suggesting both a putting to death, and the arrest 
(halt) of death) with Shelley‘s The Triumph of Life, both texts find their borders 
compromised by the other; each ‗lives on‘ the other with the inherent risk that what they 
provide for, or receive from, the other may never be recouped or repaid. Indeed, as the 
majority of ‗Living On‘ seems to concentrate on L‟Arrêt de mort – that is, as it seems to 
put this text first – in a dizzying disseminatory performance, the return on the 
investment in – or the result of the wager on – Shelley‘s text looks likely to be deferred 
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interminably.
58
 Of course, this is Derrida‘s intention, and moreover, it could not be 
otherwise: in order to live on as itself, the text requires its para-cite. It must be possible 
for it to be re-cited or translated, summoned beyond itself, to survive as itself. In super-
imposing Shelley‘s text with Blanchot‘s, Derrida finds a text with which to write on the 
poem. He desists from considering it as the object of a discourse, or rendering it through 
an interpretation, and instead affirms its survival, he re-cites it through a text – or ‗body 
of language‘ – which bears its impression, or its might. Shelley‘s poem, therefore, also 
remains ‗to come‘. Blanchot‘s text bears the impression of Shelley‘s poem as the mark 
or wound of the future, of what remains to be thought in or about the text.  
 
It is necessary to stress, however, that any ‗one‘ text is already in a movement of 
survival. The title of Shelley‘s poem again demonstrates this, in that The Triumph of 
Life could refer to both an overcoming of life by something, and life‘s overcoming of 
something. With the focus on the notion of ‗life‘ here, we might presume that this 
‗something‘ is death, but this isn‘t assured, and for Derrida the ‗triumphant translation‘ 
– the double-bind, or double procession of a triumphant translation – would live on or 
survive with this lack of assurance. In terms of this quasi-originary survival, the 
triumphant translation would think this ‗death‘ as unthinkable, bear it as unbearable, or 
suffer it as insufferable. Such a ‗death‘ would be the untranslatable remainder of a text 
which is rendered untranslatable by the very act of translation. In what could be termed 
‗surviving death‘, what dies, or what is ‗lost in translation‘, would be impossible to 
determine once and for all; in surviving death the triumphant translation keeps death as 
its necessary – but irreducible – excess; it lives on only by suffering or surviving this 
might of death as the force and potentiality of what remains undetermined or 
incalculable. The title of Shelley‘s poem survives as this ambiguity: the ‗triumph of 
life‘ becomes a ‗surviving death‘, it survives the overcoming of life – that is, death – as 
a victory of life. At the same time the triumph of life is a triumph over life; thus life also 
kills life, life becomes that which is the end of life: death. The ‗triumph of life‘ lives on, 
therefore, as both the surviving of death and the experience of death; both life and death 
are on the side of living on.
59
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Whichever reading of the title that we might decide upon must be able to survive its 
other, but only by maintaining or incorporating that other – living on that other – as the 
necessary condition of its semantic specificity (and therefore the impossibility of such 
specificity). Should any final decision be attempted here, it would always be 
conditioned by its other or alternative, and thus impossible to decide upon once and for 
all. Any attempt to negate this untranslatable remnant with an absolute verdict – the 
‗jury‘s decision‘, to which Derrida will allude – would be compromised in advance. 
Derrida explains this in relation to Blanchot‘s L‟Arrêt de mort, a title which, as noted 
above, mirrors the same ambiguity as that of Shelley‘s poem. He suggests that in 
deciding once and for all upon either meaning would presuppose a convention, a 
meeting, agreement or covenant: 
 
The arrêt de mort as verdict: it is obvious, and the translators must take 
this into account, that in ―everyday‖ language, in ―normal‖ conversation, 
the expression arrêt de mort is unambiguous. It means ―death sentence‖. 
The syntax is clear: the arrêt is a verdict, a decision that has been arrêtée, 
decided, determined, and that itself decides and determines, and its 
relationship to the object of the preposition (de mort) is, of course, the 
same as in condamnation à mort. But ―literary‖ convention, the 
suspension of ―normal‖ contexts, the context of everyday conversational 
usage or of writing legitimatized by law – starting with legislating writing 
or the body of laws that sets the norm for legal language itself – the 
functioning of the title, the transformation of its relationship to the context 
and of its referentiality […]: all this forbids (prevents, inhibits, stops 
[arrête]) a translation of the title L‟arrêt de mort by its ―homonym‖ in 
everyday language or by ―death sentence.‖ This translation, like any other, 
leaves something out, an untranslated remnant.
60
 
 
The point here is that ‗normal‘, ‗everyday‘ and even ‗literary‘ contexts could be seen as 
the determining, commanding, or legitimate context. Each could demand and command 
the unambiguous decision which would treat L‟Arrêt de mort as ‗death sentence‘ in 
‗everyday‘ language, or, in the case of ‗literary‘ convention, forbid that L‟Arrêt de mort 
is simply ‗death sentence‘.  
 
What it is important to maintain is that any convention or agreement is conditioned by 
the other, an other which they must extend into and incorporate to even suggest a 
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convention or agreement. The ‗jetty‘, as a movement where determination might find 
its possibility, underlines and undermines all attempts to form a decision. The borders 
of the conventions which may attempt to surround the title – even in the use of the word 
‗title‘ – are always-already porous, they always-already extend into their other, and 
such an attempt to arrest the movement or play of the trace, as soon as a decision or 
verdict is attempted, also announces that a final verdict is yet to come. All this is to say 
that the essential spectrality of L‟Arrêt de mort or The Triumph of Life, as the trace or 
marking of the other, is not an effect confined to the conventions of literature or the 
everyday, it is instead the possibility that the convention – or the agreement – is always 
written on the horizon of its interruption: 
 
for ―literature‖ and in general ―parasitism‖, the suspension of the ―normal‖ 
context of everyday conversation or of ―civilian‖ usage of the language, in 
short everything that makes it possible to move from ―death sentence‖ to 
―suspension of death‖ in the French expression arrêt de mort, can always 
come about (de facto and de jure) in ―everyday‖ usage of the language, in 
language and in discourse.
61
 
  
Both Shelley‘s and Blanchot‘s titles point to an unconventional literature, a literature 
which might interrupt the convention of the literary itself, as well as the convention of 
the ‗unconventional‘. Such literature might resemble a triumph, overcoming or 
surviving of the conventional/unconventional opposition; a dimension of living on from 
which to affirm what remains in excess of the text. ‗Living On – Border Lines‘ is a 
dense and complex text, and cannot be reduced to the argument attempted here. Derrida 
conducts a reading which superimposes Shelley and Blanchot‘s texts, and in turn, the 
two récits of L‟Arrêt de mort, affirming each as they extend into and incorporate the 
other – a living on the other – as the very condition of their determination.  
 
As La Jetée shares several thematic and aesthetic motifs with Alfred Hitchcock‘s 
Vertigo (1958), it could be suggested that the films live on or para-cite each other. 
Although a conventional linear chronology would suggest this is impossible, an 
anachronistic resonance between the films suggests that each is marked by the other. 
Such an extension into, and incorporation of, the other, can be read in a scene which, in 
both films, features the cross-section of a Sequoia – or Redwood – tree. By following 
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Tom Cohen‘s readings of Hitchcock62, I want to argue that the Sequoia scenes can be 
read in terms of a spectrographic cinema. I will suggest that the Sequoia scenes deploy 
a quasi-originary textual dimension as the place from which the conventional and 
traditional themes of cinema and cinematic criticism can be re-read, and in terms of this 
thesis, a place which marks, and is marked by, the might of an event which remains to 
come. Such a quasi-originary dimension echoes both the ‗structural and rigorously 
original dimension‘ of survivre, as well as Derrida‘s notion of the ‗jetty‘, a structure 
which extends into and incorporates the other in order to speak before the other; a 
structure which suffers or survives the mark of the other whilst maintaining the other‘s 
‗inappropriable exteriority‘.  
 
1.5 The Sequoia scenes 
Vertigo is structured around the ability to figure, command, bear, or suffer death. Scottie 
– the male protagonist – is contacted by Gavin Elster, an old college friend, who asks 
Scottie to follow his wife Madeleine, suggesting she has been possessed by the ghost of 
Carlotta Valdes, Madeleine‘s great-grandmother. Elster tells Scottie that Valdes killed 
herself in 1857, aged 26, the age that Madeleine is now, and that he is afraid Madeleine 
has the compulsion to repeat the same act. Scottie takes on Elster‘s assignment, and 
becomes obsessed with Madeleine. The film follows his attempts to reconcile her with 
herself, his attempts to exorcise the spirit of Carlotta from Madeleine. Yet Scottie is 
acrophobic, he suffers from vertigo, and so when Madeleine climbs a church tower in an 
attempt to commit suicide, his illness prevents him from following, and he watches 
helpless as she falls to her death. 
  
The whole thing is a ruse however; Elster is planning to kill his wife in order to inherit 
her wealth, and so has hired a woman to dress as her and act as though possessed, a ploy 
to fascinate Scottie and frame him as a witness to her suicide. The ruse hinges on 
Scottie‘s inability to cope with heights: as he is unable the reach the top of the church 
tower, the real – but already murdered – Madeleine is thrown from the top by Elster 
whilst the fake Madeleine hides. Unable to confront what he believes is Madeleine‘s 
suicide, Scottie retreats traumatized from the scene. After being diagnosed with ‗acute 
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melancholia‘, Scottie finds himself wandering the streets of San Francisco, unable to 
come to terms with Madeleine‘s death. Through this wandering, he comes across Judy, 
the woman Elster had hired to impersonate Madeleine. Unsuspecting of any foul play, 
Scottie becomes obsessed with Judy; or more precisely, he becomes obsessed with re-
figuring Judy to look exactly like the dead Madeleine. Judy goes along with this as she 
has actually fallen in love with Scottie, and hopes to make him love her for herself and 
‗so forget the other and forget the past‘.63 Eventually Scottie discovers the truth about 
Judy, and in his anger at her deception, he drives her – his ‗second chance‘ – to the top 
of the same church tower from which Madeleine appeared to throw herself, and to her 
own suicidal fall, one which he now witnesses.  
  
Scottie‘s vertigo derives from an inability to accurately figure the ground. The ground, 
therefore, becomes an abyssal beyond or other he cannot come to terms with. Such an 
abyss is synonymous with death, a death which Madeleine manifests through her 
possession by Carlotta. Madeleine, then, represents death for Scottie, she becomes a 
manifestation of death he might come to terms with and then exorcise (Scottie‘s aim is 
to cure Madeleine‘s possession through a combination of physical protection, 
observation and lay psychoanalysis). With Madeleine considered gone, however, 
Scottie is again haunted by the fear of an unthinkable, unrepresentable abyss. With the 
film‘s conclusion Scottie is able to witness Judy‘s plunge to the ground. In death, then, 
Judy finally provides him with the representation of death he had found in Madeleine. 
Judy has – if only for an instant – become Madeleine. Judy‘s death, therefore, presents 
Scottie with an image of death which he can fully witness and fully come to terms with. 
As a result of his witnessing this final act, Scottie‘s vertigo – and melancholia – is 
cured. 
 
The event which seems to have led to Scottie suffering vertigo comes at the beginning 
of the film: whilst chasing a suspect over several rooftops, Scottie and a uniformed 
policeman attempt to jump a particularly wide gap between two buildings. The 
policeman does so successfully, but Scottie fails to make the jump, he lands short and 
finds himself hanging from the gutter. Scottie looks down and is horrified by the 
seemingly immeasurable distance between him and the ground. Seeing his plight, the 
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policeman gives up the chase and returns to help Scottie, he scrambles down the tiled 
roof and offers Scottie his hand. Scottie is reluctant to take it, the fear of letting go of 
the gutter is too strong. As the policeman strains to get a little closer to Scottie, he slips, 
and falls past him. Scottie looks down and can see the dead body of the policeman on 
the ground. The scene ends with this vertiginous abyss, now experienced as an 
unthinkable fear, synonymous with death and immense guilt. 
 
As Susan White notes, this scene has been described as a ‗vertiginous birth 
experience‘.64 Coming at the opening of the film, this scene is the trauma through which 
Scottie enters our world. From the beginning then, there is a relation between death and 
the maternal, between threat and attraction which Scottie will find repeated in the figure 
of Madeleine. As trauma and the maternal combine here, Scottie can be seen to have 
been marked, or wounded, by the (m)other. He is thus both in fear of the (m)other – as 
the source of his vertigo – as well as enamoured by the (m)other (in that a certain 
reconnection with the (m)other would relieve him of that suffering). Attracted and 
repulsed by the (m)other, Scottie wants to reconnect with what at the same time he 
needs to sever himself from. His fascination with, or desire for, Madeleine takes the 
form of an attempt to rid her of the very thing that attracts him: her ability to manifest 
the dead.
65
  
  
Along with the notions of trauma and the maternal, there is a third figure enigmatically 
entwined in Vertigo‘s opening scene: the policeman as the figure of the father/law. 
Having witnessed the death of the father through a birth trauma, it is perhaps no 
coincidence that Scottie is seeking an ideal or phallic (m)other. As White notes: 
 
Having witnessed the death of the ―father‖ (the representative of the law, the 
policeman) at the beginning of the film, and having difficulty in his attempt 
to break with the motherly Midge [Scottie‘s close friend], Scottie not only 
finds the ideal ―phallic‖ woman in the Madeleine created for him by Elster, 
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but also sees his own painful plight with regard to the mother mirrored in 
hers.
66
  
 
White is referring to a complex series of identifications here; the fake Madeleine – as 
‗created‘ by Elster – is played by Judy, who, as we later find out, has moved to San 
Francisco partly due to the fact that, after her father‘s death, her mother married a man 
she didn‘t like. In a sense then, she feels abandoned by both her father and her mother, 
and as Madeleine/Judy is a figure haunted by Carlotta Valdes, a woman whose daughter 
was taken from her, Madeleine/Judy identifies with Carlotta as the lost ideal or phallic 
mother, as well as Carlotta‘s daughter as abandoned child.67 Both Madeleine/Judy and 
Scottie, then, can be seen to have been marked or wounded by the loss of the mother, 
and both bear or suffer this wound as the mark or promise of their return. 
 
Tania Modleski works with this identificatory logic in her reading of Vertigo in The 
Women Who Knew Too Much.
68
 Following a line of criticism which attempts to affirm a 
position in cinema for a feminine identification/spectator, the lack of which forms the 
basis of Laura Mulvey‘s seminal essay ‗Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema‘69, 
Modleski aims to complicate the received reading of cinema as the place where 
woman‘s response can only be masochistic, whilst man‘s would be sadistic. Modleski 
suggests how Scottie identifies with Madeleine/Judy, thus introducing an identificatory 
logic which cannot be reduced to the binary of male/female, active/passive. Modleski 
suggests that ‗despite all his attempts to gain control over Madeleine, Scottie will find 
himself repeatedly thrown back into an identification, a mirroring relation, with her and 
her desires [and thus] will be unable to master the woman the way Gavin Elster and 
Carlotta‘s paramour are able to do.‘70 Scottie is unable to draw Madeleine into the net of 
a phallic reason as he is on a certain level her mirror image, that is, ‗[i]t is as if he were 
continually confronted with the fact that woman‘s uncanny otherness has some relation 
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to himself, that he resembles her in ways intolerable to contemplate – intolerable 
because this resemblance throws into question his own fullness of being.‘71 Modleski 
cites Sarah Kofman here: 
 
[m]en‘s fascination with [the] eternal feminine is nothing but fascination 
with their own double, and the feeling of uncanniness, Unheimlichkeit, that 
men experience is the same as what one feels in the face of any double, any 
ghost, in the face of the abrupt reappearance of what one thought had been 
overcome or lost forever.
72
 
 
Modleski suggests that ‗[w]oman thus becomes the ultimate point of identification for 
all of the film‘s spectators‘73 and thus that ‗the boundaries between self and (m)other 
tend to be more fluid for the male than is sometimes supposed.‘74 Vertigo is then both 
the possibility that ‗woman‘s story gets out, though weakened and distorted in the 
process‘, but also a demonstration of ‗how she is used and cast aside or tortured and 
finally killed off, as man desperately tries to sustain a sense of himself that necessitates 
the end of woman.‘75 
 
Modleski‘s reading, as well as the citation from Kofman, suggests that it is at the level 
of the ghost that we must approach cinema, a place which uncannily allows the other to 
return. But it also confirms how cinema can be a site where otherness is assaulted, 
tortured and annihilated. As that which is marked by the other, then, it is perhaps in a 
textual dimension, a dimension which might survive cinema‘s Oedipal, heterosexual, 
anthropomorphic, mimetic, identificatory – and thus ocularcentric – structures, that a 
place for thinking film‘s potentiality (to re-think these structures, as well as the 
figurations of trauma and sexual difference which they condition) might emerge. Tom 
Cohen has considered such a dimension in Hitchcock‘s work, and refers to it as a 
‗spectrographics‘, a term coined ‗for the prehistory of cinema‘s afterlife‘, a prehistory 
which ‗many of the techniques we take for critical innovations, auratic strategies to 
anthropomorphic cinema‘ may have attempted to forget or cover up.76 Against ‗mimetic 
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media‘s representational humanism‘, Cohen suggests a ‗spectrographic cinema would 
alter the very program out of which reference is produced and anteriority managed.‘77 
 
A spectrographics prowls at the virtual interface of epistemology and event, 
trope and inscription, translation and mnemonics, an imaginary era of the 
book, on the one hand, and one of the image (Bild), video, the electronic 
archive, and so forth, on the other. For if the cinematic is distinguished, 
always, by accounting in advance for its own repetition, it also divides, 
recedes before itself, re-marks and precedes its own apparition.
78
 
 
Cohen‘s remarks recall those of Smith discussed above, as well as Derrida‘s notion of 
the ‗jetty‘ as a structure which extends ‗beyond the whole and folds it back on the 
whole to comprehend it and speak before it.‘ Cinema, in order to ‗be‘ itself, also 
‗recedes before itself‘, in order to account for its distinguishing repeatability, it extends 
beyond its borders into a spectrographic dimension which ‗precedes 
phenomenalization‘.79 
 
For Cohen, ‗[c]inema suspends in advance the promised mimeticism literalized in the 
critical tradition‘s major trends (humanist, identificatory, Oedipalist, historicist, 
auteurist), as though replacing it with webs of cross-relays and trace chains.‘80 In Anti-
Mimesis, a text in which Cohen approaches a ‗spectrographic‘ cinema in his reading of 
Hitchcock‘s The Thirty-Nine Steps, he suggests the necessity and potentiality of reading 
Hitchcock‘s texts as an anti-mimetic cinema which sabotages ocularcentric structures, 
structures which in turn lead to a critical blindness: 
 
Everything depends, it seems, on which questions are asked – and Hitchcock 
points out that the interpreter too is in this bind: by asking of the film itself 
only certain questions […] generic, prescribed questions or questions of 
genre itself – we are guaranteed the same answers, that is, we are guaranteed 
not to see or hear. What are the other questions we can ask, then, to break 
away from this machinal or cultural loop or bind? Or differently, how does a 
recurrent rupture in the attempt to produce narrative in this space proceed?
81
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Cohen‘s reference to the ‗machinal‘ is useful here; he begins by asking how to get 
beyond, or ‗break away‘ from the machinal bind, but then asks how such a mechanical 
recurrence might also be a space of potentiality.
82
 This abandoning of abandoning the 
machine suggests the ‗other questions‘ to be asked here must involve asking how a 
mechanical or cultural repetition might also welcome the other, and thus how these 
repetitious cultural tropes might be read otherwise. Of course, this is not to say we can 
abandon the ‗critical tradition‘s‘ ocularcentric trends, nor that we should ignore the 
questions of gender and sexual difference wrapped up in the notion of the image and 
representation, but rather that Cohen‘s readings of Hitchcock attempt to re-elaborate a 
textuality – or spectrographics – of cinema as the space of determinability from which 
these questions, tropes or trends might emerge otherwise: 
 
In contrast to tracing rules of the game or reading strategies to evade the 
institutional error of a divide between the visual and the scriptive, image and 
text, Hitchcock‘s recasting of marks, language, and teletechnics at the core 
of the cinematic redefines an entire set of performatives that include gender, 
memory, agency, and time.
83
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Cohen‘s spectrographics echoes Derrida‘s suggestion that the cinema concerns the art of 
ghostly return, a place where ghosts are allowed or made to return.
84
 Cohen suggests 
that  
 
locating a practice of cinema within this site [that is, as a spectrographics] 
has two immediate consequences that cannot be shed, disavowed, and 
bracketed. First, the Hitchcockian practice (which is not a unique style so 
much as the hyperformalization of the medium) inscribes the ―world‖ […] 
as a type of animation, which might then be called ―life‖ or which, at least, 
renders ―death‖ a horizonless semaphoric plane of speeds and intensities. 
And second, it confronts in different modes its own status as virtual ―event‖ 
or intervention within the histories it serves as regenerative station and 
transit point.
85
 
 
A spectrographic cinema would ‗inscribe‘ or ‗animate‘ life, or the ‗world‘. Moreover, if 
this is seen as the rendering of death (in that the cinematic text is the reanimation of 
what has ceased ‗to be‘), this ‗life‘ of death might be thought of as an ‗afterlife‘. In 
order to highlight that if a spectrographic dimension is to be thought of as an ‗afterlife‘ 
of the phenomenal world, that afterlife would also be originary, Cohen cites Derrida‘s 
reading of the spectral in Specters of Marx: 
 
Two conclusions then: (1) the phenomenal form of the world itself is 
spectral; (2) the phenomenological ego (Me, You, and so forth) is a specter. 
The phainesthai itself (before its determination as phenomenon or phantasm, 
thus as phantom) is the very possibility of the specter, it brings, it gives 
death, it works at mourning.
86
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As noted above, Derrida states in Ghost Dance that cinema concerns ‗the art of allowing 
ghosts to come back [un art de laissez revenir du fantôme].‘ Cinema is not a production 
of ghosts, then, but a place where what is already spectral might return. As an 
‗afterlife‘, then, cinema also remains quasi-originary, a spectral dimension which gives 
the possibility or semblance of ‗life‘ or ‗death‘ through its ‗horizonless semaphoric 
plane of speeds and intensities‘.  
 
Cohen‘s reference to a ‗horizonless semaphoric plane of speeds and intensities‘ marks 
both a similarity to, and difference with, Gilles Deleuze‘s reading of Hitchcock in 
Cinema 1.
87
 For Cohen this horizonless plane is ‗semaphoric‘, thus it ‗bears‘ or ‗suffers‘ 
the sign as its quasi-originary condition. Though a horizonless plane chimes with 
Deleuze‘s ‗plane of immanence‘, or ‗body without organs‘, equally a site of differing 
speeds and intensities, the sign or mark would, for Deleuze, remain symbolic of this 
originary dimension, rather than its very materiality. Cohen marks this distinction 
between Deleuze‘s reading of Hitchcock and his own spectrographic approach:  
 
There has always been a problem with characterizing Hitchcock‘s signifying 
strategies, into which trap the most sophisticated theorists have stumbled. 
Objects are hosted, seem marked, yet refuse assigned contents and dissolve 
into citational networks; after their passage through a sort of ‗spies‘ post 
office‖, they reemerge elsewhere, become host.88 
 
Cohen suggests that in the case of Deleuze, who assigns the term ‗demark‘ to the 
objects which ‗leap outside the web [of natural relations, or ‗marks‘] and suddenly 
appear in conditions which take it out of its series, or set it in contradiction with it‘89, 
this attempt to radicalise the mimetic or representational logic of the symbol actually 
‗relapses into a logic of symbolization.‘90 In his reading of The Birds Deleuze states that  
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the first gull which strikes the heroine is a demark, since it violently leaves 
the customary series […] But the thousands of birds […] are a symbol: these 
are not abstractions or metaphors, they are real birds, literally, but which 
present the inverted image of men‘s relationship to Nature.91  
 
For Cohen this reading suggests that: 
 
 [t]he Deleuzian demark operates by standing out from a series, yet as such it 
denaturalizes the natural and the ―demark‖ is effaced back into the 
―symbol‖, as when the ―thousands of birds‖ appear to him to be ―the 
inverted image of men‘s relationship to Nature.‖ The fact that ―Nature‖ is 
evoked marks a limit of Deleuze‘s technique, since whatever the ―birds‖ are 
doing can, according to their alliance with machines, have no accord with an 
anthropomorphism like ―Nature‖.92 
 
By referring to the ‗birds‘ as an ‗inverted image of men‘s relationship to Nature‘, Cohen 
suggests that Deleuze is sustaining an anthropomorphised narrative – the ‗natural‘ – in 
order to describe the indexical functioning of Hitchcock‘s film. This operation can also 
be seen in the way Deleuze approaches ‗Hitchcock‘ himself, whose films or signature 
effects are indexical of the intentions of an auteur-father. As Karyn Ball notes: 
 
Auteurism still belongs to the regime of the Author as Father. Despite an 
apparent semiotic agenda which breaks down perception, action, and affect 
shots into multiple signs including the mental image, presumably perfected 
in Hitchcock, 'which takes as its object, relations, symbolic acts, intellectual 
feelings' (Cinema 1, p.203; emphasis in original), the Cinema books remain 
resolutely transfixed on the auteur as a vehicle of a Bergsonian 'creative 
evolution,' whereby cinema 'thinks' itself from the ancient to the modern 
perception of movement in relation to time. Cohen, in contrast, focuses on a 
'Hitchcock' who 'is conjured and produced by signature systems and marks 
and not the reverse' (Hitchcock‟s Cryptonymies, vol. 2, p.264). There is only 
'Hitchcock' as the dynamic cumulative cross-referenced interplays among 
such marks. It is this deauraticizing 'Hitchcock-effect' that derails the 
indexical functions of images and with them, the visible surface-hidden 
depth aesthetic ideologies that convene the illusion of a guarantee that signs 
ultimately testify to prior, known, or knowable referents.
93
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For Deleuze, Hitchcock‘s films remain indexical of ‗life‘, or ‗reality‘, and thus remain 
tied to the auratic classicism as theorized by Benjamin. Moreover, Hitchcock‘s oeuvre 
remains indexical of a linear evolution of cinema which underpins Deleuze‘s reading. 
Alternatively, Cohen‘s Cryptonymies attempt to read ‗Hitchcock‘ as a weave of 
signature effects, an ‗allomorphic archive […] void of semantic content, irreducibly 
(a)material and semaphoric, mnemonic and performative.‘94 
  
In both Vertigo and La Jetée the Sequoia scene comes roughly at the mid point; 
interrupting the films‘ narrative and duration to manifest the ‗cut‘ or ‗cutting‘ which 
Hitchcock describes as the ‗pure orchestration of the motion-picture form.‘95 In both 
films the Sequoia‘s cross-section is marked with historical dates; concentric circles 
emanate from, or recede into the centre or origin of the tree, indexing the width of the 
tree in relation to the historic events which have taken place during its lifetime, thus 
figuring it as a record or archive of history. Cohen suggests that ‗[i]n part, ―wood/oak‖ 
cites the tree as trope of nature itself as product of the ―cut‖, or preinhabited by a 
prosthetic, such as the archival circle of dates inhabiting the severed Sequoia in 
Vertigo.‘96 The cross-section of the Sequoia makes the natural itself a product of the 
‗cut‘, and thus in a sense spectrographically cinematic. ‗Nature‘ is, like ‗life‘, 
reanimated as an ‗originary‘ dimension, the cross-section a cut in the very ‗nature‘ of 
cinema, revealing ‗nature‘ to be preinhabited by its other; cinema as cutting machine. 
Hence Cohen‘s further suggestion that, in more general terms, the ‗tree is used [in 
Hitchcock‘s films] as a trope of the photograph‘s ―natural image‖, which it must cite 
and which must seem recognizable to others.‘97 The tree reveals the iterability of the 
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‗natural image‘, and therefore the division or cut which must inhabit it in order to make 
it seem ‗natural‘ to others. The cross-section demonstrates that the natural/unnatural 
binary is itself a product of the cinematic ‗cut‘. The ‗archival circle of dates‘, which is 
cut into the cross-section, shows that history is also a product of this cinematic 
orchestration of the cut. The Sequoia is marked by history; it incorporates history as a 
series of re-markable circles, in order to come before the whole of history. It marks 
‗history‘ with the cut, dividing ‗history‘ in advance with the mark or wound of the 
future. 
 
The cross-section is marked by what it produces; it is preinhabited – marked or 
wounded – by a ‗past‘ which it precedes, a past which is also therefore ‗to come‘. The 
cross-section acts here in the same way as the image of the woman in La Jetée, in that 
they both touch on, and defer, what remains to be thought.
98
 Cinema and the feminine 
are aligned, both bearing the mark of the other as that which also remains to come. The 
image of an ideal or phallic mother, the mother both Scottie and the man in La Jetée can 
be seen to desire, is preinhabited by a promise of the future. A search for an ideal or 
phallic mother, therefore, is undercut here by the might (force and possibility) of the 
future. The cinematic image (of woman) divides itself in advance; it is marked or 
wounded by itself as other. An essential spectrographics makes it impossible to reduce 
the image (of woman) to an identificatory logic, including that of a male gaze. For 
Cohen this would be a disruptive signature effect, ‗Hitchcock‘s recasting of marks, 
language, and teletechnics [which] redefines an entire set of performatives that include 
gender, memory, agency, and time‘. Cohen suggests that ‗the vertigo-swirl in the 
Sequoia trunk preinhabits the faux maternality of nature […] with a movement that 
archives historical moments.‘99 The Sequoia, marked by an essentially divided or re-
markable history, demonstrates a spectralized or spectrographic ‗now‘: ‗If the dead that 
inhabit the living are grafted into the past by the seemingly alive (who are, anyway, 
unwitting specters), there is no ―living‖ to begin with‘.100 The ‗living‘, the ‗natural‘, or 
the ‗faux maternality of nature‘ are ghostly to begin with, a spectrality conditioned by 
the ‗dead‘ who inhabit them and who are ‗grafted into the past‘ as what might return 
(the revenant). The spectrographic cinema of ‗Hitchcock‘ demonstrates, then, that what 
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might be thought of as ‗natural‘, ‗alive‘, or even ‗maternal‘ is only so because it is 
marked by the other. Indeed, such cinema, a cinema which concerns itself with the art of 
allowing the ghost to return, re-reads the tropes of maternity, nature, life and death as 
‗essentially‘ spectrographic.101  
 
In Vertigo, the Sequoia scene takes place in Muir Woods, just north of San Francisco
102
, 
and is accessed by Scottie and Madeline by the coastal highway. Here the Sequoias are 
referred to by Scottie with their ‗true name‘: ‗Sequoia sempervirens: always green, 
ever-living.‘103 This scene appears to mark the end of the couple‘s ‗wandering‘, a word 
which returns several times in Vertigo and recalls change, turning, deviation, a 
movement without aim. But their movement without aim is interrupted by an object 
which is marked by the past, by events which might seem to have been and gone. The 
cross-section marks a deathly interruption to the ‗ever-living‘ Sequoia forest; but it is 
not an inverted image of that immortal forest, an image of death. Rather, as noted 
above, it reveals that what we think of as ‗life‘ and ‗death‘ are in fact conditioned by 
their ‗essential‘ or quasi-originary spectrality. The complexity of this scene is 
intensified as Madeleine/Judy, appearing to be possessed by Carlotta, reaches out to 
indicate on the cross-section the points which signify her – with this ‗her‘ remaining 
ambiguous – birth and death.  
 
Madeleine/Judy dislikes the immortal Sequoias, when Scottie asks why, she states 
‗knowing I have to die‘ to be the reason. Madeleine/Judy, as well as the plot, are still 
clinging to the life/death binary here, even if death has somehow possessed the living 
Madeleine/Judy. Yet when she touches the cross-section of the Sequoia there seems to 
be an interruption where the identificatory premises of the plot fall into a vertiginous 
abyss. As Madeleine/Judy marks the cross-section, she announces that ‗somewhere in 
here I was born… and here I died; it was only a moment for you… you took no 
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notice.‘104 It is difficult to know who is speaking here, it could be Judy acting as 
Madeleine channelling Carlotta, but it could also be Judy, who ‗died‘ as she became 
Madeleine/Carlotta. It is also difficult to know who she is talking to; it appears to be the 
cross-section itself, resembling a history of major events and thus unconcerned by her 
own, personal story, a story which is – as Pop Leibel states as he tells the story of 
Carlotta Valdes to Scottie – ‗not unusual‘.105 But she could also be speaking to Scottie 
as the representation of a male history, unconcerned with that of the feminine, who only 
wants to rid Madeleine of Carlotta. However, and as Modleski highlights, Scottie also 
identifies with Judy/Carlotta/Carlotta‘s daughter, in that he also sees himself wounded 
by a certain uncanny otherness. Modleski suggests that ‗[w]oman thus becomes the 
ultimate point of identification for all of the film‘s spectators.‘106 The Sequoia scene 
marks this vertiginous sabotaging of identificatory logic, in which everyone can identify 
with everyone else through a quality or uncanny otherness which is impossible to 
reduce to a single person or character. This scene marks the point at which the wound, 
mark or cut radiates out across a horizonless plane or quasi-originary dimension, a 
dimension in which both fiction and reality suffer the mark or wound of the other. Here, 
cinema‘s Sequoia scene spills out from the frame of the cinematic screen and 
incorporates all its others – including the audience – within a vertiginous ‗horizonless‘ 
plane upon which innumerable others are allowed to return. 
 
1.6 The promise of cinema 
In La Jetée, the Sequoia scene comes at a point when the man has returned to what 
appears to be a pre-war time, and in which he appears to have found the woman with 
whose image he has become obsessed. The man has travelled to a point in time at which 
he is ‗sure he recognizes her‘, to a world where this is in fact ‗the only thing he is sure 
of‘, and to a moment at which ‗she welcomes him without surprise.‘107 In this central 
section of the film the man and woman are ‗without memories, without plans‘; like 
Scottie and Madeleine/Judy they are wandering, vertiginously. But they also find 
themselves at the cross-section of a Sequoia tree which, again, deploys a certain 
vertiginous logic. As the man and the woman approach the cross-section, the woman 
                                                 
104
 Alfred Hitchcock (dir.), Vertigo. 
105
 Alfred Hitchcock (dir.), Vertigo. 
106
 Tania Modleski, The Women Who Knew Too Much, p.99. 
107
 Chris Marker, La Jetée, ciné-roman, page number unspecified. 
 64 
‗pronounces a foreign name [the man] doesn‘t understand.‘108 The commentary for La 
Jetée indicates that here the woman says ‗Hitchcock?‘ The scene therefore provokes 
different reactions from the man and the woman. For the woman this scene is already a 
cinematic echo, the cross-section is something she recognizes as being marked by a 
certain relation to ‗Hitchcock‘, and we can presume, then, this means a familiarity with 
the Sequoia scene from Vertigo. Their arrival at the Sequoia is – for the woman – 
uncannily and coincidentally a reference to ‗Hitchcock‘; it is a recognition that this 
experience is already in a certain sense cinematic, that the signature effects of 
‗Hitchcock‘ have extended beyond Vertigo into the text of La Jetée, which cites Vertigo 
as if it were reality citing the fictional, or vice versa – a cinematic fiction citing 
cinematic history –  so that each film incorporates the other, each fiction/reality 
ventriloquizes another fiction/reality in order to ‗be itself‘. 
  
For the man, the name ‗Hitchcock‘ is unfamiliar, but being faced with the cross-section 
he is provoked to confess he is from another place: ‗As in a dream, he shows her a point 
beyond the tree, hears himself say, ―This is where I come from…‖ [‗Comme en rêve, il 
lui montre un point hors de l‟arbre. Il s‟entend dire: « Je viens de là… »‘].109 
Undertaken as if in a dream, the man‘s pointing resembles Madeleine/Judy/Carlotta‘s 
marking of her life-death on the cross-section, again with the cross-section deploying 
this identificatory logic far beyond the borders of each film. In La Jetée, however, the 
man is pointing to a ‗là‘ beyond the cross-section; a space which would be analogous to 
the Sequoia forest in Vertigo. He dreamily indexes a space beyond the cross-section; a 
‗real‘, ‗natural‘ or even ‗maternal‘ space beyond the cross-section from which he has 
originated and to which he might teleologically return. This echoes Patrick Ffrench‘s 
suggestion (noted above) that La Jetée can be read to take place ‗as if between the 
beginning and end of a single sentence‘. The origin/future to which the man points, and 
from which he has come, is calculated in advance as the (maternal) origin/future which 
he once knew, and to which he dreams of returning. And yet ‗là‘ is also a vertiginous 
term, in that it can mean both here and there. The man‘s gesture is one which suggests 
he comes from a place essentially divided, a ‗there‘ (the future, the past, the origin; a 
maternal, natural forest), and a ‗here‘ (cinema, film, the tree as a ‗nature‘ preinhabited 
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by the prosthesis of the cinematic cut). Divided in advance, the man‘s ‗here‘ is also a 
‗there‘, indexed as if in a dream, his reality is also a fiction; the man – like the very 
operation of the cinematic, or as Robert Smith suggests, the ‗recordability‘ of the 
recordable – is preinhabited by the other as the mark of his own essentially unknowable 
past/future.  
 
As what is indexed with the man‘s ‗là‘ can be thought of as the man‘s point of departure 
– the memory of an image, the trace of a fragment of time as that which triggered his 
ability to travel through time – this scene suggests that it is the image of (the) woman 
which wounds, but cannot be situated as such, by cinema. The image of (the) woman 
drives the man‘s – and indeed cinema‘s – archival desire to capture, think, resurrect and 
understand the other. The man gestures, therefore, towards a certain future of cinema, 
one which has the ability to recover the image from his past in such perfect and 
comprehensible detail as to complete the perfect archive; such a cinema would allow his 
memory of the past to return in its originary glory, that which would enable his 
reconnection with the lost (m)other, returning him to the truth or origin from which he 
came. As the cross-section demonstrates, however, the archival image is preinhabited by 
the cut, and is thus irreducible to a pure origin or truth. It is the archival image which is 
marked by a ‗past‘ which it grafts into the future; the very condition of thinking the 
past, then, is an essential cut or division which inhabits the ‗now‘. In order to think the 
past, future, or now ‗as such‘, it is necessary that they are preinhabited, wounded or 
marked by the other. 
  
Both the structure and the premise of La Jetée explore the relation between cinema and 
the photographic image. Indeed, as an individual film frame, the latter is often thought 
of as a certain ‗origin‘ of cinema. In the same way that the man is marked by an image 
of his past, it could be suggested that – in its relation to the photographic image – La 
Jetée is scarred by an image of its origin. Yet La Jetée‘s engagement with the 
photographic image is one which questions its ontological status. Constructed by 
filming the ‗still‘ image, La Jetée reanimates it at 24 frames per second. In filming the 
still image, in producing its stillness in movement, La Jetée seems to be questioning the 
notion of stillness itself – and perhaps the place of the still image in cinematic history. 
As La Jetée renders stillness in movement, the still, or photographic image, cannot be 
reduced to a location, moment or history which is proper to itself. 
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La Jetée‘s rendering (or projection) of the photographic image would seem to resist the 
possibility of deciding upon either movement or stillness as the modality proper to the 
image‘s capacity to preserve, reanimate, or record ‗life‘. Moreover, this suggests that 
the incalculable status of the cinematic image would always resist any archi-teleological 
desire to capture or represent either origin or end. The structure of La Jetée suggests 
that, for the cinematic text, there is only a movement in stillness, or stillness in 
movement; with each irreducible to, but marked by, the other. Even the freeze frame 
which may close a film is the continual repetition of a ‗still‘ image. As if to demonstrate 
this, La Jetée gives us a brief scene when its ‗still‘ images are edited so closely together 
as to give the impression of movement. This scene demonstrates that what might be 
thought of, or experienced as, a movement or speed which seems ‗natural‘ to cinema, is 
also a certain product of the cut, of stillness or death, and thus that the ‗natural‘ 
movement or speed of cinema is again – like the cross-section – preinhabited by the 
mark of the other.
110
 
 
It is no coincidence that this scene in which the ‗natural‘ movement or speed of cinema 
is undermined is a scene which shows only the face of a woman. With this interruption 
of ‗stillness‘ by ‗movement‘, La Jetée suggests that what seems to be ‗natural‘ 
cinematic movement is in fact preinhabited by an originary excess, a deathly ‗stillness‘ 
which ‗natural‘ movement incorporates in order to appear ‗natural‘. As this is 
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demonstrated with the image of a woman, the film seems to suggest that the man‘s 
desire to be reconnected with a natural, maternal (m)other is futile, as there is no reality 
with which this essentially divided – or spectral – image is commensurate. With this 
scene La Jetée is marking cinema‘s ability to produce both life and stillness, to revive 
the dead – to produce life – by ‗executing‘ the image. What might appear to be the 
origin of cinema (life as such, or the photographic image as film frame), are in fact 
effects of an essentially spectrographic text. 
 
La Jetée goes beyond the conventions of cinematic movement in order to incorporate its 
other – the photographic still. It extends into stillness in order to come before it; 
Marker‘s film is thus marked by the still image as the mark of what remains to be 
thought. Sarah Cooper reads how La Jetée questions the borders between photography 
and cinema, and how such a problematization makes precarious what some see as the 
very origin of cinema: 
 
La Jetée is neither life nor death twenty-four frames per second. Nor is 
it simply the temporal stasis by which photography is often defined. The 
photo-roman projects photographs into the space of cinema, showing 
how ‗movies‘ can be made from them but also how their stillness is 
never entirely static or lifeless, in spite of their difference from the filmic 
image. The photograph endures here beyond its status as the beginning 
and end of cinema, as the still image engenders time enough to live and 
love again.
111
 
 
By going beyond its stasis – it status as its state or standing – the photographic image or 
still return as the ghost of cinematic movement. La Jetée incorporates the other in order 
to come before it, thus suggesting the need to question any notion that the photographic 
image or film frame is the origin of cinema. Here the notion of the photographic image 
is recast as the mark of what remains to come, as the memory of the future. Marker‘s 
text is marked by the still image; it suffers or bears the still image as a question which, 
for cinema, remains or returns. In marking this possibility of the future, the still image 
engenders or promises the ‗again‘ in which we might have ‗time enough to live and 
love‘. 
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What may have been thought to be cinema‘s past or origin – the photographic image – 
is demonstrated through a more complex relation between cinema and photographic 
discourse. La Jetée suggests that cinema‘s relation to the photographic image is 
something which is yet to be thought, and as such, the photographic image cannot be 
thought as either its past, or its material essence. The suggestion that the status of the 
photographic image remains a question for cinema is reflected in (the) man‘s obsession 
with the image of the woman. This image, memory trace, or fragment of time, is marked 
as a certain promise of cinema, it is a trace of what cannot be reduced to the cinematic 
archive, and therefore the trace of what is yet to be thought. As the Sequoia scenes 
demonstrate, both Vertigo and La Jetée are marked by a trace of the other. They are 
wounded by, and therefore suffer or bear the might of, what remains to come. 
Hitchcock‘s ‗signature effect‘, then, would mark a cinematic promise of the future, the 
mark or might of what is yet to be comprehended, and at the same time, perhaps never 
to be comprehended.  
 
Derrida discusses this promise of the future in relation to the notion of the archive:  
 
[T]he question of the archive is not, we repeat, a question of the past. It is 
not a question of a concept dealing with the past that might already be at 
our disposal or not at our disposal, an archivable concept of the archive. It 
is a question of the future [d‟avenir], the question of the future itself 
[l‟avenir meme], the question of a response, of a promise and of a 
responsibility for tomorrow. The archive: if we want to know what it will 
have meant, we will only know in times to come [les temps à venir]. 
Perhaps. Not tomorrow but in times to come, later on or perhaps never.
112
 
  
As the cinematic structure can be thought of in terms of an archiving technique or 
archival technology, the Sequoia scenes seem to ask how we might await the promise of 
cinema itself: would it be its future perfection, an archival technology capable of 
faithfully recalling the purity of the moment of impression (as origin, life, death, time, 
affect or the other as such)? Or, would it be as a continued engagement with otherness, 
a suffering of the mark or wound of the other, the might of the future, which sees 
cinema‘s very survival irreducibly folded into the (im)possibility of awaiting what is 
unexpected or incalculable? To know what the archive ‗will have meant‘, the projection 
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of meaning into the future anterior, is to survive or suffer the impossible anticipation of 
what Derrida refers to as the ‗to-come‘; not the ‗futur‘, but the ‗à-venir‘, the ‗to-come‘ 
which points towards ‗the coming of an event rather than toward some future 
present‘.113 Recalling Derrida‘s suggestion that all events must remain in a sense 
traumatic,
114
 the spectrographic signature effects of ‗Hitchcock‘, which traverse Vertigo 
and La Jetée via the Sequoia scenes, suggest that cinema itself may be divided in 
advance, marked or wounded by the other and thus an essentially spectral dimension 
which awaits or projects (itself as) an event which remains to come. 
  
1.7 A trauma study 
Derrida suggests that ‗archival technology no longer determines, will never have 
determined, merely the moment of the conservational recording, but rather the very 
institution of the archivable event.‘115 If we think of cinema as an archival technology, 
not least in relation to the storage of time,
116
 then it is not simply that it archives a 
recordable event, but rather that what we might archive as the event is determined by 
the very archival technology which attempts to capture it. Though this may seem 
obvious, if we think of this in terms of a mnemonic archive, it suggests that what is 
remembered is never a copy of an event, but rather that an event has in a sense been 
determined by the mnemonic apparatus. As Derrida states, ‗archivable meaning is also 
and in advance codetermined by the structure that archives. It begins with the 
printer.‘117 Although there is something to be remembered – an ‗archivable meaning‘ – 
such meaning is codetermined by the ‗structure that archives‘. As Eric Prenowitz notes, 
the archive ‗never neutrally consigns a pre-existent archivable content in a simple 
manner.‘118 As what is archived of the event is never analogous to it, the very act of 
archiving is preinhabited by a certain otherness. At the heart of all archival desire, this 
otherness is what Derrida refers to as ‗mal d‟archive‘, or ‗archive fever‘. Such a fever, 
which preinhabits all archival technology, might be thought of as a certain finitude, a 
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cut, forgetting, or radical evil in relation to which there would be no desire to archive: 
‗There would indeed be no archive desire without the radical finitude, without the 
possibility of a forgetfulness which does not limit itself to repression.‘119 Therefore, the 
archive ‗always works, and a priori, against itself‘120; all archival desire is marked in 
advance by a radical forgetting. ‗Archive fever‘ means that there is no archival 
technology which is commensurate to the event it purports to record or remember. 
  
In a similar sense, for it to be possible to recall what has been archived, it would be 
necessary to remember to forget. Such forgetting is not a simple act of repression or 
disavowal; it is the radical finitude or cut which makes all memory possible. No matter 
how commanding or complete the archive, its very possibility is due to the fact that it 
cannot be reduced to that which it attempts to archive. The archive will always be the 
mark of what exceeds it, an impression of the other – an otherness which cannot be 
reduced to its recording or reproduction. Always-already exceeded by what is 
nevertheless marked by the archive, the archival trace is divided in advance, marked by 
what is grafted into the future. The archive, then, is a certain spectrographic technology, 
a ghost-writing machine, a machine which lets the ghost return as the mark of what 
remains to come. The Sequoia scenes explore this archival fever, allowing us to ask 
what it might mean to suffer, survive or live on with the fever at the heart of every 
archive. Deploying a spectrographic cinema, Hitchcock‘s ‗signature effects‘ provide an 
essentially unstable platform from which to ask what such a suffering and survival 
would mean for the notions of memory and for forgetting. 
 
Archontic desire is preinhabited, therefore, by the question of suffering, of suffering the 
mark of a radical otherness as that which cannot be recalled to memory or to forgetting, 
but which is the condition of both. That a memory or record of the event is conditioned 
by a certain ‗fever‘, echoes Derrida‘s suggestion that ‗[b]y reason of this 
unforeseeability, this irreducible and inappropriable exteriority [my emphasis] for the 
subject of experience, every event as such would be traumatic.‘121 As the event ‗injures 
desire, whether or not desire desires or does not desire what happens‘122, its very 
condition – for the experiencing, archiving subject or structure – would be the mark or 
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wound of what remained ‗irreducible and inappropriable‘. Cinema, subject, and the 
archive are traversed by this essential spectrographics; an art of cinema, the experience 
of the subject, and the possibility of the archive are all conditioned by their bearing the 
mark of ‗some outside, […] some nondesire, some death, and something inorganic, the 
becoming possible of the impossible as im-possible.‘123 All are preinhabited by what 
exceeds them, like Derrida‘s ‗jetty‘, they extend into and incorporate the other as their 
very possibility. In turn, each are ‗themselves‘ by bearing the might of the future as the 
‗becoming possible of the impossible as im-possible‘. 
 
A trauma study, as that which attempts to devote itself to thinking the traumatic event, 
must also suffer and live on as that which bears the mark or might of the im-possible. Of 
course, this would mean that the study of a traumatic event would be the study of what 
remains ‗to come‘, a study in the possibility of the im-possible. This would also mean, 
however, that such a suffering would be the only possibility of thinking a traumatic 
event, in that, at an infinite distance from the event, a trauma study would register its 
essentially divided impression. As an impression, mark or wound of what remains to 
come, a trauma study remains trembling and hesitant upon this horizonless plane. A 
trauma study, then, could never be (re)assured. As the archiving of the traumatic event 
could never be reduced to itself once and for all (to the point where its ‗traumatic‘ status 
could be secured), any study which might attempt to think that event would be equally 
unstable. A traumatic event is a return from the future, a ghost-effect which returns to 
the texts which attempt to write (on) it. Moreover, as a traumatic event
 
could never be 
reduced to the total control, command or recollection of a perfect memory or a total 
forgetting, it would never be proper to a particular archive, or to a particular scientific or 
academic discipline. Indeed, a trauma study would put such archives, categories or 
disciplines necessarily at risk.  As there ‗is no political power without control of the 
archive, if not of memory,‘124 a trauma study, then, as the possibility of the im-possible, 
would politicize trauma and traumatize the political.  
 
Of course, a trauma study would also be impossible to name ‗as such‘; it would always 
be the possibility that it might be something other than what it purports to be, and this 
inability to decide once and for all upon its status would be its necessary condition. If 
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there is to be a trauma study, it would be impossible to situate or to locate ‗as such‘ 
(either academically, politically, epistemologically, nomologically, or topographically). 
Rather, a trauma study would suffer and survive – live on – as that which is marked by 
what remains to come. It is as likely, then, that a trauma study would ‗take place‘ as a 
cinematic text as an academic text. Indeed, there is no genre or faculty which would be 
appropriate to it. This is why cinema – or an art/science/séance or spectrographic 
cinema – is a medium in which a trauma study, as the possibility of the im-possible, 
might take place. 
 
1.8 Suffering the wound 
As a making visible of the cut which preinhabits the natural, the Sequoia scenes are 
suffused with the fantasy of castration. Indeed, as a traumatic cut or interruption would 
be the very condition of the event, the question of castration is central to a cinema 
whose condition is also a certain marking of the other. However, as the Sequoia scenes 
reveal the cut to be the condition of the ‗natural‘ or ‗living‘, it could be suggested that, 
in their deployment of a certain spectrographics, these scenes might allow us to re-read 
the relation to the other upon which the fantasies of castration (and their traumatic 
effects) rely. 
 
In various ways, both Vertigo and La Jetée can be seen to suffer the mark of the other. 
At the opening of Vertigo Scottie witnesses the death of the law, of the father, a death 
which marks a shift of castrating authority from the real father to the symbolic father, or 
what Lacan terms the ‗Name of the Father‘.125 Thus the castrating threat of the real 
father shifts to the threat of death ‗as such‘. Like the man in La Jetée, Scottie is marked 
by the image of his death; both films open with a clear demonstration of this threat, in 
turn suggesting that a reconnection with the phallic (m)other is the only safeguard 
against it. The narratives of both films follow this search for a reconnection with a 
maternal safety, the return to an idyllic prehistorical bliss of the (phallic) mother. From 
this it is clear how critics can read Scottie as identifying with Madeleine/Judy, in that 
both are haunted or marked by a notion of the feminine/maternal to which they wish to 
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return. However, and as Cohen notes, the notion of the feminine with which Scottie 
wishes to reconnect or reattach (himself) is fake: ‗a first model, first object, or first 
memory for Scottie on which all else supposedly depends, is itself a plant, prosthetic, 
even a joke – that is, Madeleine.‘126  
 
Like Scottie, the man in La Jetée is also haunted by something which is planted, 
inscribed, or marked in him. The memory which haunts him from childhood – the 
memory of his own death – is also a fake, in that, as he witnesses that death as a child, it 
cannot be his own. His death is also another‘s, and therefore a fake, virtual, 
inappropriable to himself alone. Both films, then, can be seen to ask what might be the 
effect of believing that what is most natural, most our own, most proper to us is in fact a 
prosthetic implant, something inscribed in us like the archiving circles of the Sequoia‘s 
cross-section. Castration, or the cut, interruption, wound, or mark of the other, is 
addressed as an originary condition of what we take to be most natural, real, or proper. 
Cohen glosses this spectrographic dispossession of origin: 
 
With this circular buckling of mnemonic order, model and copy, before and 
after are decoupled. Any intervention in the historical program […] rests 
with this rendering virtual of a programmed past through a dispossessing 
―priority‖ of inscription to perception, identity, legibility.127  
  
In both Vertigo and La Jetée, then, castration, or the mark of the other, can be read to be 
figured through a phallocentric prism: for Scottie, Judy, and the man in La Jetée, the 
desire to reconnect (with) a lost maternal other allows them to be linked via an 
identificatory logic (hence Modleski can read Vertigo as exceeding the masculine gaze 
by anticipating a feminine or bisexual spectator). However, as Scottie and Judy are 
haunted or preinhabited by a virtual memory (Madeleine), we find an identificatory 
logic has been disposed of its priority by a logic of prosthesis, inscription, and the cut. It 
could be suggested, then, that a certain spectrographic cinema – or cinema as the 
art/science/séance of ghosts – preinhabits a cinema based on identificatory, Oedipal, 
mimetic, and anthropomorphic themes and structures. In a sense castration, or the mark 
of the other, is the condition of all these themes and structures, and yet, as sites where 
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this textual dimension is deployed, Vertigo and La Jetée present opportunities to read 
castration otherwise.  
 
We can see the potential of, and the resistance to, such an opportunity in the Sequoia 
scene from La Jetée. When faced with the cross-section, the word the woman speaks but 
the man cannot comprehend is ‗Hitchcock?‘ (for some perhaps the father of auteur 
cinema). This is a certain staging of the castration complex: whilst the woman makes an 
association between the cross-section and ‗Hitchcock‘ (that is, she recognizes the Name 
of the Father), the man cannot comprehend this name; his reaction is one of disavowing 
this castrating symbolic law – and the cross-section as the image of the cut – and 
indexing a point beyond the cross-section from which he originated (as the future and/or 
the image of woman which guards him from death). Just as the man attempts to go 
beyond the image of the woman in order to reconnect with her real presence, he also 
disavows the signifier ‗Hitchcock‘ when faced with the cross-section, an image of 
castration as a ‗natural‘ – and ‗ever-living‘ – life marked by death. As noted above, 
however, the vertiginous logic of the Sequoia scene, of a natural life preinhabited by the 
cut, overflows or extends beyond the confines of the cross-section. The spectral 
inscription mirrors the double meaning of ‗là‘ (here/there) with which the man tries to 
index his origin/future. 
 
In terms of narrative plot, we might see a difference between Vertigo and La Jetée in 
their relation to loss – which, again, can be read in both films through the castration 
complex. For Vertigo‘s Scottie, the loss/castration/death he cannot bear is a 
loss/castration/death he cannot figure – hence his acrophobic condition, illustrated in the 
film with the famous ‗dolly zoom‘ or ‗Vertigo shot‘ in which camera both zooms 
towards and moves away from the subject. Scottie attempts to rid himself of his 
vertiginous relation to loss/castration/death through his desire for a woman who can 
manifest, and therefore figure death for him; someone who can contain death by giving 
it a presence.
128
 After what appears to be the death of Madeleine – something he cannot 
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bra she is designing). But she is also attracted to Scottie, and wants to be desired by him in the same way 
he desires Madeleine. As if to tell Scottie this, Midge paints a portrait of herself in the image of the dead 
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witness and which provokes a profound melancholy – his ‗second chance‘ comes with 
the discovery of Judy, a woman who can figure the dead Madeleine, and in turn, 
Madeleine‘s capacity to represent death. Once uncovered as a sham however, Judy, as 
his second chance, turns out to be his saving grace: with the discovery that Madeleine‘s 
capacity to figure the dead was faked, Scottie drives Judy to her real death, and in doing 
so overcomes his vertigo by witnessing loss/castration/death as a bearable event.  
  
Whilst Vertigo‘s plot sees Scottie shifting from a ‗pathological‘ melancholia to ‗normal‘ 
mourning, a work of mourning which seems to end successfully by coming to terms 
with/witnessing Judy‘s death, the man in La Jetée is returned to the instant of his ‗own‘ 
death. Here, the man – who is also the child – survives and experiences his own death. 
This doubling of the child/man means that the subject/other is at once in a position of 
knowledge and non-knowledge: the man knows he is – as a child (and therefore as 
another) – witnessing his/another‘s death, and the child – as the man (and therefore 
another) – does not. The man knows what himself-as-other does not know, and the child 
does not know what himself-as-other knows. One way to think this impossible logic 
might be in relation to the notorious ambiguity surrounding the status of the primal 
scene
129
 – that is, as to whether such a scene has been experienced ‗for real‘ or 
fantasised. Such ambiguity would also concern the castrating violence with which most 
instances of the primal scene are overdetermined: for the child/man in La Jetée, the 
primal scene is both witnessed and experienced. If such a vertiginous logic could be 
cured (as Scottie‘s is in Vertigo), the boy would know immediately that what he was 
witnessing was a murder – and that he could bear, or figure this appearance of death. 
However, though the boy/man will later realise that ‗he had seen a man die‘, and that 
this death is his ‗own‘, his survival of it renders that death as essentially divided or 
spectral. His ‗own‘ death in fact divides him in advance; his ‗own‘ death is the other 
                                                                                                                                               
Carlotta – that is, she figures herself as what will screen/figure death for Scottie. But Scottie is appalled 
by this, and states she has gone too far. Though Midge‘s role in Vertigo would require a much longer 
reading here, it might tentatively be suggested that Scottie‘s rejection of Midge suggests that death has 
already been more comprehensively figured for him by Madeleine, and that Midge‘s painting appeared to 
him as only a weak, clumsy and excessive counterfeit. 
129
 ‗Scene of sexual intercourse between the parents which the child observes, or infers on the basis of 
certain indications, and phantasises. It is generally interpreted by the child as an act of violence on the 
part of the father.‘ See: Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, 
p.335. In this case, the boy/man witnesses/experiences the murder as the violent and castrating act of the 
father. That the boy/man is both witness and subject of the experience raises a further complication 
regarding the roles of reality and fantasy here. 
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which preinhabits him, which wounds or marks him, as his very condition. The man can 
only assume his ‗own‘ death because he has already survived it.  
 
From the opening scene of La Jetée, a curious logic sees the man survive himself in 
order to experience ‗himself‘. As a point of origin or end – a point which would be 
proper to the man‘s history – the child/man finds that his murder/witnessing is 
impossible to return to or arrive at, as it would always-already be marked – and 
therefore divided or differentiated – by the other. Indeed, the very notion of this moment 
being reducible to an origin or end could only be thought because it was marked, 
differentiated, and haunted by the other. We can think of this in terms of the film‘s 
relation to psychoanalysis, and to Derrida‘s suggestion that psychoanalysis is an event 
whose interruption has marked intellectual discourse, but which remains irreducible to 
conventional reason. For Derrida, psychoanalysis and cinema form an 
art/science/séance of ghosts. In its pseudo-psychoanalytic scenario – the 
analyst/experimenter‘s provocation of the prisoner‘s dreams as a passage to their proper 
origin/history – La Jetée suggests that, in order to recall their past, the analysand must 
be haunted by the other. The secret of psychoanalysis, or what Derrida refers to in 
Ghost Dance as an ‗aspect‘ or ‗something‘ [quelque chose] of psychoanalysis, is the 
very thing which cannot be reduced to psychoanalytic reason, to the reason of the 
analyst. Once the man tunes into the images with which he is obsessed, he can dream 
that time and therefore be transported to it. But to live these moments again would 
demand their repetition, their iterable trace. The moment of which the man dreams, and 
to which he wants to return, must first of all be the mark of what might return, a mark 
which is haunted by the other as the possibility of the future. The fragment or memory 
trace of which he dreams cannot be reduced to an experience, history, or space-time 
which is proper to the subject, as that trace is divided in advance by the possibility of its 
repetition. This pseudo-psychoanalytic process is both conditioned and compromised by 
the very thing it introduced, an irreducible unconscious. It is perhaps necessary then that 
psychoanalysis be thought of in terms of a theoretical jetty, as that which must extend 
beyond its own borders and incorporate the other in order to be ‗itself‘. Such a pseudo-
science might also incorporate a certain art, or indeed, be an art of incorporation. 
Indeed, and recalling Derrida‘s reference to a relation between cinema and a certain 
‗something‘ of psychoanalysis, here we might find an art/science/séance of cinema as 
the medium which channels the return of its ghostly other. 
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La Jetée demonstrates an essential paradox: the man is both dead and alive, his history 
his own because it is also another‘s. And this paradox is the very condition of memory, 
the very possibility of thinking or ‗returning‘ to a ‗past‘. The condition of time-travel 
(which depends upon an intense attachment to a fragment of memory), and thus the 
condition of the man‘s pseudo-analysis, is that it is impossible for the man to be reduced 
to his own memory. Here, the very condition of psychoanalysis would be the 
impossibility of reducing analysis to a traditional notion of the psyche: an animating 
force which is proper to a host subject or entity. As if in defiance of this essential 
irrationality, the ‗reasonable‘130 experimenter of the future (the figure of the analyst) 
attempts to terminate the session by returning to the pier to kill the man (with violence 
and the desire to ‗call time‘ providing a castrating law here). But the experimenter has 
travelled with the man; he is already part of the impossibility of terminating that scene 
as his shooting of the man begins the process anew. The event which demands that this 
story cannot end (the murder witnessed by the child) is, therefore, the result of a desire 
to end it – to put an end to the enigmatic might of memory. The castrating death, the cut 
or interruption is the condition of the film, La Jetée only ‗begins‘ because it is 
preinhabited by the end, the cut, death. 
  
With the man‘s murder comes the realization that ‗there was no way to escape Time.‘131 
A moment of inescapable death, then, must also be escaped (as it is also the moment of 
resurrection) in order to be thought of as inescapable. This event is at the same time a 
‗madness‘132 (for the child), and a sober realization (for the man). The paradox at work 
here is that the (im)possible doubling of the event (in that it is both experienced by the 
man and witnessed by the boy) is, on the one hand, the result of the child/man already 
surviving him/them-selves. On the other hand, however, such a survival is also a result 
of the doubling of the event. It would seem that what might be thought of as death and 
survival are constituted in the very difference of the same (moment). The consequence 
being that such a moment both can and cannot be thought. From the moment of the 
murder/witnessing, every step of the film can be thought of as both an after-effect and 
an awaiting of the (un)known ‗traumatic‘ event; an event – or the ‗worst‘ – both 
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 Chris Marker, La Jetée, ciné-roman, page number unspecified. 
131
 Chris Marker, La Jetée, ciné-roman, page number unspecified. 
132
 Chris Marker, La Jetée, ciné-roman, page number unspecified. 
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experienced and to come, a paradox conditioned by the quasi-originary suffering, 
marking, or inscription of the other. 
   
The boy‘s survival of his own death forever defers the man‘s reconnection with it. The 
image of the woman, then, which seems to promise the absolute knowledge of maternal 
origin and proper death, only signifies that origin/death as a further virtuality. The 
spectrality of the image, as the mark or inscription of what exceeds it, defers the 
phallocentric archival drive of the man‘s desire to reconnect with the lost object, as well 
as a certain cinematic desire to reduce everything – including the threat of death – to a 
mimetic regime. That the very possibility of the film‘s plot depends upon the 
impossibility of resolving it suggests that the plot is itself preinhabited by a textuality 
which exceeds it. Such a textuality would be the spectrographics or cryptonymies which 
survive on the borders of the text; the signature effects of ‗Hitchcock‘ which sabotage 
narrative in their endless traversal of a ‗Hitchcockian‘ telegraphic network. In neither 
avowing nor disavowing the man‘s attempted denial of castration, La Jetée allows this 
spectrographic textuality to infiltrate the plot and form a resistance to any definite 
reading of it.
133
 The film neither allows his complete reconnection with the woman, nor 
– in the fact the child survives his own (that is, the man‘s) death – disallows this 
possibility. Neither does it sublimate his desire (the film resists substituting or 
translating woman as the object of desire). Rather the film affirms a quasi-originary 
textual dimension, a living on which bears the mark of the (m)other as its very 
possibility, a spectrographics which suffers or survives the (m)other as the might – the 
force and potentiality – of the future. 
 
1.9 Welcoming the im-possible 
As if somehow expecting the man‘s arrival, the woman in La Jetée ‗welcomes him 
without surprise‘.134  Though the man repeatedly returns in his desire to know once and 
for all what she means for him, she is not alarmed by his unexpected appearances, 
instead she  
 
                                                 
133
 Like the Palais de Chaillot which hid a Resistance reseau, a spectrographic network of resistance, 
which traverses or tunnels/extends into and under Hitchcock‘s work, is deployed here. 
134
 Chris Marker, La Jetée, ciné-roman, page number unspecified. 
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welcomes him in a simple way. She calls him her ghost […] She accepts as 
a natural phenomenon the ways of this visitor who comes and goes, who 
exists, talks, laughs with her, stops talking, listens to her, then disappears.‘135  
 
Moreover, when the man tells her his almost unbelievable story, she takes it seriously: 
‗Of a truth too fantastic to be believed he retains the essential: an unreachable country, a 
long way to go. She listens. She doesn‘t laugh.‘136 Though the man knows that in the 
future from which he has come she is dead, and that therefore she is also a ghost for 
him, it is only the woman who welcomes the ghost, who doesn‘t expect, demand or 
desire the confirmation of presence or knowledge, but allows the other to return in the 
here and now; it is only the woman who welcomes what is ‗too fantastic to be 
believed‘.137  
 
The welcoming of the other, of the ghost effect, can be seen in the Sequoia scene; as 
opposed to the man‘s unawareness of the cinematic significance of this scene, the 
woman recognizes the signature of ‗Hitchcock‘, she countersigns this signature effect or 
mark of the other as her ‗reality‘ incorporates the cinematic. It is as if she inhabits 
cinema as that which preinhabits her, that ‗something‘ which cannot be reduced to the 
logic of ‗reality‘.138 The spectrographics of ‗Hitchcock‘ have been incorporated by the 
woman so that when faced with the cross-section she welcomes it as the return of an 
almost familiar ghost, as something with which she has already been marked, and yet 
which keeps returning from the future.  
 
The two grammars of La Jetée each preinhabit the other. Indeed, La Jetée is 
grammatically doubled in advance; it extends into the other as a text marked by what 
remains to come, whilst also coming back to itself because of that marking. It can be 
seen to take place between the beginning and end of a single sentence because it extends 
                                                 
135
 Chris Marker, La Jetée, ciné-roman, page number unspecified. 
136
 ‗Elle l‟accueille sans étonnement‘; ‗Elle l‟accueille simplement. Elle l‟appelle son Spectre‘; ‗Elle 
accepte comme un phénomène naturel les passages de ce visiteur qui apparaît et disparaît, qui existe, 
parle, rit avec elle, se tait, l‟écoute et s‟en va‘; ‗D‟une vérité trop fantastique pour être reçue, il garde 
l‟essentiel : un pays lointain, une longue distance à parcourir. Elle l‟écoute sans se moquer.‘ See: Chris 
Marker, La Jetée, ciné-roman, page number unspecified. 
137
 Chris Marker, La Jetée, ciné-roman, page number unspecified. 
138
 This ‗inhabiting‘ of cinema recalls Benjamin‘s essay ‗The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction‘, in which he suggests a certain distracted or habitual consideration of film, mirroring the 
distracted or disinterested way people inhabit buildings. See: Hannah Arendt (ed.), Illuminations 
(London: Pimlico, 1999), pp.211-44 (p.233). Of course, distracted consideration or disinterested interest 
has a philosophical history which stems at least from Kant‘s Critique of Judgement. 
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into and incorporates what remains beyond that circular or teleological grammar. 
Because of this double movement, La Jetée can be read to subscribe to the same 
structure of Freud‘s ‗Beyond the Pleasure Principle‘139, a structure noted in Derrida‘s 
‗To Speculate – On ―Freud‖‘140, in which Freud touches on, marks, or is marked by the 
death drive which preinhabits the pleasure principle.
141
 As Smith notes, Derrida‘s 
reading asks if Freud ‗is the author of this text or is there a more powerful machine 
manipulating him?‘142 As Freud attempts to move his theory of trauma forward, as he 
attempts to touch on the death drive, he also recoils from his hypothesis, as if to return 
the text to the safety of a pleasure which is not inhabited by the mechanical repetitions 
of the death drive. Freud will touch on the other whilst returning to himself, in this 
sense his text suffers the inscription of the death drive as what remains to come, and 
performs the very movement he is trying to theorize (and reduce to a single point or 
principle). Yet whilst Freud is tentative and timid in his inscription of the other, and 
whilst the man in La Jetée attempts to return to his own principle point, the woman 
seems to welcome the other as if it were the very condition of the ‗natural‘.  
  
In his essay on the ‗state‘ or ‗states‘ of ‗theory‘ in the North American university, 
Derrida distinguishes in the jetty  
 
on the one hand, the force of the movement which throws something or 
throws itself (jette or se jette) forward and backwards at the same time, prior 
to any subject, object, or project, prior to any rejection or abjection, from, on 
the other hand, its institutional and protective consolidation, which can be 
compared to the jetty, the pier in a harbour meant to break the waves and 
maintain low tide for boats at anchor or for swimmers. Of course, these two 
functions of the jetty are ideally distinct, but in fact they are difficult to 
dissociate, if not indissociable.
143
 
 
On the one hand the force of a movement which throws itself forward and backwards 
would be a certain destabilizing ‗jetty‘, a ‗non-place‘ in which the ‗the appearance of 
the effects of deconstruction can be situated.‘144 On the other, the jetty as harbour pier 
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 Sigmund Freud, ‗Beyond the Pleasure Principle‘ [1920], The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XVIII (London: Vintage, 2001), pp.7-64. 
140
 Jacques Derrida, ‗To Speculate – On ―Freud‖‘ [1980], The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and 
Beyond, trans. Alan Bass (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp.257-409. 
141
 See also: Robert Smith, ‗Deconstruction and Film‘, pp.123-4. 
142
 Robert Smith, ‗Deconstruction and Film‘, p.123. 
143
 Jacques Derrida, ‗Some Statements and Truisms‘, p.65. 
144
 Jacques Derrida, ‗Some Statements and Truisms‘, p.72. 
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would consolidate its position, calming the waters for those who want to swim in them. 
These two jetties can be read in La Jetée; the destabilizing jetty, essentially divided by a 
forward and back movement, recoiling and suffering from the mark of the other it also 
projects or grafts into the future. The Sequoia scene would be only one instance of this 
double movement in the film. Derrida‘s second jetty can be found in Ffrench‘s 
suggestion that the film can be read to take place as if between the beginning and end of 
a single sentence; a film which extends into the other only to return to its ‗proper‘ 
conclusion (the man‘s ‗own death‘). Following Derrida then, these two jetties would be 
difficult to separate, indeed each may be the possibility of the other, and both contribute 
to the ‗essential vagueness‘145 of the notion of ‗theory‘ he is discussing.  
 
As ‗Trauma Studies‘ – as a discipline or field of academic enquiry – can be seen to have 
emerged from North American (comparative literature) departments, departments in 
which Derrida‘s ‗essentially vague‘ notion of ‗theory‘ also appears, there is the 
possibility that Derrida‘s indissociable jetties can also be found there. Trauma Studies, 
then, might be seen to function according to the destabilizing jetty of deconstruction, as 
well as to the consolidating or static jetty of an academic discipline‘s political desire to 
sustain and secure its borders. A trauma study, then, might also be structured by these 
indissociable jetties; both a place where deconstruction might happen, or where its 
effects might appear, but also a consolidatory act: that which gives place to an ‗essential 
vagueness‘, a thetic placing, assurance or consolidation of what can‘t be placed, 
reassured, or consolidated. I have tried to give place to a destabilizing jetty through my 
reading of the Sequoia scenes, suggesting that such scenes radiate ‗Hitchcock‘s‘ 
vertiginous signature effect as a writing which suffers the mark or wound of the other. I 
suggest that these vertiginous scenes mark a particular instance where a trauma study – 
which must remain in a sense im-possible – might find its possibility.  
 
If La Jetée is to be read as a trauma study, such a reading must preserve its secret as the 
very condition of being able to think, experience and come to terms with it. Whilst 
returning to itself in an attempt to come to a conclusion, I hope this chapter has also 
touched on the other, that it has borne or suffered the mark of the other as a memory of 
what exceeds it. If La Jetée is to be read as a trauma study, such a reading must 
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 Jacques Derrida, ‗Some Statements and Truisms‘, p.85. 
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countersign it ‗as such‘, it must place itself alongside the woman who welcomes the 
ghost, who suffers what might return, alongside the one who welcomes a story ‗too 
fantastic to be believed‘, but who says yes to this unbelievable excess as if it were the 
very essence of the believable. 
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2. 
 
FROM LOSS TO IMMINENCE: 
READING BARTHES READING STENDHAL 
 
 
In short, what has happened – what has transpired – between the 
travel journals and The Charterhouse, is writing [c‟est l‟écriture]. 
Writing – which is what? A power, probable fruit of a long 
initiation, which annuls [défait] the sterile immobility of the 
amorous image-repertoire [l‟imaginaire amoureux] and gives its 
adventure a symbolic generality. When he was young, in the days 
of Rome, Naples, Florence, Stendhal could write: ―… when I tell 
lies, I am like M. de Goury, I am bored‖; he did not yet know that 
there existed a lie, the lie of novels [le mensonge romanesque], 
which would be – miraculously – both the detour of truth and the 
finally triumphant expression of his Italian passion. 
Roland Barthes.
1
 
 
Does this all mean I‘m going to write a novel? How should I 
know? 
Roland Barthes.
2
 
 
 
My first epigraph is from ‗On échoue toujours à parler de ce qu‟on aime‘, an essay 
written in 1980 by Roland Barthes, for a colloquium in Milan on Stendhal. It is thought 
to be the last he wrote before his death. Barthes left the first page typed and amended, 
but the manuscript‘s second page remained in the typewriter. Perhaps it was left 
unfinished (the fact Barthes had amended the first page certainly implies he would have 
amended the rest), but this cannot be known for sure, and so it might also be considered 
as a text which marks what remained to come. Barthes‘s essay maps a shift between 
Stendhal‘s early travel journals and his later novels; with the latter performing the 
‗romanesque‘ lie as referred to in my epigraph. Such a lie is the lie of the novel, which, 
in going via the ‗detour of truth‘, achieves the final ‗triumphant expression of 
[Stendhal‘s] Italian passion‘. Barthes‘s essay is concerned with Stendhal‘s ability to 
                                                 
1
 Roland Barthes, ‗One Always Fails in Speaking of What One Loves‘, trans. Richard Howard, in: The 
Rustle of Language, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1986), pp.296-305 (p.305); ‗On échoue toujours à 
parler de ce qu‟on aime‘, Tel Quel, no.85, automne 1980; Œuvres Complètes, vol.V (Paris: Éditions du 
Seuil, 2002), pp.906-914 (p.914). 
2
 Roland Barthes, ‗ « Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure... »‘, trans. Richard Howard, in: The 
Rustle of Language (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1986), pp.277-90 (p.289); Œuvres Complètes, vol.V 
(Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2002), pp.459-470 (p.470). 
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address this intense ‗Italian‘ passion without reducing that passion to definitive 
knowledge, or specific object. My second chapter, therefore, will argue that, with his 
reading of Stendhal, Barthes also reflects on his own desire to write on the subject of 
(his) passion, a writing which might express that passion whilst sustaining it as his most 
intimate secret. 
 
Chapter One of this thesis suggested how an art/science/séance of cinema might affirm, 
or write (on), the traumatic event as the possibility of the im-possible, a writing (on) 
trauma which welcomes the might of what remains to come. Chapter Two reads this 
‗might‘ in terms of imminence, and asks how, in his reading of Stendhal, Barthes 
reserves a space in writing for what is yet to come. Referring to Jacques Derrida‘s 
notion of the arrivant as that which must remain wholly other, utterly unexpected and 
‗to come‘, this chapter argues that, in order to think the other as what must remain ‗to 
come‘, Barthes puts to work a notion of the ‗imaginary‘ as an effect of the text in which 
what remains wholly other is imminent, but yet to arrive ‗as such‘. I argue that, it is 
through this reading of the imaginary that Barthes can claim Stendhal has 
‗triumphantly‘ expressed his ‗Italian passion‘ via the truth of a ‗romanesque‘ lie, that 
this ‗triumph‘ has been achieved through an imaginary punctuated by the promise – and 
threat – of what remains to come. 
 
At the beginning of ‗On échoue toujours à parler de ce qu‟on aime‘, Barthes seems a 
little uncertain of his conclusion; he remains unsure as to whether Stendhal did 
eventually express his passion for Italy: ‗Stendhal‘s Italy is indeed a fantasy [un 
fantasme], even if he partially realized it [même s‟il l‟a en partie accompli]. (But did 
he? I shall end by saying how).‘3 As we can‘t be sure that Barthes‘s essay was 
complete, we cannot be sure of how he thought Stendhal might have ‗partially realized‘ 
his fantasy, though the closing passages do give an indication of the direction in which 
his thought was heading. Barthes suggests that ‗Italy‘ is ‗un fantasme‘ for Stendhal, a 
term which recalls a psychoanalytic lexicon. Moreover, my first epigraph shows Barthes 
using the term ‗imaginaire‘ to describe a space in which the mode of address shifts in 
Stendhal‘s work. The use of these two terms marks Barthes‘s essay as an intersection in 
the work of several major thinkers: Nietzsche, Sartre, Deleuze, Guattari and Lacan. 
                                                 
3
 Roland Barthes, ‗One Always Fails in Speaking of What One Loves‘, p.296; Œuvres Complètes, vol.V, 
p.906. 
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Though it is impossible to recall the intricacies of this convergence here, it is necessary 
to sketch its outline. 
 
Kris Pint argues that Barthes re-reads the imaginary in order to find a neutral term 
between the Lacanian and Deleuzian readings of fantasy.
4
 Lacan sees fantasy as a form 
of defence, a compromise formation which touches on but protects the subject from an 
overwhelming ‗Real‘ or ‗jouissance‘, whilst sustaining a desire for the other. The 
fantasy, therefore, is a function of the subject, a ‗defense which veils castration.‘5 
Whilst Lacan sees fantasy as essential to the formation of the subject, Deleuze and 
Guattari see the Lacanian subject as an effect of the Oedipal/castration fantasy, and 
therefore a subject whose desires are individuated, stifled and controlled according to 
the formation of the self or ego.
6
 For Deleuze and Guattari, the Freudian/Lacanian – and 
therefore Oedipal – subject is an effect of language or representation, a subject which is 
determined by an originary lack (castration). As Claire Colebrook explains, ‗[i]f I am 
subjected to this system of lawful signs (the [Lacanian] Symbolic), then I imagine that 
there was some renounced object that was lacking (but which the law promises).‘7 The 
subject of the Symbolic order must therefore mediate their relation to lack – their desire 
– through the signifier. Through its imaginary manipulation of the Symbolic order, the 
subject of the Oedipal/castration fantasy is predicated on lack and negation, a lack or 
negation figured through the loss of the mother, and thus the feminine. In turn, the 
signifier which might account for this originary loss is phallic. Against this Oedipal 
subject, Deleuze and Guattari propose a ‗nomadic‘ individual-as-collective, a function 
of the desiring-machines which populate a ‗plane of immanence‘ (or ‗body without 
organs‘). Here, echoing Nietzsche, desire is not predicated by lack or need, but is 
instead a process of ‗becoming‘.8 
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 Kris Pint, ‗How to Become What One Is: Roland Barthes‘s Final Fantasy‘, Paragraph, 31:1 (2008), 
pp.38-49. 
5
 Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (New York: Routledge, 1996), 
p.60; with reference to: Jacques Lacan, Le Seminaire, Livre IV, La relation d‟object, 1956-57, ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Seuil, 1994), pp.119-20. 
6
 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: capitalism and schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, 
Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (London: The Athlone Press, 1984), passim. 
7
 Claire Colebrook, Understanding Deleuze (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2002), p.22. 
8
 See: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (London: The Athlone Press, 1988), passim. 
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Kris Pint argues that Barthes utilizes the notion of the imaginary to span these theories 
of desire; such an imaginary suspends the decision between a position of subjective 
fantasy as the enaction of a desire which guards against an originary and castrating lack, 
an internalised Oedipal/castration fantasy, and one which admits the revolutionary 
potential of a Nietzschean/Deleuzian ‗becoming‘. For Pint, however, Barthes‘s use of 
the imaginary ‗eludes‘ both Lacanian psychoanalysis and the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari.
9
 For him, Barthes‘s later work reassessed the notion of the imaginary, and in 
doing so, ‗explicitly pleaded for a return of the repressed ―ego‖ in literary theory.‘10 
Though the purpose of my argument will be to show how Barthes‘s use of the 
imaginary cannot be reduced to the return of a repressed ‗ego‘ formation, Pint‘s 
argument is useful in that it suggests how Barthes reads the imaginary as a neutral 
position between Lacan‘s theory of the subject as predicated on lack, and Deleuze and 
Guattari‘s denunciation of the imaginary as a function of an individual subjected to 
language. Pint‘s suggestion, therefore, points towards a position between lack and 
immanence, a position which my argument will develop in terms of imminence.  
 
The relation between Barthes and Sartre must also be underlined here. Whilst Pint fails 
to mention how Barthes‘s use of the imaginary is indebted to Sartre‘s use of the term, 
Jean-Michel Rabaté highlights that Barthes maintained an allegiance with Sartre 
throughout his work. Indeed, Rabaté suggests that Sartre‘s ‗L‟Imaginaire, published in 
1940, can be taken as the philosophical foundation for Camera Lucida.‘11 That Barthes 
dedicates Camera Lucida to Sartre‘s text would seem to endorse Rabaté‘s claim. Yet 
Sartre‘s notion of the imaginary – and therefore his concept of ‗freedom‘ – is structured 
by the idea of ‗nothingness‘ or negation; central terms for much of his work. As Rabaté 
explains, for Sartre, the ‗imaging or imagining consciousness, which transforms the 
object into an analogon of itself, is therefore primarily a negating consciousness that 
has to empty the world of its ordinary qualities in order to transform it into an aesthetic 
image.‘12 As with the Lacanian subject, the Sartrean imaginary requires an originary 
lack or loss which Deleuze and Guattari will read as conducive to the phallic mediation 
of desire. Moreover, Rabaté argues that Sartre‘s ‗negativity makes it impossible […] to 
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move logically from the domain of aesthetics to the realm of ethics [and that this] tragic 
dimension of the imaginary experience‘ is revisited by Barthes.13  
 
That Barthes dedicated one of his most famous texts to Sartre‘s L‟Imaginaire indicates 
that in this late period he is concerned with returning to the notion of the imaginary. My 
chapter will argue, therefore, that Barthes‘s late essay on Stendhal offers a reading of 
the imaginary as an effect of the text. I want to suggest that Barthes‘s later work 
approaches an aesthetic of the promise which, rather than revisiting a ‗tragic dimension 
of the imaginary experience‘, instead reads the imaginary to be marked by the very 
possibility of doing justice to the other. Rather than being predicated on an originary 
lack – which might require the mediation of the text/symbolic in order to recall what has 
been lost – I suggest that Barthes‘s reading of the imaginary engages with a symbolic or 
representative order which is structured by the promise of what is wholly unexpected 
and always to come. This chapter will demonstrate that Barthes‘s reading of the 
imaginary cannot be reduced to any one particular definition. It reads the imaginary to 
be an effect of the text which inherits the work of Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari, 
Sartre and Lacan (amongst others), without affirming any of these readings as the 
definition of the imaginary as such. This suggests that the imaginary negotiates the 
investments of those who attempt to formulate it, whilst remaining irreducible to them. 
Though populated by fantasy, the imaginary cannot be reduced to what Deleuze and 
Guattari see as the colonizing Oedipal and castration complexes, but neither can it be 
denounced as a singular engagement with loss, division and difference. I argue instead 
that Barthes reads the imaginary as an effect of the text which cannot be reduced to the 
subject, yet is neither a collective fantasy; rather, Barthes posits a ‗romanesque‘ 
imaginary for which there is no originary loss or lack, a ‗romanesque‘ imaginary as an 
essentially textual dimension imminent with wholly other. 
 
Barthes‘s mother died in 1977, and ‗On échoue toujours à parler de ce qu‟on aime‘ was 
written in the shadow of that event. As Barthes suggests, ‗Italy‘ is, for Stendhal, a 
profoundly feminine and maternal space:  
 
passion is Manichean for Stendhal, the wrong side is France, i.e., la patrie – 
for it is the site of the Father – and the right side is Italy, i.e., la matrie, the 
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space in which ―the Women‖ are assembled (not forgetting that it was the 
child‘s Aunt Elisabeth, the maternal grandfather‘s sister, who pointed her 
finger toward a country lovelier than Provence, where according to her the 
―good‖ side of the family, the Gagnon branch, originated).14 
 
As Stendhal‘s mother died when he was ‗scarcely seven years old [quand à peine 
j‟avais sept ans]‘15, ‗Italy‘ becomes an important figure for staging a possible 
(re)connection with a maternal love. Barthes, then, writing in the aftermath of losing his 
own mother, sees in Stendhal‘s writing of ‗Italy‘ an attempt to speak of what one has 
loved and lost. In the shift from the travel journals to the novel, Barthes reads 
Stendhal‘s representation of ‗Italy‘ to shift from a writing predicated on – and 
attempting to mediate – maternal loss, and one for which a maternal ‗Italy‘ is 
triumphantly expressed. As his essay opens, Barthes finds himself at Milan station, and 
whilst ‗parodying‘ Stendhal, he suggests that ‗lovely Italy is always farther 
away…elsewhere‘.16 Even when he is seemingly there, Barthes‘s ‗Italy‘ becomes an 
idyllic place towards which he can address his imagination: 
 
a train was leaving; on each car hung a yellow placard bearing the words 
Milano-Lecce. I began dreaming: to take that train, to travel all night and 
wake up in the warmth, the light, the peace of a faraway town. At least that 
was my fantasy [ce que j‟imaginais], and it doesn‘t matter what Lecce 
(which I have never seen) is really like.
17
 
 
For Barthes, ‗Italy‘ both situates the dreamer, and is that of which the dreamer dreams. 
‗Italy‘ remains a function of the imaginary for Barthes, even when he is there. It could 
be said that Barthes sees ‗Italy‘ as a destination at an infinite distance. There is an 
irreducible difference between being situated in Milan and an imaginary ‗Italy‘, 
suggesting that, for the imagination, the point of arrival is precisely to not arrive. This 
relation to ‗Italy‘ points towards what Barthes will also read in Stendhal‘s later work; 
work in which the ‗triumphant expression‘ of ‗Italy‘ also signals its imminence. 
Barthes‘s essay is concerned with how what might be thought of as a 
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mediation/recollection of an originary or primary loss of the maternal in Stendhal‘s 
early travel journals shifts – in his later novels – to a writing of ‗Italy‘ as the expression 
or marking of what remains imminent to the text. In terms of this thesis, I want to argue 
that this shift takes place through a reading of the imaginary which is conducive to a 
trauma study, a study in which writing (on) the traumatic event is not the mediation in 
language of an originary loss or lack. Rather, such a study would be structured by the 
apparent paradox of expressing what remains to come. I will argue that, in his later 
work, Barthes alludes to a ‗romanesque‘ imaginary as a place where an art and science 
of study combine to evade the platitudes of critical analysis, a project which was 
overdetermined by the question of how to write about (the death of) his own mother. 
 
2.1 A ‘primal state of pleasure’ 
Barthes‘s essay aims to read a profound difference between Stendhal‘s experience of 
Italy as depicted in his early writing – his travel journals and quasi-autobiography 
(Rome, Naples et Florence en 1817 and Vie de Henri Brulard) – and the encounter with 
Italy in the later novel, La Chartreuse de Parme.
18
 For Barthes, Stendhal‘s expression 
of his beloved Italy manifests itself through music, yet Barthes will read a shift in the 
mode of that expression. Whilst Stendhal‘s earlier texts describe countless musical 
experiences through which he searches for a profound pleasure, Barthes intimates that 
the later novel has become that experience. Indeed, and as I hope to demonstrate, 
Barthes‘s essay suggests that whilst Stendhal‘s travel journals describe encounters with 
a music that promises the other, the later novel has become that promise.  
  
Barthes reads Stendhal as being in love with ‗specific details‘, a plurality of pleasures 
which overdetermine the notion of ‗Italy‘. Through these pleasures, Stendhal can both 
produce and mask – symptomize – his passion for the maternal other. Barthes suggests 
that Stendhal‘s desire, unable to attach itself to one experience in particular, ‗cruises‘ 
the delights on offer. Such cruising is ‗evidentially a Stendhalian principle: it involves 
an implicit theory of irregular discontinuity which can be said to be simultaneously 
aesthetic, psychological, and metaphysical.‘19 Though Barthes is aware that this 
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transferential drift persists throughout Stendhal‘s work, the question for him is whether 
or not Stendhal might realize the object of his desire through writing, a writing which 
might be capable of speaking of what he loves.   
 
Opening the essay with a discussion of Stendhal‘s travel journals, Barthes suggests that, 
in Stendhal‘s ‗Italian system, Music has a privileged place because it can replace 
everything else: it is the degree zero of this system: according to the needs of 
enthusiasm, it replaces and signifies journeys, Women, the other arts, and in a general 
manner any sensation.‘20 ‗Music‘, therefore, allows Stendhal to ‗cruise‘ the pleasures 
‗Italy‘ may offer. As Barthes describes it, music would figure a primal state of pleasure, 
a pleasure which has no knowable cause:  
 
[Music‘s] signifying status, precious above all others, is to produce effects 
without our having to inquire as to their causes, since these causes are 
inaccessible. Music constitutes a kind of primal state of pleasure: it 
produces a pleasure one always tries to recapture but never to explain; 
hence, it is the site of the pure effect, a central notion of the Stendhalian 
aesthetic.
21
 
 
Though music may signify ‗any sensation‘, its ‗pure effect‘ means that it generates in 
the listener a ‗primal state of pleasure‘. It could be suggested here that Barthes is 
claiming that ‗any sensation‘ might be pleasurable as long as its cause is inaccessible. 
Barthes asks ‗what is a pure effect?‘, and in answering, suggests an ‗effect severed from 
and somehow purified of any explicative reason, i.e., ultimately, of any responsible 
reason.‘22 As the ‗degree zero‘ of Stendhal‘s ‗Italian system‘, ‗music‘ would be the 
elusive signifier of an encounter untainted by the ideology, reason or experience of 
bourgeois society, but as such, this would also be a purely fleeting – if not impossible – 
encounter. ‗Music‘ signifies the impossibility of feeling anything but ‗pleasure‘, but 
without reference to any clear category of pleasure, we might ask how we would be able 
to determine this experience in the order of ‗pleasure‘; hence to experience music as a 
‗primal state of pleasure‘ would be to experience what is irreducible to both memory 
and history. As an experience irreducible to memory and history, Stendhal‘s search for 
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the most primal of pleasures would, paradoxically, mark a search for the very 
possibility of the future.   
  
It is possible to relate Stendhal‘s search for a ‗primal state of pleasure‘ to Barthes‘s 
reading of plaisir and jouissance in Le Plaisir du texte:  
 
(Pleasure [Plaisir]/Bliss [Jouissance]: terminologically, there is always a 
vacillation – I stumble, I err. In any case, there will always be a margin of 
indecision; the distinction will not be the source of absolute classifications, 
the paradigm will falter, the meaning will be precarious, revocable, 
reversible, the discourse incomplete.)
23
  
 
Though the relation between pleasure and bliss retains a ‗margin of indecision‘, Barthes 
does offer something which – through an experience of the text – resembles a 
distinction between the two terms: 
   
Text of pleasure: the text that contents, fills, grants euphoria; the text that 
comes from culture and does not break with it, is linked to a comfortable 
practice of reading. Text of bliss: the text that imposes a state of loss, the 
text that discomforts (perhaps to the point of a certain boredom), unsettles 
the reader‘s historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the consistency 
of his tastes, values, memories, brings to a crisis his relation with 
language.
24
 
 
Though the texts of pleasure and jouissance may appear to denote two distinctly 
separate experiences, the ‗stumble‘ [‗j‟achoppe, j‟embrouille‘] over the definition of 
either term suggests that separation may not be as clear as it first appears. As Barthes 
suggests, there is an unavoidable ambiguity between the terms: ‗Pleasure of the text, 
text of pleasure: these expressions are ambiguous because French has no word that 
simultaneously covers pleasure (contentment) and bliss (rapture). Therefore, ―pleasure‖ 
[plaisir] here (and without our being able to anticipate) sometimes extends to bliss 
[jouissance], sometimes is opposed to it.‘25 The (in)distinction between pleasure and 
jouissance suggests the possibility of an encounter with the text which can both comfort 
and discomfort the reading subject, a relation with the text which allows the reader both 
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a subjective experience of pleasure as well as the dissolution of that subjectivity through 
jouissance.  
 
An encounter with such pleasure/jouissance would not resemble a dialectical conflict, 
but instead allow for a simultaneous but differential experience which both defers and 
welcomes the other. The pleasure/jouissance of the text, therefore, would be the 
(im)possibility of situating an experience of self or other; it is a dimension of the text 
which survives the self/other opposition, indeed, all oppositions. But equally, 
pleasure/jouissance takes place as the possibility of a self/other; it is the possibility of 
experience, response, and therefore, of the future. Encountering pleasure/jouissance, 
then, would be an experience which is essentially disjointed by a ‗margin of indecision‘; 
an experience of each would go via the other, what would be a decision would go via 
indecision. In his reading of Stendhal‘s later work, this incalculable logic will be the 
condition which allows Barthes to describe the novel as effecting a lie which takes a 
‗detour‘ through truth. The difference between Stendhal‘s early journals and later novels 
will, for Barthes, be one which sees a shift from a writing which depicts the search for 
this pleasure/jouissance, to one which manages to produce it. 
  
2.2 A promise of the other 
At the conclusion of Le degré zéro de l‟écriture, Barthes posits a relation between 
desire and a ‗Utopia of language‘, a relation which he then elaborates upon in the later 
work Le Plaisir du texte. In Le degré zéro de l‟écriture, Barthes speaks of the ‗living 
languages‘ of ‗Nature‘ ‗from which the writer is excluded.‘26 As such, the writer is 
condemned to a ‗stale language‘ which he must, paradoxically, continue to use in order 
to try to escape it. The writer is therefore caught in the double bind of attempting to 
locate an ideal – or perhaps ‗Italian‘ – language through its unnatural and always-
already impure form:  
 
Feeling permanently guilty of its own solitude, [literary writing] is none the 
less an imagination eagerly desiring a felicity of words, it hastens towards a 
dreamed-of language whose freshness, by a kind of ideal anticipation, might 
portray the perfection of some new Adamic world where language would no 
longer be alienated. The proliferation of modes of writing brings a new 
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Literature into being in so far as the latter invents its language only in order 
to be a project: Literature becomes the Utopia of language.
27
  
 
With a move which is perhaps led by an anxiety concerning what might be seen as an 
idealistic utopian ‗project‘, Barthes‘s Le Plaisir du texte appears to reformulate a 
‗Utopia of language‘ by stressing its radically atopic aspect. In this later text, Barthes 
utilises the ambiguity of the term ‗utopia‘, a term which means both an ideal place and 
no place. Moreover, he reads this ambiguous place in terms of pleasure. The notion of 
jouissance/bliss has been dropped here; rather, pleasure [le plaisir] is itself an 
ambiguous potentiality – or ‗might‘ – of the text:  
 
Pleasure [Le plaisir], however, is not an element of the text, it is not a naïve 
residue; it does not depend on a logic of understanding and on sensation; it 
is a drift, something both revolutionary and asocial, and it cannot be taken 
over by any collectivity, any mentality, any idiolect. Something neuter? It is 
obvious that the pleasure of the text is scandalous: not because it is immoral 
but because it is atopic.
28
  
 
Instead of the utopic project of Le degré zéro de l‟écriture, Le Plaisir du texte posits an 
atopic site across which pleasure drifts. For Barthes, the pleasure of the text must be 
thought, paradoxically, as an unusual, or out of place, place which resists the 
normalising strategies of both bourgeois mythology and academic intellectual thought.
  
The ambiguity of plaisir is atopically ‗situated‘ as an experience of the text, and the 
utopia of Le degré zero has been re-read by the atopia of Le plaisir du texte. From this 
we can suggest that the notion of a ‗new Literature‘ – which announced the ‗Utopia of 
language‘ – has become ‗the pleasure of the text‘ as a possible experience in the here 
and now. Although we cannot reduce the movement between utopia and atopia to a shift 
between two clear concepts, especially ones determined by a chronological succession 
of texts, we may provisionally suggest that whilst the utopic is projected (as an ideal), 
the atopic is an imminent potentiality of the text. It is necessary, however, to retain the 
notion of the utopic in that of atopia. As it is the placing of what is unusual or out of 
place, the atopic marks what is here is also not where it should be, that what is ‗here‘ is 
not proper to this site, but the mark of another place. The atopic marks, then, the 
                                                 
27
 Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, p.88; Œuvres Complètes, vol.1, p.224 
28
 Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, p23; Le plaisir du texte, p.39. 
 94 
possibility of an ideal or proper space, but also a non-space, a Utopia. The atopic is the 
promise of the utopic, the very mark or expression of a place which is yet to come. The 
essential ambiguity of the atopic/utopic would resist the attempt to reduce ‗pleasure‘ to 
what is merely the result of a calculation. Rather, pleasure would be the very marking of 
what remained other, an otherness or non-place for which the text reserves a place.  
  
Rather than an ‗element‘ of the text – something reducible to an identifiable constituent 
of its construction – Barthes‘s experience of utopia/atopia would be an effect of the text, 
of the trace, and therefore of a writing as spatio-temporalization. The thinking of an 
atopic/utopic experience, therefore, would constantly run the risk of being compromised 
by the reductive strategies of language and discourse. The concern here, would be that 
the promise of the other might be reduced to a determinable essence which can be put to 
work as a concept or commodity. Hence the necessity for an interminable vigilance, a 
vigilance which admits that an atopic/utopic pleasure of the text could only be expected 
without the horizon of expectancy. 
 
For Barthes, Stendhal‘s relation to Italy, and in turn the ‗privileged‘ relation to music, is 
the search for a ‗primal state of pleasure‘. Such pleasure ‗one always tries to recapture 
but never to explain.‘ It could be suggested, therefore, that this pleasure has come and 
gone for Stendhal, and that his only hope will be to locate a place in which he can 
encounter it once again. Yet ‗to recapture but never to explain‘ also admits the 
impossibility of apprehending once and for all. If what we recapture can never be 
explained, the impossibility of knowing for sure what we apprehend would also be the 
eternal evasion of that recapture. What ‗recapture‘ might signify, then, would be an 
interminable apprehension without apprehending; neither the absolute activity of seizing 
the experience, nor the absolute passivity of being evaded by – or subject to – it. 
Beyond activity and passivity, to ‗recapture‘ but never explain would be an 
apprehending and apprehension of something to come – the suggestion of an 
immanence which could only be forever imminent. Though the prefix ‗re-‘ would 
suggest a return, it would be the return of what was never fully ‗here‘, a here and now 
which is also and always elsewhere. 
 
Barthes reads a ‗primal state of pleasure‘ as the experience of ‗pure effect‘, where cause 
is unthinkable, and where one is ‗voluptuously delivered from the responsibility of the 
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citizen.‘29 Barthes quotes Stendhal when he reads that, if ‗Stendhal were an Italian 
citizen, he would die ―poisoned by melancholy‖: whereas, a Milanese by affection [de 
cœur] rather than civil status, he need merely harvest the brilliant effect of a civilisation 
for which he is not responsible.‘30 For Barthes, with official citizenship comes a 
recognised duty, a national language and civil responsibility; as citizen, Stendhal would 
be confined to all that attempts to delimit ‗Italy‘ in an essential fashion. Yet, by being 
neither native nor tourist, Stendhal inhabits an Italian imaginary; an imaginary which is 
neither the ‗real‘ Italy of the citizen nor the fantasy of the tourist. Neither ‗poisoned‘ by 
the melancholy which accompanies the immutable allegiance to the lost object (as 
we‘ve seen, ‗Italy‘ is overdetermined as a maternal figure), nor freed through the 
complete abandoning of that object (a completed work of mourning), Stendhal inhabits 
his Italian imaginary as the site of an infinite – and insistent – transferential movement.  
  
As neither native nor tourist, Stendhal neither abandons the love object as lost, nor is 
nostalgically bound to it. Rather, and regardless of Stendhal‘s intentions (to either 
‗recapture‘ a ‗primal state of pleasure‘ or triumphantly express his passion), the promise 
of the other seems to be staged as a function of the imaginary. It is only with this 
imaginary – where one is neither at home nor abroad, neither in nor out of mourning – 
that Stendhal can conduct his transferential search for the other. Moreover, it is only 
through this imaginary that the logic of the transference could operate: irreducible to 
either a past or present encounter, transference presupposes an essential and originary 
(im)possibility of ‗both‘, as it is always-already marked by a relationship to the other 
which remains to be thought. Such an incalculable dimension would also suggest the 
impossibility of Stendhal ever recapturing a ‗primal state of pleasure‘ once and for all. 
As this ‗primal‘ state is sought through the logic of transference, it would be an 
experience of pleasure as the mark of the other, and thus the mark of what remained to 
come. 
  
Barthes cites the phrase ‗poisoned by melancholy‘ from Stendhal‘s Rome, Naples et 
Florence en 1817. In the same passage, the phrase is preceded by an indication that the 
figure of ‗music‘ – which according to Barthes is a ‗primal state of pleasure‘ that can 
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signify any sensation – also lives on despite everything: ‗In Italy, Music alone remains 
alive [La Musique seule vit en Italie], and the only other thing to do in this beautiful 
country is to make love; the other pleasures of the soul are inhibited there [les autres 
jouissances de l‟âme y sont gênées]; if one were a citizen of that country, one would die 
poisoned by melancholy.‘31 There is something noticeably odd in the notion of music 
remaining the only thing alive. Music alone has survived in an otherwise desolate 
world; it remains that with which Stendhal can engage in order to think a relation to the 
past – to the lost or past glory of a Renaissance ‗Italy‘ which is overdetermined with a 
lost maternal relation. Yet as the only thing alive, music remains the very possibility of 
the future, it prompts sexual relationships whereas all other ‗pleasures of the soul are 
inhibited‘. Moreover, as the only thing alive is music, we might presume Stendhal is not 
living either. As the promise of a ‗primal state of pleasure‘, music might bring Stendhal 
back to life. As the last thing alive, music marks the possibility of the future for 
Stendhal. 
  
Whilst other pleasures remain on offer to Stendhal, they are inhibited in comparison to 
the transferential relation to music, a relation which promises an unadulterated passion: 
 
We know that for Stendhal, Italy was the object of a veritable transference, 
and we also know that what characterises transference is its gratuitousness: 
it occurs [il s‟instaure] without any apparent reason. Music, for Stendhal, is 
the symptom of the mysterious action by which he inaugurated his 
transference – the symptom, i.e. the thing which simultaneously produces 
and masks passion‘s irrationality. […] Stendhal constantly reproduces it, 
like a lover trying to regain that crucial thing which rules so large a share of 
our actions: the first pleasure.
32
 
  
Barthes reads transference to occur without apparent reason; it is the irrational method 
which Stendhal reproduces in his attempt to recapture his primal love. As a symptom, 
music manifests the ‗mysterious action‘ [l‟acte mystérieux] of that which inaugurated 
Stendhal‘s transference: ‗the first pleasure‘. The question for Barthes is one of how 
Stendhal ‗reproduces‘ that symptom, how he appears to shift between the description of 
his recurring encounters with music and a ‗romanesque‘ lie, a ‗lie‘ which allows that 
encounter to take place as writing. Barthes‘s (un)finished essay marks this shift as a 
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movement between what seems to be Stendhal‘s courtship of ‗Italy‘ and – in later 
novels such as La Chartreuse de Parme – a wholly other expression of desire. Barthes 
suggests that ‗Stendhal, shifting from the Journal to the Novel, from the Album to the 
Book […] has abandoned sensation, a vivid but inconstruable [inconstructible] 
fragment, to undertake that great mediating form which is Narrative, or better still 
Myth.‘33 Such a move has allowed Stendhal to write ‗certain triumphant pages about 
Italy which, this time, fire up the reader (this reader – but I don‘t suppose I‘m the only 
one) with that jubilation, with that irradiation which the private journals claimed but did 
not communicate.‘34 Indeed, Barthes appears to find a ‗pleasure of the text‘ in the later 
work, a pleasure he could not find in the travel journals.  
  
What is perhaps surprising – for a writer who championed the fragmentary in many of 
his most well known texts – is that such pleasure could not be found in the 
‗inconstructible‘ fragments of the journals, but rather with the relatively linear 
narratives of myth. Recalling my epigraph, Barthes describes the change:  
 
In short, what has happened – what has transpired – between the travel 
journals and The Charterhouse, is writing [c‟est l‟écriture]. Writing – which 
is what? A power, probable fruit of a long initiation, which annuls [défait] 
the sterile immobility of the amorous image-repertoire [l‟imaginaire 
amoureux] and gives its adventure a symbolic generality. When he was 
young, in the days of Rome, Naples, Florence, Stendhal could write: ―… 
when I tell lies, I am like M. de Goury, I am bored‖; he did not yet know 
that there existed a lie, the lie of novels [le mensonge romanesque], which 
would be – miraculously – both the detour of truth and the finally 
triumphant expression of his Italian passion.
35
 
 
Rather than asking why Barthes finds a certain pleasure in the later novels of Stendhal, 
a pleasure which he couldn‘t find in the journals, this passage allows us to suggest the 
pivot upon which that move is made: the amorous imaginary [l‟imaginaire amoureux].36 
Barthes suggests a shift in Stendhal‘s writing, a shift to ‗writing‘ [l‟écriture], which 
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enacts a shift in the ‗amorous‘ imaginary. Writing stages the imaginary here, and as 
Barthes reads Stendhal, it is the shift to writing which ‗annuls‘ the imaginary‘s 
immobility in favour of a ‗symbolic generality‘, an imprecision or sketch which can 
perform the lie of the novel and triumphantly express Stendhal‘s ‗Italian passion‘. 
Therefore – and in referring to La Chartreuse – Barthes suggests an imaginary which 
expresses the event to such a degree that he experiences ‗a kind of miraculous harmony 
between the ―mass of happiness and pleasure which explodes‖ in Milan with the arrival 
of the French and our own delight in reading: the effect described finally coincides with 
the effect produced.‘37 
  
For Barthes, there has been a shift from Stendhal‘s early inability to express his ‗two 
loves‘ (Italy and Music).38 In the travel journals, Barthes claims that Stendhal is 
suspicious of language, and therefore that ‗Music and Italy‘ are ‗spaces outside of 
language‘, outside of the trace and beyond history.39 This ‗suspicion attached to 
language joins the kind of aphasia which is generated by the excess of love: before Italy 
and Women, and Music [note here the addition of Stendhal‘s third love: ‗Women‘], 
Stendhal is, literally speechless, interloqué, i.e. ceaselessly interrupted in his locution 
[Stendhal est à la lettre interloqué, c‟est-à-dire sans cesse interrompu dans sa 
locution].‘40 Stendhal is, literally, taken aback by his – at this point – three excesses of 
love. Rather than an experience of the ‗atopic‘ – which would be an experience of the 
text – Barthes suggests that Italy, music and women are, for Stendhal, outside of 
language. Such an ‗outside‘ of language, as a space of pure effect, or a space without 
responsibility, remains – paradoxically – reassuringly local in Stendhal‘s early texts. 
The ‗outside‘ is a space localised by the ability to delimit what is internal to language, 
and therefore pre-programmed by a categorisation of what is or is not proper to 
language. The ‗other‘ of language, then, is safely put to one side as an outside of 
language which can remain an idealistic – or Utopian – dream for the writer. We can see 
                                                 
37
 Roland Barthes, ‗One Always Fails in Speaking of What One Loves‘, p.304; Œuvres Complètes, vol. 
p.914. 
38
 Roland Barthes, ‗One Always Fails in Speaking of What One Loves‘, p.302; Œuvres Complètes, vol. 
p.912. 
39
 Roland Barthes, ‗One Always Fails in Speaking of What One Loves‘, p.302; Œuvres Complètes, vol. 
p.912. 
40
 Roland Barthes, ‗One Always Fails in Speaking of What One Loves‘, p.303; Œuvres Complètes, vol. 
pp.912-13. 
 99 
that the limits of the imaginary are very clear at this point; it knows in advance the 
outline of the other which it will be impossible to represent.  
  
For Barthes – reading Donald Winnicott – Stendhal‘s early aphasia recalls the child‘s 
interactions with the transitional object: 
 
Such a dialectic of extreme love and difficult expression resembles what the 
very young child experiences – still infans, deprived of adult speech – when 
he plays with what Winnicott calls a transitional object; the space which 
separates and at the same time links the mother and the baby is the very 
space of the child‘s play and of the mother‘s counterplay: it is the still-
shapeless space of fantasy, of the imagination, of creation. Such is, it seems 
to me, Stendhal‘s Italy: a kind of transitional object whose manipulation, 
being ludic, produces these squiggles which Winnicott notes and which are 
here any number of travel journals.
41
  
 
At this point the Stendhalian imaginary is that of an infant who – without adult speech – 
maintains a relation to the love object through a transitional object. Not the expression 
or representation of the love object, the transitional object is rather the fantasy of its 
extended presence. Stendhal is yet to express his love; he is still using a Winnicottian 
squiggle to sustain himself in the vicinity of his love object‘s presence, a presence to 
which he might one day be reconnected. 
 
However, ‗twenty years later, by a kind of after-the-fact [une sorte d‟après-coup] which 
also constitutes part of the devious logic of love‘42, Barthes suggests that Stendhal‘s La 
Chartreuse de Parme forms a relation between writing and the imaginary which can 
produce an effect of reading analogous to that being described. Stendhal can now 
express what he loves to such an extent that the reader encounters that same effect. 
Rather than the capture of, or reconnection with, the love object – its presence in writing 
– this is an expression of the other, an other which, nevertheless, also remains at in 
infinite distance. Moreover, this expression of what remains elsewhere seems to 
condition a telepathic dimension: Barthes has found a text which allows him to witness 
– in an analogous fashion – the events being expressed in Stendhal‘s text. This 
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telepathic dimension seems to take place through a development of the imaginary, a 
mutation effected by Stendhal‘s shift to ‗writing‘.  
 
Writing and the imaginary are in a relation which is the site of both the writer‘s, and the 
reader‘s, experience. There is, then, a transferential relation to the text through which 
the experiences of Stendhal and Barthes are entwined. Transference is experienced 
through an imaginary which seems particular to both Stendhal and Barthes, and as such, 
the imaginary cannot be reduced to the writer or reader as subject. Particular to both, it 
is reducible to no ‗one‘ as such. Rather, the imaginary is the staging of experience 
which survives a reduction to the psyche as the locus for that experience. Indeed, 
Barthes‘s reading suggests this, in that his allusion to the imaginary is such that we 
cannot tell for sure whether he is describing his own, or Stendhal‘s. Rather than 
producing the presence of the other, as a staging of the imaginary, the text would now 
be a place where the ‗symptom‘ can be shared; a symptom which is not localisable 
within the traditional limits of the body, a symptom which would be an experience of 
the promise of writing. 
 
2.3 Spectral reservation 
Barthes‘s experience of ‗jubilation‘ or ‗irradiation‘, an almost atopic pleasure achieved 
in his reading of Stendhal‘s novel, would suggest the promise of writing is a shared 
experience. In the reading of Stendhal‘s La Chartreuse de Parme – a text where ‗the 
effect described finally coincides with the effect produced‘ – there is an experience of 
the text which is irreducible to self or other (either Barthes or Stendhal). Instead, the 
experience of the event takes place in a shared imaginary. Here, ‗Stendhal‘s‘ writing is 
an experience which is not reducible to a history which is proper to himself or another. 
Barthes does not experience a description of the event as himself; rather, there is an 
experience of the event – in writing – which cannot be reducible to a place, time or 
identity which is proper to a reader who consumes it. Barthes‘s essay suggests an 
experience of the text as the promise of the other (of both the other‘s experience and an 
experiencing as other). Such a promise would be the effect of a writing which both 
marks and defers that event. 
 
From the naïveté of the travel journals to the triumph of the novel, Barthes‘s reading 
suggests a promise of the other. In order to read how Barthes‘s use of the imaginary 
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functions in terms of this promise, we might recall how Derrida reads Maurice 
Blanchot‘s consideration of the coming of the messiah. For Blanchot: 
 
Jewish messianic thought (according to certain commentators), suggests the 
relation between the event and its non-occurrence. If the Messiah is at the 
gates of Rome among the beggars and the lepers, one might think that his 
incognito protects or prevents him from coming, but, precisely, he is 
recognized: someone, obsessed with questioning and unable to leave off, 
asks him: ―When will you come?‖43 
 
For Derrida, the profundity of Blanchot‘s tale resides in the suggestion that there is an 
essential disjunction of the present: 
 
[t]here is some inadequation between the now and now. He is coming now; 
the messianic does not wait. This is a way of waiting for the future, right 
now. The responsibilities that are assigned to us by this messianic structure 
are responsibilities for here and now. The Messiah is not some future 
present; it is imminent and it is this imminence that I am describing under 
the name of messianic structure.
44
 
 
We might read a resonance, therefore, between this structure of the promise and the 
structure of ‗On échoue toujours à parler de ce qu‟on aime‘. Whilst opening with the 
suggestion that ‗Italy‘ is ‗always farther away… elsewhere‘, Barthes‘s essay closes with 
the promise that it can finally and triumphantly be expressed. Like much of Barthes‘s 
work, this essay asks how writing could be a place for an encounter with the other; how 
the text might be a place from which to await the other without the horizon of 
expectancy which the many codes, ideologies and mythologies of language can bring to 
writing. It is no coincidence, therefore, that ‗On échoue toujours à parler de ce qu‟on 
aime‘ closes with a focus on literature – and the novel in particular (the ‗romanesque‘) – 
as a privileged space for this encounter, for Barthes is also concerned with evading the 
predictable rhythms of critical theory. 
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For Derrida, the text is imminent with what is yet to arrive, the ‗arrivant‘.45 As the 
arrivant is irreducible to any possible identity, it must remain ‗to come‘, and as what 
remains ‗to come‘, it sustains what must remain incalculable as the possibility or 
promise of the future. Essentially incalculable, then, the arrivant survives what is 
determinable as possible or impossible, and is instead the very possibility of the im-
possible:  
 
This originary affirmation of beyond the beyond offers itself on this basis of 
numerous figures of the impossible. I have studied a few of these elsewhere: 
hospitality, gift, forgiveness – and above all the unpredictability, the 
―perhaps,‖ the ―what if‖ of the event, the coming, and the coming of the 
other in general, his or her arriving. Their possibility is always announced as 
the experience of a non-negative im-possible.
46
  
 
As ‗non-negative im-possible‘, the arrivant would be the coming of the wholly 
unexpected; a possibility of the ‗im-possible‘ which survives the possible/impossible 
binary. And as the arrivant is awaited via a promissory structure, Derrida is also 
alluding to what he terms the ‗messianic‘. As Stendhal moves from the travel journals to 
the novel (and whether he desires a reconnection with a primal presence or not), what is 
constant throughout Barthes‘s reading is the promise of the other. For Barthes, it is the 
imaginary which stages this promise; whether it is the ‗sterile immobility of the image-
repertoire‘ or the miraculous and final ‗expression of his Italian passion‘, the imaginary 
is marked by the promise of the other as its essential structure. 
  
Derrida reads the notion of a messianic structure in his engagement with the spectres of 
Marx, and therefore with the promise of communism.
47
 Indeed, the messianic structure 
is, for Derrida, the very locus of spectrality, and as such, the place where we commune 
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with ghosts, ghosts of the past, present and future. Such a structure is conditioned by the 
imminence of the wholly other, and is therefore a structure whose stability is comprised 
– indeed threatened – in advance by this radical unpredictability. The arrivant, 
therefore, would disrupt any horizon of expectation, it would problematize any attempt 
to decide upon, predict or pre-programme the form or condition of the future. Awaiting 
the other would also be the impossibility of waiting as such, as waiting would always be 
performed through the logic of expectation and prediction: 
 
Awaiting without horizon of the wait, awaiting what one does not expect yet 
or any longer, hospitality without reserve, welcoming salutation accorded in 
advance to the absolute surprise of the arrivant from whom or from which 
one will not ask anything in return and who or which will not be asked to 
commit to the domestic contracts of any welcoming power (family, State, 
nation, territory, native soil or blood, language, culture in general, even 
humanity), just opening which renounces any right to property, any right in 
general, messianic opening to what is coming, that is, to the event that 
cannot be awaited as such, or recognized in advance therefore, to the event 
as the foreigner itself, to her or to him for whom one must leave an empty 
place, always, in memory of the hope [en mémoire de l‟espérance] – and 
this is the very place of spectrality.
48
 
 
  
For Derrida, and although this structure obviously takes up a Jewish inheritance – and 
the question of inheritance is of course at the heart of his reading – the ‗use of the word 
―messianic‖ bears no relation to any messianistic tradition.‘49 Derrida suggests, 
therefore, that an awaiting without the horizon of the wait might therefore be 
‗nicknamed‘ the ‗messianic without messianism [surnommons le messianique sans 
messianisme].‘50 Of course, such a nicknaming, or sur-naming (both inherited name and 
over-naming – an excessive or supplementary name) should immediately alert us to the 
provisional status of the ‗messianic‘; this term is yet to be determined ‗as such‘. Indeed, 
the logic of Derrida‘s term seems quite apparent: as what we await would be wholly 
other to the notion of awaiting, any determined horizon of expectation – including a 
determinable messianism – would compromise the other in advance. Although Derrida 
refers to this movement as a ‗messianicity‘, any right to, or appropriation of, this term 
by an (un)orthodox religious tradition would be problematized by the wholly otherness 
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of the arrivant, by its absolute heterogeneity to thinking. Thus Derrida‘s use of the 
messiah refers to a ‗desert-like messianism‘, paradoxically, a messianism ‗without 
content and without identifiable messiah.‘51 Nevertheless, Derrida has maintained the 
term ‗messiah‘, and therefore a structure of the promise, of emancipation (hence the 
return to/returns of Marx) and of hope. For Derrida, the messianic would be ‗a certain 
experience of the emancipatory promise; it is perhaps even the formality of a structural 
messianism, a messianism without religion, even a messianic without messianism, an 
idea of justice – which we distinguish from law or right or even human rights – and an 
idea of democracy – which we distinguish from its current concept and from its 
determined predicates today.‘52 
  
In retaining an ‗eschatological relation to the to-come of an event and of a singularity, 
of an alterity which cannot be anticipated‘53, there remains, however, a notion of ‗last 
things‘. Whilst the fulfilment of an eschatological promise would take the form of a 
faithful and responsible accordance with the wholly other – something to which we 
might refer as ‗justice‘ – the wholly other would disrupt the fulfilment of the 
eschatological promise. Recalling the logic of Blanchot‘s tale of the messiah, we can 
see that what might be seen to be the arrival of the ‗end‘, or the judgement of ‗last 
things‘, would also be a renewed – and perhaps more urgent – question of when they 
might arrive. It is the here and now which must remain structured by imminence, an 
imminence of the other which ruptures any calculable determination of the present 
moment; it is in the here and now that it remains imperative to keep asking when might 
justice come. It is this notion of imminence that Derrida puts to work in the 
deconstruction of the ‗determinable messianisms‘ of biblical and secular thought 
(Judeo-Christian; Hegelian; Marxist; Fukuyamic, and indeed, a Freudian work of 
mourning). As John D. Caputo suggests, Derrida‘s insistence on the future ‗to come‘ [à-
venir], as justice or democracy, would mean that  
 
one cannot gauge the extent to which it is being approximated or realized, 
even while conceding that it is consistently deferred. For that allows us to 
tolerate, to be patient with the most massive injustice. Because the à-venir 
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of the ―messianic in general‖ is completely open-ended […] it is profoundly 
urgent and unable to be placidly complacent with the present.
54
 
 
There remains, then, a disjunction of the injunction, a need to affirm the imminence of 
such justice, and this would require remembering that there remains a promise of the 
other, a promise that the other is still ‗to-come‘, and therefore that it is necessary to 
‗leave an empty place, always, in memory of the hope [en mémoire de l‟espérance].‘55 
The condition of the other would be a memorial to ‗l‟espérance‘, to hope but also to a 
notion of expectancy (l‟espérance de vie means ‗life expectancy‘). A memorial would 
not ‗be‘ hope and expectancy, but their marking, a trace in memory to them (recalling 
Barthes‘s reading of Stendhal, we might use ‗symptom‘ here rather than memorial). 
Further, a memorial to/symptom of hope and expectancy would mark – here and now, 
in the present – a memory which could only come from the future. Such a memorial, 
therefore, would also be the trace of an originary time out-of-joint, a tracing of the 
untraceable which would reserve a place for the other as ‗the very place of 
spectrality.‘56 
  
In considering the notion of a writing of the promise, or a marking of the other, we may 
read a more general relation between the notion of the messianic structure and Barthes‘s 
search for an atopic experience of the text, an experience other than that provided by the 
coded and compromised structures of language and culture. In memory of the future, 
works such as Le Plaisir de texte – with its reading of plaisir/jouissance – seem to 
approach a notion of the other to whom our relation may be one of absolute 
unpreparedness. Moreover, we might suggest that in Barthes‘s reading of Stendhal‘s 
later texts – as the place which may admit a shared experience of the symptom – it is 
with the notion of the imaginary that Barthes appears to situate this promise of the 
other. As the site which reserves a place for the other, and the notion which irreducibly 
spectralizes the Barthes-Stendhal experience of reading/writing, the imaginary seems to 
function via a messianic structure, as that through which – whether it be deemed 
possible or not – the other might arrive.57 Should this be the case, the imaginary may be 
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a dimension in which to affirm the absolute otherness of the event through the necessity 
of representational structures (or horizons), whilst at the same time attempting to remain 
faithful and to do justice to the unknowability and unpredictability of experience. It may 
be ‗here‘, then, where we ‗delimit‘ a horizon without horizon.  
  
I want to suggest that Barthes‘s reading of the imaginary, a space imminent with the 
other, would be where a trauma study might take place. The promise of the wholly other 
would rupture the position of study in advance, yet that promise would also be its very 
possibility. We might think this by recalling the terms ‗punctum‘ and ‗studium‘ from 
Barthes‘s La Chambre claire – in terms of a trauma study the imaginary would be a text 
in which the studium (as what is reducible to analysis and study) would be marked or 
punctuated by the punctum (a ‗detail‘ which promises the other). Indeed, La Chambre 
claire is testimony to this haunted space, it is a study of the image punctuated by 
‗details‘ which remain irreducible to analysis. Though I return to how Barthes stages 
this imaginary, and how it might function in terms of a trauma study, below, I want to 
take a slight detour through some of Derrida‘s work on the notion of the messianic. This 
will help demonstrate the spectral dimension in which the imaginary might be situated, 
a dimension in which the imaginary might reserve a place for the other. 
 
2.4 Spectralizing messianism - a hesitation 
In his reading of Blanchot‘s tale of the messiah‘s arrival, Derrida demonstrates the 
imminence of the messianic structure, an imminence which means ‗He is coming now; 
the messianic does not wait.‘ The messianic, therefore, would be a dimension in which 
‗the now‘ remains inadequate to ‗the present‘. Moreover, with the possibility that ‗the 
Messiah might also be the one I expect while I do not want him to come [… that] I do 
not want what I want and I would like the coming of the Messiah to be infinitely 
postponed‘58, Derrida reads a libidinal investment in the messianic. A desire for the 
arrival of the messiah, then, might also be the desire for its deferral, with this ambiguity 
forming a condition for thinking and living on:  
 
That is why the man who addressed the Messiah said, ―When will you 
come?‖ That is a way to say, well as long as I speak to you, as long as I ask 
you the question, ―When will you come?‖, at least you are not coming. And 
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that is the condition for me to go on asking questions and living. So there is 
some ambiguity in the messianic structure. We wait for something we would 
not like to wait for. That is another name for death.‘59 
 
Derrida suggests an essential ambiguity concerning the arrivant, an ambiguity which 
would be the condition to thinking and living on. Such ambiguity leaves the possibility 
that the absolute otherness of the other may also be what we think of as death. Desire, 
therefore, would become a paradoxical notion: both a desire for the other and a desire 
for the deferral of the other. The difficulty would then be then, that, as the notions of 
‗justice, peace and revolution‘ are those which might come with the arrival of the 
messiah, such notions would inextricably be overdetermined by death. Thus the 
awaiting without waiting for such notions is also a risky and dangerous undertaking; it 
poses a threat which – both imminent and deferred – is both around every corner and 
always to-come. 
 
The possibility of these concepts being arrived at in any concrete form is unthinkable 
for Derrida. But as such – and as the condition for thinking and living – our relation to 
the otherness of the other requires the combination of an infinite patience, immediate 
response, and the willingness to risk everything. As the arrival of the messiah might 
also be the arrival of death, it is perhaps reasonable that an experience of the other is 
sometimes teleologically projected as an ideal – rather than being the most imminent 
and intimate of responsibilities. Furthermore, it may also be possible that an intense 
encounter with death would short-circuit this imminence; indeed, that any intense 
encounter with a radical otherness – an intimate encounter with death, but also the 
infant‘s bond with the mother – may subsequently render a thinking of the wholly other 
as that which has already happened and which is from then on only possible to think 
through (and as such, be the condition of) a logic of recollection or recapture.
60
 We can 
see here how, as an experience of the wholly other cannot be reduced to any of these 
schemas – for to locate it would be to annul it – the messianic structure is always open 
to the reductive and comforting strategies of religious narratives and cultural 
mythologies.  
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An aspect of this ambiguous relation to the messianic structure can be seen in Barthes‘s 
notions of pleasure [plaisir] and jouissance. Barthes suggests a definition of the text of 
pleasure and the text of bliss [jouissance]. The former would, to a certain extent, 
participate in culture – but only in a hedonistic manner. The latter would interrupt such 
culture, a textual encounter in which both culture and subject are dispersed. But as the 
text of pleasure and the text of bliss are entwined, their experience is conditioned by an 
essential anachronism: 
 
Now the subject who keeps the two texts in his field and in his hands the 
reins of pleasure and bliss is an anachronistic subject, for he simultaneously 
and contradictorily participates in the profound hedonism of all culture 
(which permeates him quietly under cover of an art de vivre shared by the 
old books) and in the destruction of that culture: he enjoys the consistency 
of his selfhood (that is his pleasure) and seeks its loss (that is his bliss). He 
is a subject split twice over, doubly perverse.
61
 
 
Barthes‘s subject would have two aims, two perverse pleasures; he would be split 
doubly from ‗normality‘ by this. Such a subject would desire – that is, seek pleasure – 
in both the profound delights of culture and its absolute destruction. In a certain sense 
this would be a fort/da relation figured through a ‗perverse‘ experience of the text.62 
Recalling Derrida‘s reading of an ambiguous relation to the arrivant, we find in 
Barthes‘s reading a similar desire for both the deferral of the other as the condition for 
the pleasure of living and thinking (Barthes‘s ‗culture‘) and – folded irreducibly into 
that relation – the desire for the arrival of the wholly other as the bliss of what might be 
overdetermined as dispersion, death, pleasure and justice. The locus for this relation to 
the text would be atopic, it would be the non-site of a double perversion, not a stable 
place from which to peruse or await the pleasures on offer, but an essentially spectral 
experience where an art de vivre is also the bliss of losing that life. Neither a living 
according to cultural or ideological norms, nor death as the exhaustion of desire, 
Barthes‘s doubly split subject would be an – atopic – locus of awaiting at the horizons 
of a culture always-already punctuated by the blissful event ‗to-come‘. Barthes‘s 
reading of ‗pleasure‘ suggests an attempt to formulate thinking in the vicinity of bliss, 
without reducing its absolute unpredictability through an horizon of expectation. He is 
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thus attempting to reserve a place for the other without delimiting that place through the 
logic of determinable space. 
 
Barthes‘s subject of the text of pleasure/jouissance would be ‗anachronistic‘; to recall 
Derrida‘s allusion to Hamlet in Specters of Marx, the subject would ‗be‘ essentially out 
of joint. Indeed, a subject split twice over would also be the subject of an essentially 
divided temporality.
63
 This experience of time, a time rent by the ‗doubly perverse‘ 
subject, suggests a relation to Derrida‘s messianic structure as an ‗inadequation between 
the now and now.‘ Such a structure marks the ‗present‘ as essentially divided; hence a 
‗now‘ would never be adequate to itself. This also resonates with Barthes‘s formulation 
of the text of pleasure/jouissance, in that a text split by a doubling of desire would be a 
state of pleasure/bliss. Such a doubling could not be reduced to a single locus of 
experience; it would have to take ‗place‘ in an atopic community, perhaps a community 
of ghosts. Yet there appears to be a resounding difference between Barthes‘s reading of 
pleasure/bliss and Derrida‘s messianic structure, in that the latter, as it is deemed to be 
an essential condition for thinking and experience, may seem to assume a universal 
status, whereas Barthes‘s reading is dependent upon a particular experience: hedonism.  
The problem of how we might think the status of the messianic structure is already 
posed in the notion itself: is the messianic structure an essential condition for thinking 
our determinable messianisms, or, is it abstracted from a determinable messianism as its 
essential structure? Derrida returns to this question at several points, and in the 
following citation, it remains an enigma: 
 
The problem remains – and this is really a problem for me, an enigma – 
whether the religions, say, for instance, the religions of the Book, are but 
specific examples of this general structure, of messianicity. There is the 
general structure of messianicity, as the structure of experience, and on this 
groundless ground there have been revelations, a history which one calls 
Judaism or Christianity and so on. […] This is one hypothesis. The other 
hypothesis – and I confess that I hesitate between these two possibilities – is 
that the events of revelation, the biblical traditions, the Jewish, Christian, 
and Islamic traditions, have been absolute events, irreducible events which 
have unveiled this messianicity. We would not know what messianicity is 
without messianism, without these events which were Abraham, Moses, and 
Jesus Christ, and so on. In that case singular events would have unveiled or 
revealed these universal possibilities, and it is only on that condition that we 
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can describe messianicity. Between the two possibilities I must confess I 
oscillate and I think some other scheme has to be constructed to understand 
the two at the same time, to do justice to the two possibilities.
64
 
   
Derrida must ‗confess‘ that he hesitates between these two possibilities, that he remains 
undecided. Of course, it is necessary that this is the case; should Derrida come down on 
either side, it would either name the structure of experience as determined by a 
particular Messianism, or name a universal structure of experience which is immanent 
to itself, thus erasing the very possibility of the other and their promise.  
 
At this point, a second question arises: if such a position is necessarily ambiguous for 
Derrida, how might one approach the thinking of the messianic without reducing one‘s 
point of departure to either possibility? In this case, the answer requires a reference to 
the word ‗Messiah‘ as the hinge upon which both possibilities rest:  
 
That is why – and perhaps this is not a good reason, perhaps one day I will 
give this up – for the time being I keep the word ―messianic‖. Even if it is 
different from messianism, messianic refers to the word Messiah; it does not 
simply belong to a certain culture, a Jewish or Christian culture. I think that 
for the time being I need this word, not to teach, but to let people understand 
what I am trying to say when I speak of messianicity. But in doing so I still 
keep the singularity of a single revelation, that is Jewish, Christian 
revelation, with its reference to Messiah. It is a reinterpretation of this 
tradition of the Messiah.
65
 
 
Therefore, with the word ‗messianic‘, Derrida maintains the singularity of the event in 
the suggestion of a universal structure of experience without deciding upon either as the 
basis of the other. To enable a re-reading of religious tradition, the ‗messianic‘ becomes 
a term which remains in the vicinity of Judeo-Christian revelation without being solely 
its property. Neither does such a term name the absolute or universal structure of 
experience, for, as noted above, the very notion of the messianic is that it waits without 
horizon of expectation. In other words, what might be ‗to come‘ – as wholly other – 
would puncture in advance the universality of any universal structure. 
 
As the history and heritage of the messiah is ambiguous for Derrida, as the ‗messiah‘ 
cannot be reduced to a Jewish or Christian messianism, but also because it can never 
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leave behind these singular experiences of the promise, the term ‗messiah‘ seems to 
sketch the oscillatory, hesitant position Derrida suggests he must take (for now). 
Derrida suggests that if a ‗to come‘ is to be expected without expectancy, if it is to be 
awaited without the ‗calculation of a program‘, then such a promise of the other, such a 
messianicity, must always-already be rent by the hesitancy between a general structure 
and a particular experience. This would be a promise of the other entrusted to an 
‗experience that is so impossible, so unsure in its indigence‘.66 Thinking the promise of 
the other as such an impossible experience would render the notion of the messianic as 
‗strange, strangely familiar and inhospitable at the same time (unheimlich, uncanny)‘.67 
An existential and ontological ambiguity, then, is sketched in the very word ‗messiah‘ – 
its status is impossible to determine in the notion of messianicity. The ‗messiah‘ is a 
mark of hesitancy, or figure of spectrality, in the word ‗messianic‘; the very word 
reserving a space for the stranger, the very word structured by the imminence of the 
other. The word ‗messianic‘ survives; it lives on as a spectral trace, the mark which 
promises a ‗messiah‘ to come. Such is a ‗despairing ―messianism‖‘, one which, with a 
curious ‗taste of death‘, awaits without waiting as an essentially uncanny experience.68  
 
2.5 It’s all in the head 
In Specters of Marx, Derrida suggests that what both Marx and Stirner ‗seem to have in 
common is the critique of the ghostly. Both of them want to have done with the 
revenant, both of them hope to get there.‘69 With this ‗hoping to get there‘ Derrida is 
alluding to a determinable messianism, a utopian promise of Marx and Stirner, realised 
for both as the ‗reappropriation of life in a body proper.‘70 Derrida reads that whilst for 
Stirner this ‗messianic formality‘ would be the promise of exorcising the self, for Marx, 
it would come with exorcising the social body from the ghostly operations of capitalist 
production:  
 
whereas Stirner seems to entrust this reappropriation to a simple conversion 
of the self that takes back into itself (a self that in truth is nothing but this 
movement of interiorizing gathering) and authentically reanimates, in some 
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fashion, the objectified ghosts, the ghost at large, Marx, for his part, 
denounces this egological body: there, he cries, is the ghost of all ghosts.
71
  
 
Like Stirner, Marx will conjure up the ghosts of ‗the Emperor, the State, the 
Fatherland‘, but in order to see them for what they are, in their ‗practical reality‘, and 
therefore in a state which can be entirely exorcised. Of course, and as the possibility of 
exorcism is conditioned by a belief in ghosts, both Marx and Stirner paradoxically 
found their eradication of the spectral upon what Derrida calls a ‗pre-deconstructive‘ 
ontology, an ontology which demands a clear opposition between being and not-being, 
and which is thus not at all spectral. 
  
Derrida is engaged with a reading of Marx‘s relation to the spectre, which, in both The 
German Ideology and Capital, provides a foil for a materialist philosophy. This reading 
takes up Marx‘s reading of the commodity, its value(s), and its fetishistic appeal. For 
Derrida, the commodity is that around which the question of the ghost turns, for it is in 
the ‗socius‘ of the commodity that Marx attempts once again to confine the 
‗phantasmagoric‘ relations of a market economy. Here, and through an analogy to the 
‗misty realm‘ of religion for which it is a substitute, the autonomy and automata of 
commodities form a series of ‗relations both with each other and with the human 
race.‘72 At this point Derrida asks if it is merely a coincidence that at the moment in 
Capital when Marx attempts to ‗demonstrate that the mystical character [of the 
commodity] owes nothing to a use-value‘, his reading revolves around a table, or a table 
which revolves: ‗Is it just chance that he illustrates the principle of his explanation by 
causing a table to turn? Or rather by recalling the apparition of a turning table?‘73 As a 
footnote to the English translation explains, in French, ‗―une table tournante‖ refers 
most often to the spiritualist séance.‘74 Derrida is alluding here to the reading he is 
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about to make, of a commodity whose mystical ability to dance on its head is, for Marx, 
the result of it being haunted. For Marx, such ghosts must be exorcised from the 
commodity and traced to the head of the consumer, from which they can then be 
expelled once and for all. 
  
For Marx, the table as commodity spins out ‗grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if 
it were to begin dancing of its own free will.‘75 If the table were endowed with its own 
essence, if its mind were its own, it would be far less interesting than in its commodity 
form, a form where it is possessed by the spirit of another. For Marx, then, the 
commodity both haunts and is haunted. Indeed, for him, the commerce between 
commodities should be a reflection of the socius of worker relations, but as this 
reflection is not clear – and as any real ghost knows that a mirror cannot show its true 
reflection – the ‗ghosts that are commodities transform human producers into ghosts.‘76 
Here Marx is approaching a head-to-head with a ghosting en abyme. The commodity 
would be the objective reflection of labour relations by making those relations appear 
natural to the object they produce. It ‗shows by hiding‘, and thus what should 
objectively reflect labour relations actually renders those relations in their essential 
spectrality: 
 
the returned (deformed, objectified, naturalized) image becomes that of a 
social relation among commodities, among these inspired, autonomous, and 
automatic ―objects‖ that are séance tables. The specular becomes the 
spectral at the threshold of this objectifying naturalization.
77
  
 
Commodity relations produce a disruption of the specular relation between man and his 
object. Man can no longer see himself as that which is haunted, as the being to which a 
haunting happens; man is instead haunted, ghosted, spooked from the beginning: ‗There 
is a mirror, and the commodity form is also this mirror, but since all of a sudden it no 
longer plays its role, since it does not reflect back the expected image, those who are 
looking for themselves can no longer find themselves in it.‘78 There is a complex theatre 
at work here, where the actors who should represent the worker relations are instead the 
original performance of those relations (what Werner Hamacher terms a 
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‗performaterialsm‘79). As the worker cannot see a specular reflection of himself as the 
one who is replicated by the commodity, but rather his originary – spectral – condition, 
the worker as other cannot be reduced to the same. A spectral dimension extends into 
both the market of the commodity and the socius of the worker. 
  
In turn, the ghost effect of the commodity may also tell us about the ghosting of the one 
who seeks their reflection in it. As Derrida highlights, Marx describes the commodity as 
sensuously non-sensuous; in its form as table it is a sensuously wooden object, yet when 
it becomes a commodity, it is a sensuous supersensuous thing [ein sinnlich 
übersinnliches Ding].
80
 Derrida glosses this: 
 
Transcendence, the movement of super-, the step [pas] beyond (über, 
epekeina), is made sensuous in that very excess. It renders the non-sensuous 
sensuous. One touches there on what one does not touch, one feels there 
where one does not feel, one even suffers there where suffering does not 
take place, when at least it does not take place where one suffers (which is 
also, let us not forget, what is said about phantom limbs, that phenomenon 
marked with an X for any phenomenology of perception).
81
 
 
The mysterious super-sensuous quality which haunts the form of the commodity 
survives the sensuous; it lives on as both supersensuousness and non-sensuous, the 
step/not [pas] beyond as an essential and originary dis-jointing of the material present. 
The ghost cannot be reduced to its proper essence in the commodity, the spirit cannot be 
made manifest as the commodity‘s own sensuousness, and this is due to the disruptive 
spectrality of the commodity which haunts it from the beginning. As such, the 
‗commodity is a ―thing‖ without phenomenon, a thing in flight that surpasses the senses 
(it is invisible, intangible, inaudible, and odourless).‘82 But it also touches on all these 
realms, it survives them without being reduced to the phenomenon, or a 
phenomenology. The experience of a sensuous supersensuousness would also be one of 
‗suffering‘ of the other, a work of mourning which is never complete – an experience of 
what Derrida would call half-mourning – where a sense of the non-sensuous survives 
the opposition of absence/presence or mourning/melancholia. As a sensuous 
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supersensuousness, our relation to the commodity is spectral, an originary half-
mourning, in that the commodity cannot be proper to, or property of, either itself or the 
other. There is no true value or essence of the commodity to which it can be reduced, a 
value with which we could exchange it in order to substitute it one for the other as in a 
complete work of mourning: ‗Just as there is no pure use, there is no use-value which 
the possibility of exchange and commerce (by whatever name one calls it, meaning 
itself, value, culture, spirit [!], signification, the world, the relation to the other, and first 
of all the simple form and trace of the other) has not in advance inscribed in an out-of-
use – an excessive signification that cannot be reduced to the useless.‘83 As we can see, 
it is not Derrida‘s aim to somehow champion the commodity as a transcendental or 
revelatory experience of the ghost effect, it is merely to point out that what Marx is 
attempting to exorcise from the head of the commodity is in fact the effect of an 
originary spectral dimension, a ghost-effect which survives the simple opposition of 
use/useless and ‗as such‘ is the condition of all productive relations – capitalist or not (if 
there can be such a negation). 
  
Not only does Marx try to exorcise the spectral from the head of the commodity, he also 
attempts to reduce it to the ‗head‘ of the subject. In The German Ideology, as in Capital, 
‗Marx advances that belief in the religious spectre, thus in the ghost in general, consists 
in autonomizing a representation (Vorstellung) and in forgetting its genesis as well as its 
real grounding (reale Grundlage).‘84 At this point Derrida is about to read a passage 
from The German Ideology, a passage in which Marx stages the desire to reduce 
everything to the archi-tecture of a materialist base. But ‗leaving that aside‘, Marx – in 
his critique of Stirner – finds it more urgent to confine to the head the ‗obsessions‘ 
which engender the (religious) ghosts we find it necessary to manifest as if they were 
autonomous. For Marx, the critique of these subjective representations presupposes the 
secured limits of the subject; it presupposes a clear notion of what is inside and outside 
the head. We should read Marx‘s passage as cited by Derrida: 
  
In religion people make their empirical world into an entity that is only 
conceived, imagined [zu einemnur gedachten, vorgestellten Wesen], that 
confronts them as something foreign [das ihnen fremd gegenübertritt]. This 
again is by no means to be explained from other concepts, from ―self-
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consciousness‖ and similar nonsense, but from the entire hitherto existing 
mode of production and intercourse, which is just as independent 
[unabhängig] of the pure concept as the invention of the self-acting mule [in 
English in the text] and the use of railways are independent of Hegelian 
philosophy. If [Stirner] wants to speak of an ―essence‖ of religion, i.e., of a 
material basis of this inessentiality, [d.h. von einer materiellen Grundlage 
dieses Unwesen], then he should look for it neither in the ―essence of man‖ 
[im “Wesen des Menschen”], nor in the predicates of God, but in the 
material world which each stage of religious development finds in existence. 
All the ―spectres‖ which have filed before us [die wir Revue passieren 
liessen] were representations [Vorstellungen]. These representations – 
leaving aside their real basis [abgesehen von ihrer realen Grundlage] 
(which Stirner in any case leaves aside) – understood as representations 
internal to consciousness, as thoughts in people‘s heads, transferred from 
their objectality [Gegenständlichkeit] back into the subject [in das Subjekt 
zurückgenommen], elevated from substance into self-consciousness, are 
obsessions [der Sparren] or fixed ideas.
85
 
 
For Derrida, this passage shows that in order to reduce the ghost to the head – that is, 
securely confined and awaiting exorcism – spectrality must permeate its walls from the 
beginning:  
 
 If one follows the letter of the text, the critique of the ghost or of spirits 
would thus be a critique of a subjective representation and an abstraction, of 
what happens in the head, of what comes only out of the head, that is, of 
what stays there, in the head, even as it has come out of there, out of the 
head, and survives outside the head. But nothing would be possible, 
beginning with the critique, without the surviving, without the possible 
survival of this autonomy and automatism outside the head.
86
 
 
In order to exorcise the spectre of religious belief, which has its analogy in the 
commodity, Marx must act as if he did not know that the spectre proceeds and exceeds 
the limits of both, and is in fact, the very condition of their thinking. Like the table head 
of the commodity-form, the human head is the place of a haunting for Marx, it is that to 
which a haunting occurs, and in turn that which must be exorcised. Yet for Derrida, 
there can be no secure head to which this haunting happens, no house or economy (the 
law or rule of the house: oikos and nomos) from which a poltergeist can be identified 
and expelled; both the head and the house are always-already spooked – places where 
any attempt at exorcism must presuppose an essential spectrality. As Derrida states, 
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though Marx parodied Stirner for his attempt to reduce the ghost to the imagination of 
Man – Stirner‘s ‗Mensch, es spukt in deinem Kopfe‘ [‗Man, there are spectres in your 
head‘] – he makes the same move.87 In order to rid Stirner of the ghost – in order to 
locate its source in the ‗real grounding‘ of the material modes of production – Marx 
must presume that the ‗I‘ of man is something to which a haunting happens, rather than 
a figuration of the self whose very possibility is a relation to the ghost. Though it is 
impossible to summarise Marx‘s reading of Stirner here, it hinges upon the possibility 
of revealing the ghost as an effect of a commerce which precedes the spectral, a 
commerce which would then generate a ghost effect in the heads of men. Marx suggests 
it is not enough to exorcise this ghost from the head – as he claims is Stirner‘s aim. 
Rather, it should be exorcised from its source in the current modes of production. Of 
course, it is Derrida‘s aim to show that Marx‘s reading requires an ontology of 
presence, and therefore, that Marx must have already remembered to forget the ghost in 
order to posit a means of production as the real – and un-haunted – ground of his 
critique. 
  
Derrida suggests that it is in Stirner‘s – and Marx‘s – use of the phrase ‗es spukt‘ that 
we can begin to see that the head has already marked the impossibility of reducing the 
ghost to its source. As Derrida notes, ‗es spukt‘ has always been difficult to translate.  
 
The German idiom seems to name the ghostly return but it names it in a 
verbal form. The latter does not say that there is some revenant, specter, or 
ghost; it does not say that there is some apparition, der Spuk, nor even that it 
appears, but that ―it ghosts,‖ ―it apparitions.‖ It is a matter [Il s‘agit], in the 
neutrality of this altogether impersonal verbal form, of something or 
someone, neither someone nor something, of a ―one‖ that does not act.88  
 
As Stirner claims that the ghost resides in the heads of the people (and that the head 
must be exorcised and restored to a pre-spectral architecture), and as Marx claims that 
Stirner himself needs to be rid of this haunting obsession (and instead turn his attention 
to the real source of the ghost), Derrida suggests that the ‗es spukt‘ of ‗Mensch, es spukt 
in deinem Kopfe‘ marks the very impossibility of reducing the ghost to a logic of 
identity. However, neither can it be confined to a function of rhetoric:  
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[T]he figure of the ghost is not just one figure amongst others. It is perhaps 
the hidden figure of all figures. For this reason, it would perhaps no longer 
figure as one tropological weapon among others. There would be no 
metaphoric of the ghost.
89
 
 
‗Es spukt‘, then, cannot be reduced to the head of a haunted subject or object; neither 
does it describe the haunting of something previously un-haunted. To demonstrate this 
Derrida plays on the verb ‗agir‘ [to behave, to act], which suggests that this is a matter 
of, or it is a question of [il s‟agit], non-materiality, an action determined by neither 
subject or object, an action which is at the same time an apprehension about acting: ‗It 
is a matter [Il s‘agit] rather of the passive movement of an apprehension, of an 
apprehensive movement ready to welcome.‘90 Such a movement requires thinking 
otherwise about the activity of action, where the ‗apprehensive movement‘ would be 
that which welcomed the other, an action which passively let the other come. Of course, 
apprehension is often thought of as a seizing or laying hold of something or someone – 
in the name of the law, an arrest. Apprehension is also a consciousness or sensing of 
something, a feeling, which perhaps also becomes an anxiety. In the ‗passive movement 
of an apprehension‘ we would find both a welcoming of the other, and an anxious desire 
to halt such a movement: 
 
To welcome, we were saying then, but even while apprehending, with 
anxiety and the desire to exclude the stranger, to invite the stranger without 
accepting him or her, domestic hospitality that welcomes without 
welcoming the stranger, but a stranger who is already found within (das 
Heimliche-Unheimliche), more intimate with one than one is oneself, the 
absolute proximity of a stranger whose power is singular and anonymous (es 
spukt), an unnameable and neutral power, that is, undecidable, neither active 
nor passive, an an-identity that, without doing anything, invisibly occupies 
places belonging finally neither to us nor to it.
91
 
 
Derrida suggests a movement which welcomes without welcoming, without accepting 
as domestic the strangeness of an absolute proximity to home, to economy, and 
therefore to the law of the house. Here, ‗es spukt‘ would mark the uncanny anonymity 
or automatism that both Stirner and Marx attempt to confine to, and then exorcise from, 
the head. But the head cannot be ghosted; it cannot be reduced to the conjunctions of the 
verb ‗to be‘. As Stirner remarks and Marx repeats, the head already ghosts, it spooks, 
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‗es spukt‘; any delimiting of the ‗head‘ as the container or receptacle of this experience 
would suggest that an apprehension of the stranger be diverted in advance. However, an 
attempt to apprehend would also suggest that the stranger had already been welcomed. 
The head would first of all be the experience of this ghosting, a space marked by an 
‗unnameable and neutral power‘, a certain ‗might‘ of a stranger more familiar than the 
self, and yet impossible to apprehend or welcome once and for all to the household. 
Such a ‗might‘ – as force and potential – would mark an originary dimension, neither 
active nor passive, but the condition of all (in)action and (in)decision (something along 
the lines of the ‗weak messianic power‘ which ‗shards‘ the logic of the ‗now‘ – as 
Derrida reads in Benjamin
92
). Derrida asks where this experience might (not) take place, 
a (non) place where any mapping of its limits would be atopic in advance:  
 
What is the head before this apprehension that it cannot even contain? And 
what if the head, which is neither the subject, nor consciousness, nor the 
ego, nor the brain, were defined first of all by the possibility of such an 
experience, and by the very thing that it can neither contain, nor delimit, by 
the indefiniteness of the ―es spukt‖?93 
 
The ‗head‘ would be the possibility of an experience of ‗es spukt‘, an experience which 
cannot be reduced to the subject, or consciousness, the ego, nor the brain. ‗Here‘ the 
‗head‘ would atopically situate a ghost effect as the possibility of place, the ‗head‘ 
would ‗ghost‘ as the possibility of experience. The ‗head‘ would exceed the limits of 
identity whilst remaining in the vicinity of the subject. The ‗head‘ would survive, or live 
on as the ‗indefiniteness‘ which gives the possibility of definition and experience. 
Before an ontology, then, the ‗head‘ would mark what Derrida calls ‗hantologie‘ 
[hauntology
94
]:  
 
This logic of haunting would not be merely larger and more powerful than 
an ontology or a thinking of Being (of the ―to be‖, assuming that it is a 
matter of Being in the ―to be or not to be‖, but nothing is less certain). It 
would harbour within itself, but like circumscribed places or particular 
effects, eschatology and teleology themselves. It would comprehend them, 
but incomprehensibly. How to comprehend in fact the discourse of the end 
or the discourse about the end.
95
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A passive apprehension, a place of incomprehensible comprehension, this would be the 
logic of the ‗head‘ as hauntology. Eschatology and teleology would be taken in, 
comprehended, but through a logic which could not reduce them to a ‗discourse of the 
end or the discourse about the end.‘ Rather, they would mark a promissory discourse, 
irreducible to a comprehension of the end (death/justice/the messiah). Again, if the end 
appeared, as it had been promised, here and now, we could only ask if it was imminent. 
 
Awaiting with an uncanny apprehension, das (un)heimliche would here be an originary 
affect of the text, the feeling without sensing, or sensing without feeling, of the most 
intimate and faraway stranger, both here-now, and forever to come. An alterity at the 
heart of singularity, as difference and différance, ‗es spukt‘ as originary ghosting, the 
‗head‘ marks the very possibility of experience. Might we say here, following Barthes, 
that the ‗head‘ is split by two desires, (in)comprehensibly and (un)decidably divided 
between, on the one hand, a desire for the other (the welcoming of the most strange, 
foreign, or other) and on the other hand, a desire to desire what remains other (and thus 
the deferral of the other)? Might the ‗head‘ be a place in which both a welcoming of the 
other and the promise of the other remain possible? Both an apprehending and 
apprehension of the other, this divided desire would be impossible to separate once and 
for all. As the site of both activity and passivity, the divided desire of the ‗head‘ would 
be impossible to reduce to the teleology, eschatology or ontology it may have promised 
itself. And if this echoes Freud‘s reading of the ‗uncanny‘, as what is a most familiar 
strangeness, it is perhaps because the ‗es spukt‘ – as Derrida highlights – is the place 
from which Freud thought his thesis on the uncanny ought to have begun. For Derrida, 
if Freud didn‘t start where he should or ought to have done  
 
 it is because with the thing in question (the strongest example of 
Unheimlichkeit, the ―es spukt‖, ghosts, and apparitions), one scares oneself 
too much [one makes oneself fear too much: on se fait trop peur]. One 
confuses what is heimliche-unheimliche, in a contradictory, undecidable 
fashion, with the terrible or the frightful (mit dem Grauenhaften).
96
  
 
There is a risk involved by beginning with the ‗es spukt‘; this would be the fear of 
fearing too much, of experiencing a fear incompatible to the ‗subject‘ who experiences 
it. Such a fear would manifest itself in the possibility of confusing the ‗might‘ or 
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promise of the (un)heimliche with the too terrible, or too frightening. The excess, the 
‗too much‘ of what remains ‗undecidable‘, is always at risk of being experienced as a 
fear too terrifying, too traumatic. The risk involved in thinking ‗es spukt‘, then, would 
be that what is ‗to come‘ would be too much to take. This uncertainty, however, might 
also suggest that what remains ‗to come‘ could be the ability to say what one loves. 
  
2.6 Fragments d’un discours amoureux 
As an intense shock or wound, the effect of an encounter which exceeds the capacity for 
thought or avoidance but which the one who experiences it nevertheless survives, 
traumatic experience could be thought to be inextricably linked to a messianic structure, 
in that a traumatic experience would be the mark of what remained an unthinkable 
excess, the mark of what remains wholly other, still to be thought, still ‗to come‘. The 
messianic structure, however, is a condition for thinking and living ‗as such‘, it is the 
condition or possibility of all experience. The question to be asked, therefore, might be 
how such a general and originary condition for thinking and survival can be considered 
in terms of a particular notion of trauma or traumatic event. It has already been 
suggested that a hesitation between the universal and the particular remains necessary; 
we might now ask how such an essentially ambiguous ‗position‘ may be taken up in the 
form of a trauma study. With this question in mind, we can return to Barthes to suggest 
that his reading of the imaginary could offer a particular place from which to await what 
must remain wholly other; a space which, whilst admitting the impossibility of thinking 
an unassimilable event once and for all, remains in the vicinity of that event. Such a 
study would be traumatized from the beginning, punctuated by the imminence or 
promise of the other; such a study would be – and whilst attempting to avoid reducing 
the other to the self-stabilising desires of discourse, discipline and myth, or the absolute 
dissolution of loss, madness or death, but not forgetting the role of desire in any 
encounter – a place for thinking the event which risks an essential – but potentially 
traumatic – exposure to the wholly other. 
 
Although there may be many other places where we ought to begin reading such a 
study, Barthes‘s 1977 text, Fragments d‟un discours amoureux, might give us a 
particular idea of how we could read the imaginary as a memorial to the future, a study 
marked by the force and potential – the ‗might‘ – of what remained to come. This would 
be where we could say to Barthes: ‗it‘s all in your head‘, whilst at the same time 
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knowing that the text marks the very impossibility of confining this passion for the 
other to the identity of a single subject. Such an imaginary, as an always-already 
ghosted ‗head‘, could not be preceded by an ontology which is yet to be haunted, an 
ontology which was not yet the ghost-dance of a particularly haunting possession. The 
imaginary would be ‗where‘ topography, ontology and chronology ‗are‘ already 
structured by a promise of the other. Sharded or punctuated by the other, in advance of 
any logic of logos, the imaginary lives on in this text as a devotion to, an affection for, 
or study of, the other ‗to come‘. But this devotion is also a suffering and an endurance 
of a desire marked by the other, an imaginary doubled – or spectralized – by the twin 
desires of pleasure and jouissance, the pleasure/bliss in experiencing/awaiting the other 
as both here and to come. 
 
Fragments d‟un discours amoureux is a text which discusses the imaginary as the only 
structure through which the other may be awaited, but more importantly, intimates it is 
essentially out-of-joint. Barthes opens the text with a note upon the necessity for the 
text. For him, the potential of a lover‘s discourse is to return to a register which has 
been forsaken by literary critics, as well as the avant-garde, for being overly 
sentimental. There is therefore no theory of a lover‘s discourse, yet it is the shared 
language of thousands: 
 
The necessity for this book is to be found in the following consideration: 
that the lover‘s discourse is today of an extreme solitude. This discourse is 
spoken, perhaps, by thousands of subjects (who knows?), but warranted 
[soutenu] by no one; it is completely ignored, disparaged, or derided by 
them, severed not only from authority but also from the mechanisms of 
authority (sciences, techniques [savoirs], arts).
97
 
 
Of course, we might suggest that the book is already a technique or science of authority. 
That it already comes under the authority of editors and publishers, as well as the 
demands of the market. But the point is that the lover‘s discourse is an ‗extreme‘ 
solitude, that is, an excess of solitude, a solitary discourse spoken by thousands, and 
under no authority. It cannot come under the authority of the book; it has already 
escaped the book, and yet is also what is promised in it. An extreme solitude would be 
absolutely alone; it would be an absolute singularity which could not be experienced by 
                                                 
97
 Roland Barthes, A Lover‟s Discourse: Fragments, trans. Richard Howard (London: Vintage, 2002), 
n.p; Fragments d‟un discours amoureux [1977], Œuvres Complètes, vol. V, pp.27-296 (p.27).  
 123 
any other – unthinkable to anyone but the One, absolute idiom, and therefore, absolutely 
untranslatable. But to name this experience as an absolute solitude would be to already 
think it, to figure it to oneself, and therefore to trace it, to mark it and therefore to 
translate it. The lover‘s discourse would therefore also be the absolute impossibility of 
thinking the singular experience, it would be a discourse supported [soutenu] by ‗no 
one‘ [emphasis mine]. Spoken by thousands (perhaps) but reducible to ‗no one‘, a 
lover‘s discourse is the property of no one. What might be thought of as proper to the 
lover or to the loved object – their identity for example – is impossible to delimit. The 
lover‘s discourse is already the impossibility of confining it to a single head. But neither 
is it proper to all, a transcendental given. It is merely spoken by thousands, perhaps : 
‗Ce discours est peut-être parlé par des milliers de sujets (qui le sait?)‘.98 
  
For Barthes, a discourse which resembles an extreme solitude, which is irreducible to 
absolute authority, is the place of affirmation: 
 
Once a discourse is thus driven by its own momentum [sa propre force] into 
the backwater of the ―unreal‖ [la dérive de l‟inactuel], exiled from all 
gregarity [hors de toute grégarité], it has no recourse but to become the site, 
however exiguous, of an affirmation. That affirmation is, in short, the 
subject of the book which begins here… [Cette affirmation est en somme le 
sujet du livre qui commence].
99
 
 
Here, Barthes seems to describe the actual loss of anything proper to the lover‘s 
discourse; its momentum, which was its own, results in an unreality. The discourse thus 
becomes a drift [dérive] of the ‗inactuel‘. Not actual, no longer present to its proper 
force, the discourse drifts in exile. Of course, Barthes‘s notion of the ‗drift‘ is a 
necessarily ambiguous term; as ‗pleasure‘, the ‗neuter‘ and the ‗atopic‘, this term 
suggests a space which is resistant to the commanding order of the concept. But here, 
the discourse as drift must become a place of affirmation. It is not outside language as 
some sacred space of hallowed, unmediated, ground; rather, it must become – as the 
book, the text, or language – the site of an affirmation. And yet, as to what is affirmed 
we are unclear. This ambiguous affirmation hinges on the word ‗sujet‘. What is 
affirmed is overdetermined: at once the affirmation of the subject (perhaps the lover or 
the beloved), or the subject of affirmation (the affirmation that the book is about 
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affirmation). Yet there is also the possibility that what is affirmed is the subject (the 
subject as either lover, beloved. The lover‘s discourse ambiguously affirms the ‗subject‘ 
as an essentially spectral figure.  
  
Spanning all these interpretations is an affirmation of the other, where the other would 
drift across and punctuate all possible sites of affirmation – making it impossible to 
reduce affirmation to a specific location, or what is affirmed to a determinable subject. 
Moreover, such an impossible affirmation, the affirmation of what remains 
indeterminable, is effected there where no proper identity, commanding order or 
determinable place which could host it. The lover‘s discourse is instead a (g)hosting, 
what has exiled itself from all gregarious company, all forms of commonality or 
community (or perhaps, communism) only in order to say yes to the imminence of the 
other – an affirmation which is (perhaps) spoken by thousands, and is therefore – 
perhaps – a very secret promise of (the) community. 
  
As it is impossible to situate the site of affirmation, but the discourse remains that of the 
lover, the utterance of the lover must be staged. In a section entitled ‗How this book is 
constructed‘, Barthes states that:  
  
Everything follows from this principle: that the lover is not to be reduced to 
a simple symptomal subject, but rather that we hear in his voice what is 
―unreal‖, i.e., intractable [mais plutot faire entendre ce qu‟il y a dans sa 
voix d‟inactuel, c‟est-à-dire d‟intraitable]. Whence the choice of a dramatic 
method which renounces examples and rests on the single action of a 
primary language (no metalanguage). The description of the lover‘s 
discourse has been replaced by its simulation, and to that discourse has been 
restored [on a rendu] its fundamental person, the I, in order to state an 
utterance, not an analysis.
100
 
  
All begins with a principle, but the principle is not what might be described as a ‗simple 
symptomal subject‘, rather, the principle is the notion that we can hear or understand 
what is ‗unreal‘ [inactuel], what is not actually here, what is not present, topical, of the 
moment, fashionable, or which refers to a current theme or discourse. But also what is 
virtual, what is virtually here – imminent perhaps. The principle from which all follows, 
from which we all begin, is that we can hear or understand what is not here, that there is 
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some form of a relation to what is virtually here which does not compromise that 
imminence with the topic of the day. The opening principle is that this channel of 
communication, whatever it is, and however impossible, is possible. Yet such virtuality, 
such imminence, is also ‗intractable‘ [intraitable]. It is in-flexible, that with which one 
cannot reach an accord or an agreement, that which remains irreducible to current 
negotiations, or the negotiation of the moment. We find, then, that the lover‘s discourse 
stages an originary out-of-jointness, a discourse that hears or understands the intractable 
imminence of what is virtually here. 
  
The description of a lover‘s discourse has been substituted for its double, for its 
simulation. Rather than attempt to describe it, which would presuppose a metalinguistic 
command over or distance from the lover – something no one could claim, the discourse 
being (perhaps) the secret language of thousands – the text can only simulate the 
discourse through various fragmentary figures. Not a lover‘s discourse ‗as such‘; rather, 
it is a fragmentary simulation of it. Renouncing examples, which would presuppose a 
perfect rendition of the discourse, there is here only a counterfeit, only the uncanny 
doppelganger which resembles it (almost) to the letter. But Barthes‘s text is not the 
double of an original; rather, it is a simulation of the virtual, the fake of a fake – which 
is perhaps the only possible option for a staging of the unreal. To that stage has been 
returned [‗rendu‘: past participle of rendre, which means, amongst other things: to give 
back, return, produce, pronounce, render] an ‗I‘, a ‗personne fondamentale‘. Barthes has 
therefore let what is fundamental return; he has restored the fundamental, and therefore, 
returned what is absolutely fundamental to the production. But the return is to a 
simulation. There can be no presentation of the lover‘s discourse, no presentation of 
what is essential; rather, it must first of all be a matter of simulation, a simulation as the 
substitute for the discourse. What is essential or fundamental, therefore, can only be 
staged in a simulation. What is essential can only be virtual, almost, imminent. The ‗I‘ – 
which might indeed stand in for the ‗Imaginary‘ itself – is what returns. It is an essence 
which haunts the virtual, and the virtual is therefore spectralized – in essence – by the 
very thing it intends to stage. The ‗I‘ is from the beginning a virtual essence, a 
simulation of the fundamental, a ghosted essentiality. 
  
The fragmentary simulation of the lover‘s discourse is therefore  
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a portrait – but not a psychological portrait; instead, a structural one which 
offers the reader a discursive site [il donne à lire une place de parole]: the 
site of someone speaking within himself, amorously, confronting the other 
(the loved object), who does not speak [la place de quelqu‟un qui parle en 
lui-même, amoureusement, face à l‟autre (l‟objet aimé), qui ne parle pas].101  
 
There is a confusion of tenses here; the virtual and fragmentary staging of the lover‘s 
discourse is a portrait, a rendering already made (the noun ‗portrait‘ stemming from the 
past participle of portraire: ‗to portray‘). We have a site, then, at which the past speaks, 
where the past lives on. A ‗portrait‘ can also refer to a photograph, and so here we 
might have a living photograph, or a photograph of what lives on. Not a film, but a 
living image as the impossibility of confining the past to the past. Not a present acting 
like a past, but the impossible conjunction of a simulation which is almost, virtually, the 
past; that is, its past is yet to come, the portrait is the memory of the future, the mark or 
‗trait‘ of the future‘s force and potential – its ‗might‘. There is only the simulation: its 
past – which is also its future – is yet to be uttered; both future and past are imminent, 
but impossible to reduce to the moment. The simulation (the ‗I‘) is structured, therefore, 
by a promise which demands that this portrait should always be that of the ghost. 
 
The ‗portrait‘ is the site of someone speaking ‗en lui-même‘. Barthes suggests here that 
the lover is faced with the other within himself. But he also suggests that the lover does 
not speak with the other, but rather speaks in sight of, vis-à-vis, or whilst confronted 
with the other [face à l‟autre]. The other does not speak; the other cannot be assigned a 
speaking part. On the one hand Barthes seems to position the other in opposition to the 
site of the lover‘s utterance. The lover speaks in sight of the other in himself, but not 
with the other in himself, or himself as other. Indeed, there seems to be an incorporation 
of the loved object in relation to which the lover can then set up an opposition; a 
delimitation or crypting of the other in oneself in order to portray oneself in clear 
opposition to it – to cast the actors for this work of mourning. On the other hand, the 
lover‘s discourse resists the desire to stage the other as an identity, or perform an 
identification. This is, after all, a simulation, a series of fragments which stages an ‗I‘ 
who can only speak ‗amorously‘ whilst faced with the other. Barthes does not set up a 
secure self in opposition to the other, but rather stages the lover‘s imaginary in the 
vicinity of an irreducible otherness. There can only be a virtual affection here, a loving 
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portrait – not a portrait of the other, but in relation to the other. We might say, then, that 
as a portrait of affection – a virtual affection in memory of a future in which ‗one‘ may 
speak of what has been loved (the other is the ‗loved object‘) – the lover‘s discourse 
could come close to a study in affection, to a study which is punctuated or imminent 
with an other which it cannot identify and to which it could not be reduced. A study 
which is traumatized from the beginning – traumatized by being irreducible to the other, 
and therefore from having no secure or proper position from which to think the other. 
And a study for which the word ‗traumatized‘ suggests the impossibility of reducing 
what is studied to the object or to a concept, even if that concept may be ‗trauma‘ as 
such. Impossible ‗to be‘ traumatized, rather, the traumatic would name the point of 
departure for all studies of experience. Such a study would stage a quasi-essential space, 
an apprehension without apprehending; a place which may be reserved for the other, 
reserved for their ‗might‘. Such a study would suffer and survive in the vicinity of the 
other as an awaiting without waiting for the future as his/her/its – and indeed, the 
event‘s – very possibility. 
  
Barthes suggests a series of figures. These figures populate the lover‘s imaginary as its 
fragmentary discourse:  
 
These fragments of discourse can be called figures. The word is to be 
understood, not in its rhetorical sense, but rather in its gymnastic or 
choreographic acceptation; in short, in the Greek meaning: σχήμά is not the 
―schema‖, but, in a much livelier way [d‟une façon bien plus vivante], the 
body‘s gesture caught in action and not contemplated in repose: the body of 
athletes, orators, statues: what in the straining body can be immobilized. So 
it is with the lover at grips with his figures: he struggles in a kind of lunatic 
sport [il se démène dans un sport un peu fou], he spends himself [il se 
dépense], like an athlete; he ―phrases‖, like an orator; he is caught, stuffed 
into a role, like a statue [il est saisi, sidéré dans un rôle, comme une statue]. 
The figure is the lover at work.
102
 
 
The figure is therefore a figure of action. But this is not the capturing of action; the 
figure is much livelier than that. Rather, it suggests a choreographic excess of life: the 
hyper-living of the figure which is immobilized whilst dancing; a dance which is 
performed at the same time as it is choreographed, a dance neither improvised nor 
scripted in advance. The lover exerts itself dementedly, in a sport which touches on 
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madness. The lover spends itself in figures of jouissance, or of bliss, but that dispersion 
of the self is also its seizing or its captivation. In a phrase which is difficult to translate, 
Barthes suggests the lover‘s exertion, their jouissance, is staged through an awestruck 
seizure: ‗il est saisi, sidéré [from ‗sidérer‘: to be captivated, staggered, starstruck] dans 
un rôle‘. The figure – that is, the lover‘s discourse – is the staging, the immobilized 
dance, of a passive or apprehensive action – or actor – who/which is seized or awestruck 
in its/their lunatic exertion. 
  
Barthes suggests that the accuracy of these figures, or their potential to account for the 
lover or the beloved, is unimportant. The lover‘s discourse is not the (in)accurate 
rendition of a subject or object, not the description of an experience which is reducible 
to either, instead, it is a setting, a scene of writing, a map which is at the same time the 
very place it describes: 
 
All the [lover] knows is that what passes through his mind at a certain 
moment is marked, like the printout of a code (in other times, this would 
have been the code of courtly love, or the Carte du Tendre).
103
 
  Each of us can fill this code according to his own history; rich or poor 
[maigre ou pas], the figure must be there, the site (the compartment [la 
case]) must be reserved for it. It is as if there were an amorous Topic, whose 
figure was a site (topos). Now the property of a Topic is to be somewhat 
empty: a Topic is statutorily half coded, half projective (or projective 
because coded).
104
 
 
The figures of the lover‘s discourse reproduce a ‗code‘, a system of marks or traces 
which represent – figure – an inscription or table/tablet of laws (‗code‘ stems from the 
word ‗codex‘ and therefore ‗caudex‘, thus referring us to the trunk of a tree upon which 
laws are inscribed or the table/tablet hewn; with the table in turn recalling us to Marx‘s 
turning table, around which we spun tales with the dead).
105
 But this code would be the 
mark or cipher of the other, a space reserved for the other‘s law. Hence these figures 
would be half coded, a half empty box which awaits the other‘s contribution. The 
amorous ‗Topic‘, the theme which is common or local to the lover, would always be 
‗somewhat empty‘. ‗Statutorily‘, that is, by rights or by law, the topic would be only 
half coded, half planned, half decided – and only half decided because coded. As code, 
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the figure would essentially be only half decided, and therefore, to be read, written and 
populated by the other. The figure is essentially a space reserved for the other. Not yet 
decided and therefore also a promise of what remains to come. Moreover, the figure is 
projective, thrown towards the other, because it is coded, because it awaits the other; a 
projected waiting. What is written is always a movement which cannot be reduced to 
call or response, activity or passivity. It calls whilst responding, is active whilst passive, 
goes towards whilst waiting, and dances whilst remaining immobile. 
  
The figure is first of all supplementary: 
 
What we have been able to say […] about waiting, anxiety, memory is no 
more than a modest supplement offered to the reader to be made free with, 
to be added to, subtracted from, and passed on to others: around the figure 
the players pass the handkerchief [les joueurs font courir le furet] which 
sometimes, by a final parenthesis, is held a second longer [une seconde 
encore] before handing it on. (Ideally, the book would be a co-operative: 
―To the United Readers and Lovers‖).106 
 
‗Waiting‘, ‗anxiety‘ and ‗memory‘ are three figures which are included in the lover‘s 
discourse. As figures, they are ‗no more than modest‘ supplements. The passing on of 
such supplements is neither the search for their final resting place, their final definition 
(as the final parenthesis is always followed by a handing over to the other), nor a return 
to origin (as, being supplementary, ‗what we have been able to say‘ about the figure will 
always have been preceded by an attempt to speak of it; therefore, one could never 
define the description of the figure as originary). Barthes also alludes here to a society 
game in which a circle of players pass an object (le furet) around another participant 
who, in the middle of the circle, must guess who holds that object at any particular 
moment. Barthes considers a particular moment in the game at which hesitancy, delay 
and desire combine. In a ‗final parenthesis‘, the desire to locate the object, and to be 
found holding the object, almost synchronise at a moment of revelation – the player, 
holding onto the object for a second too long desires their own identification as the one 
who holds, whose location is proper to, the object of desire. The final definition of what 
is awaited – the determinable position of the object – is about to be aligned with the 
central figure (both the figure of the player and the figure of the discourse). The topos of 
the figure, as a supplementary and provisional ‗work‘ in the vicinity of the other, is 
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about to be aligned with that which it attempts to say. Rather than the triumphant 
expression of the other in Stendhal‘s novel, this would be the actual manifestation of the 
object in a perfect alignment with what reveals it. In terms of messianism, this would be 
the arrival of a determinable messiah.  
  
Yet the movement of the game cannot stop there; that the condition of the figure is its 
supplementarity, that it can be translated, read again, passed on, means that it is both 
produced by, and awaits, the other. The very possibility of it being held onto for one 
second longer than necessary (une seconde encore) – an almost melancholic attachment 
– means that it is never proper to a single moment. Indeed, the very idea of holding onto 
something for a moment longer than is necessary to it – even in an attempt to identify it 
– suggests a frivolous excess, a spending more time than one should, or one has, or is 
proper to the game. In relation to the figure, the object is passed around the circle of 
players. The object passes between them, awaiting identification by the central player, a 
movement which produces the double desire of wanting identification, and wanting the 
delay of that identification. It also provides the possibility of holding the object for too 
long; again, a movement which effects desire, which takes the one who holds the object 
and the one whose aim is to locate it to the brink of pleasure/jouissance. In order for this 
dance to go on (for, even if the object is found, the game can be played again and 
again), there must be no figure capable of locating the final and proper location of the 
object. No figure who could name the object as such. The figure is therefore a site 
which is neither proper nor improper to that with which it attempts to align itself. The 
figure, indeed, the game, survives – lives on; it survives its final destination, its 
definitive round. And this is the condition of thinking and desire: an essential survival 
as the lover at work, at work awaiting the other to whom that work will be passed. A 
half-finished work of mourning which – rather than preserving the other in a 
melancholic immutability (keeping the object for ever) or detaching oneself from the 
other in a completed work of mourning (pretending that there isn‘t always the 
possibility of holding it for just one second more) – awaits the other – suffers and 
survives as/with/for the other. 
  
Barthes suggests a circle or society of friends, family or lovers who are ‗united‘ in such 
a movement. This final assertion is problematic to everything I have said about an 
‗essential‘ spectrality, in that it suggests a predetermined attempt to delimit a 
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‗community‘ of players/figures who might take part in the movement. Within such a 
community of figures, the other would always be predicted, foreseen or expected in 
advance. There would be an artificial and prescriptive containment of the other in the 
borders or limits of the community. Read in terms of a study, the figures which 
populated such a community would be the predetermined concepts with which we 
might attempt that study, the predicted structures of its dissemination or the pre-
allocated spaces of articulation. A spectral logic, however, would always undermine any 
attempt to patrol the borders of this community, or the limits of a study. As there is no 
space-time which can exorcise itself from an originary and essential spectrality, a 
hauntology would always make the border impossible to police. If we are to affirm this 
essential spectrality, to affirm that uncanny anticipation or apprehension of what is both 
most familiar and wholly other, our starting point should then perhaps be the figures 
which stage, or which play the game. 
  
We have seen how the figures which populate the lover‘s discourse are essentially the 
supplementary, virtual and only partially rendered marks of the other. They populate an 
imaginary which cannot be reduced to the head of the lover, the limits of the book, or a 
borders of the community. Rather, the imaginary takes in and expels all of these terrains 
in its essential ghosting. The imaginary is where ‗es spukt‘; where the head is ghosted 
from the beginning and therefore impossible to reduce (to shrink) to its proper borders. 
In terms of Barthes‘s text, the imaginary is the very performance of the lover‘s 
discourse, a performance which is forever imminent with the arrival on stage of the 
other. Such a performance affirms the virtual, the almost, the perhaps, the ‗as if‘ at work 
in every theme, topic or concept which may want centre stage. 
  
2.7 A spectral imaginary 
As I have demonstrated, Barthes‘s later work allows a reading of the ‗imaginaire‘ as a 
space imminent with the wholly other. This ‗imaginary‘ resembles both the amorous 
repertoire of a lover‘s discourse, and an unfinished work of mourning; the subjects and 
objects of each impossible to reduce to a simple logic of identity. It could be suggested 
that, in relation to Barthes‘s œuvre, figures such as jouissance, plaisir, studium, 
punctum, the obtuse, the filmic, the mother, atopia, and the neuter would populate such 
an imaginary; each a figure with which to (mis)apprehend the (un)heimlich impression 
of the other as it ghosts [es spukt]. Always-already spectral, the imaginary would enact 
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an originary ghosting of the ‗head‘, an atopic topography which allows us to 
incomprehensibly comprehend the possibility of experiencing a radical otherness, 
without reducing it to the sacred image of a determinable messianism, or pre-
programming it through an horizon of expectation. The imaginary would be messianic 
in structure, a structure through which drifts the promise of the other, a wholly other 
which punctuates the imaginary as its most imminent, urgent, intimate and distant 
stranger. Neither a gathering nor dispersal, the imaginary hosts the other whilst turning 
it away. Neither traumatized nor in love, it would instead – and at the same time – be 
the possibility of both. Recalling Derrida‘s Specters of Marx, the imaginary would be 
reducible to neither a figure of homogenous space or linear time, nor to a ‗pre-
deconstructive‘ ontology proper to it; instead it would figure a hauntology from which 
or as which – and perhaps even as a ‗Scholar‘ – it might be possible to speak with the 
ghost:  
 
 If he loves justice at least, the ―scholar‖ of the future, the ―intellectual‖ of 
tomorrow should learn it and from the ghost. He should learn to live by 
learning not how to make conversation with the ghost but how to talk with 
him, with her, how to let them speak or how to give them back speech, even 
if it is in oneself, in the other, in the other in oneself.
107
 
 
Such an imaginary could not be reduced to a concept of itself. The imaginary is a series 
of figures, fragments, scraps, which are gathered without gathering; that is, also 
dispersed. This movement does not exclude the notion of the imaginary itself. The 
imaginary would have no fixed definition, capacity or order; the term would span 
previous notions of the imaginary – Sartre‘s or Lacan‘s for example – without being 
reducible to them, that is, whilst exceeding them. Nor could the imaginary be reduced to 
a ‗Barthesian‘ definition; as it would always exceed any authorial or commanding order, 
it would not be proper to any theory, definition or location. Therefore – and whilst all 
notions of the imaginary would be spectralized from the beginning, in that they would 
necessarily involve a notion of the trace – it seems necessary to refer to this reading of 
the imaginary as spectral. Affirming its spectrality would be an attempt to resist the 
reduction of the term ‗imaginary‘ to either its concept, or an identificatory logic, in that 
a ‗spectral imaginary‘ would always-already be ghosted by the other. 
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A spectral imaginary could not be circumscribed once and for all; its limits could not be 
determined by the edges of a book, the title which announces it, or the themes which it 
may address. A spectral imaginary would always be partial; irreducible to the limits of a 
whole. Barthes suggests in Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes that ‗the vital effort of 
this book is to stage an image-system [L‟effort vital de ce livre est de mettre en scène un 
imaginaire]‘, where 
  
―To stage‖ means: to arrange the flats one in front of the other, to distribute 
the roles, to establish levels, and at the limit: to make the footlights a kind of 
uncertain barrier. Hence it is important that the image-system [l‟imaginaire] 
be treated according to its degrees (the image-system is a matter of 
consistency [une affaire de consistence], and consistency a matter of 
degrees), and there are, in the course of these fragments [of the book], 
several degrees of image-system. The difficulty, however, is that one cannot 
number these degrees, like the degrees of spirituous liquor or of a torture.
108
 
 
The text would be the staging of the imaginary in that it would establish its consistency 
– in the sense of density or viscosity – without reducing that consistency to a 
quantifiable or measurable scale; hence an inconsistent consistency. As a staging of the 
imaginary, a staging of uncertain barriers, the text would already be in the vicinity of 
another. Through its plural and incalculable consistencies, any text might be read in 
relation to another without being comparable to it. Each text would be of a consistency 
with another – a relation between degrees of intensity, between stages or steps of the 
text – without either being preceded by a metatextual scale. We might describe this in 
terms of Derrida‘s notion of messianicity, and say that the spectral imaginary is where a 
general messianic structure would find itself in the vicinity of a particular experience of 
the text, without either being the a priori condition of the other. We must add, therefore, 
that the spectral imaginary can only be staged; there is no imaginary before this staging, 
no imaginary before the staging-as-text. 
 
Though it may be staged in the form of a book, the spectral imaginary is impossible to 
reduce to its borders, and as such, always-already overflows that staging. The spectral 
imaginary can therefore return, be staged again, and otherwise. We might illustrate this 
by saying that, though Barthes‘s reading of Stendhal‘s ability to express his ‗Italian 
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passion‘ is a singular response to his texts, it is also and already readable in the 
questions surrounding the absolute resemblance of the photograph to Barthes‘s mother 
in La Chambre Claire. Though a spectral imaginary can be read in both texts, neither is 
capable of being reduced to a comparable measure, schema or system. Between texts, 
there is a relation without relation, and this is due to the impossibility of delimiting their 
borders. Without clear borders, then, we cannot say in any definitive capacity where the 
spectral imaginary ends or begins, and therefore to what it might be related. We could 
not say where or what might be considered the ‗same‘, or where or what might be 
definitively thought of as ‗other‘. An essential spectrality, a ghosting, a text, the spectral 
imaginary has the absolute unknowability of the other as its condition and its effect. Yet 
the notions of ‗condition‘ and ‗effect‘ would be ambiguous here; the wholly other 
would act – at the same time – as both condition and effect of the text (no text without 
other, no other without text). We might prove the latter by its alternative, in that, should 
the other be known in advance, should what is ‗to come‘ be predicted or calculated, the 
horizons of expectation – the limits of the spectral imaginary – would already and 
undisputedly be mapped. 
  
The spectral imaginary might be likened to a study, in that it would situate a devotion, 
affection, pleasure or inclination towards or for something. Yet, and referring to 
Barthes‘s notion of the punctum, this study would be punctured from the beginning, in 
that – to recall Barthes‘s essay on Stendhal – it would always fail in speaking of what it 
loves. Again, regardless of any object or horizon of study, such a study would be 
traumatized by a wholly other which cannot be reduced to the figure of trauma ‗as 
such‘, or mastered by the concepts which approach it. As a trauma study, the spectral 
imaginary might suggest how all studies call for a radical re-evaluation of their 
approach, of how all studies might call for a scholar(ship) which could speak with the 
ghost. 
  
An always-already punctured study, the spectral imaginary cannot form a clear horizon 
for its object, or calculate the object from its horizon. There must always be the 
possibility that what could result from such a study might always be other than what is 
sought. A trauma(tized) study, then, would be proper to no object, no task. But neither 
could it devote itself to anything whatsoever, because it must always await the other in a 
particular vicinity. Though the spectral imaginary may, as a staging, be comprised of 
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the figures of a lover‘s discourse, and therefore whilst it would on the one hand be 
expected to address itself to an object of desire, it could not be proper to that object in 
that its expectancy would always be imminent with the promise of the wholly other. 
Should a notion of trauma be one of the figures which populated the spectral imaginary, 
the wholly other of the arrivant, imminent at every turn, would mean that such a notion 
must also concern itself with those of love, anxiety, humour or music – amongst many 
others. 
 
It could be suggested, then, that Barthes‘s late essay – in which Barthes suggests a point 
in Stendhal‘s writing at which it is impossible to decide between a described effect and 
the effect that description produces – is itself a mapping of Stendhal‘s journey from 
travel journal to novel. Barthes has shown how Stendhal moves from a Winnicottian 
play – a writing which attempts to recall the lost (m)other through the transitional object 
– to a triumphant expression of the other. As Barthes suggests, when Stendhal writes of 
‗Italy‘ in the travel journals, he ‗speaks it, he sings it, he does not represent it; he 
proclaims his love but cannot express it, or, as we say nowadays (a metaphor from 
driving), he cannot negotiate it.‘109 This then shifts to the ‗triumphant expression‘ of the 
novel as the impression of the other, a description which is the particular and singular 
mark of the other. As the mark of the other, this writing is also a sign of their ‗might‘, 
the sign that they are imminent For Barthes, then, Stendhal‘s novel produces writing 
which reserves a place for the other. 
 
Barthes‘s essay plots Stendhal‘s journey; it seems to form – or ‗formaterialize‘ – a 
Bildungsroman as the Stendhalian experience of ‗Italy‘, which passes from the early 
insecurities of infancy to an imaginary which – rather than being reducible to that of an 
adult – is in fact irreducible to a single subject. As we have seen, Stendhal‘s later work 
is, for Barthes, informed by ‗a kind of after-the-fact [une sorte d‟après-coup] which also 
constitutes part of the devious logic of love‘. It is also a ‗novelistic lie‘ [le mensonge 
romanesque], which ‗would be – miraculously – both the detour of truth and the finally 
triumphant expression of his Italian passion‘. Here, a passion for the other is not their 
truth, but a lie which takes a turn through truth. The devious logic of love, the après-
coup or mark/might of the other, is figured through a lie which touches on truth. 
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The Novel – as writing – enacts the imaginary to such an extent that what is experienced 
there cannot be reduced once and for all to the experience of Stendhal alone. The 
imaginary is instead a transferential locus at which writer/reader, Barthes/Stendhal, 
text/experience cannot be formalized into normalizing categories for thinking. Barthes‘s 
essay closes by staging this figure of the imaginary. This is why Barthes‘s essay could 
never be deemed finished, even if he had amended every page and published it before 
he died. Barthes reads Stendhal‘s text as the ‗triumphant expression of his Italian 
passion‘; in Stendhal‘s text, ‗Italy‘ is imminent, an imminence which is the very 
experience of reading, a ‗passion‘ which could not be reduced to an experience proper 
to either Barthes or Stendhal, a passion for the other which could never end. 
 
2.8 A virtual double act 
In his essay on Proust, read at the Collège de France in 1978, Barthes asks himself if he 
would write a novel: ‗Does all this mean I‘m going to write a novel?‘110 Amongst other 
things, Barthes is uncertain as to the form of such a novel. Indeed, such a ‗novel‘ would 
be a memory of what is yet to come: ‗I still mean by the Novel that uncertain, quite 
uncanonical Form, insofar as I do not conceive it but only remember or desire it.‘111 
Although Barthes figures the other as ‗the reader‘ in this essay, the novel could not 
exert any pressure upon him or her, no action which would force them to be ‗the 
reader‘: ‗since its writing is mediate (it presents ideas and feelings only by 
intermediaries) – the Novel then, exerts no pressure upon the other (the reader).‘112 
Barthes suggests he does not know if he will write this novel – ‗How should I know?‘; 
which in turn suggests that if it were to be written, it would perhaps not be recognized 
as that which he sought. What remains important is the performance and the act of 
writing. Barthes knows that the novel could only arrive through its imaginary or unreal 
staging: ‗It is important for me to act as if I were [de faire comme si je devrais] to write 
this utopian novel.‘113  
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Barthes concludes this essay with a return to method – or perhaps, to method acting. 
Here, the subject is not studying something, but is rather the staging of a production 
which – with the arrival of the novel imminent – is ghosted by the very thing to come. 
Barthes poses this production as an amateur dramatics, but it is also ‗vaguely oriented‘ 
towards a science to come. The production would therefore be a working towards that 
future, whilst attempting to resist deciding – either professionally or legitimately – upon 
it in advance: 
 
[…] here I regain, to conclude, a method [je retrouve ici, pour finir, la 
méthode]. I put myself in the position [Je me mets en effet dans la position] 
of the subject who makes something, and no longer of the subject who 
speaks about something: I am not studying a product, I assume a production; 
I abolish the discourse on discourse; the world no longer comes to me as an 
object, but as writing, i.e., a practice: I proceed [je passe] to another type of 
knowledge (that of the Amateur), and it is in this that I am methodical […] I 
postulate a novel to be written, whereby I can expect to learn more about the 
novel than by merely considering it as an object already written by others.
114
 
 
Barthes closes by suggesting that such a production, such writing, as the horizon 
without horizon of the novel, may also be an intimacy with the subject‘s absolute 
particularity (a subject he has put himself in the position of). Through a conditional 
double-act, in acting as if he were the subject who writes, as if he were the one who 
might write a ‗novel‘, the one who virtually or quasi-acts – an ‗almost‘ acting which 
might also be real – would be the one who proceeds ‗to another type of knowledge‘, a 
knowledge where a practice and theory of the ‗novel‘ remain undecidable. In turn, such 
amateur method acting might also be the vague recognition of a new science which 
might express – at once – the brilliance and suffering of the world. Such a double-act 
might perform the writing of what is, at once, both the particular and the universal, and 
of what is, at once, the most loved and most feared: 
 
Perhaps it is finally at the heart of this subjectivity, of this very intimacy 
which I have invoked, perhaps it is at the ―pinnacle of my particularity‖ that 
I am scientific without knowing it, vaguely oriented toward that Scienza 
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Nuova Vico spoke of: should it not express at once the world‘s brilliance 
and the world‘s suffering, all that beguiles and offends me?115 
 
It might be possible to conclude by passing on some further figures; figures for a lover‘s 
discourse or even a trauma study – for players or actors to come. Such figures might be 
vaguely oriented towards a new science; half finished, modest supplements, fragments, 
they might await an amateur science which can think both brilliance and suffering (a 
psychoanalysis ‗to come‘ perhaps). In their essential repetition, their originary double-
act, these figures may suggest the impossibility of reducing the figure to itself, to a 
concept, to a space, location or position of locution. Furthermore, in any recognisable 
associations with pleasure, jouissance, comfort, affirmation or indignation, they may 
also affirm the spectrality which undermines any imaginary which would seek to decide 
upon these figures in advance: 
 
now now 
 
here here 
 
there there 
 
come come 
 
yes yes 
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3. 
 
ADDRESSING ARRIVANCE: 
LE JOUR OÙ JE N‟ÉTAIS PAS LÀ 
 
 
Now ghosts and spirits are undoubtedly Powers, but it 
does not follow that all Powers are ghosts and spirits, 
even if they tend to become so. 
R. R. Marett.
1
 
 
 
‗I have just been all omnipotence, all savage. That‘s how 
one must do it if one wants to get something done.‘ 
Sigmund Freud.
2
 
 
 
‗For some weeks I have been pregnant with the germ of a 
larger synthesis, and will give birth to it in the summer.‘ 
Sigmund Freud.
3
 
 
 
Being born doesn‘t end. 
Hélène Cixous.
4
 
 
 
Hélène Cixous‘s Le jour où je n‟étais pas là [The Day I Wasn‟t There] is narrated by a 
woman attempting to address the life and death of her son.
5
 Born with Down‘s 
syndrome, her child dies in a maternity clinic in Algeria, a clinic run by the narrator‘s 
mother, to whom she has relinquished his care. Although Cixous also had a son who 
died very young, Le jour où je n‟étais pas là is not an autobiographical consideration of 
that event. Nor is it a ‗fictionalized‘ account of her son‘s death. Rather, this text 
addresses the event in such a way that any border between author and narrator, reality 
and fiction, or life and writing remains incalculable.  
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Le jour où je n‟étais pas là opens with a question: ‗Comment enfouir le souvenir d‟une 
faute qui revient d‟un lointain passé?‘6 This asks how it might be possible to bury, or 
‗tuck away‘ – a notion which the verb ‗enfouir‘ can also suggest – the ‗memory of a 
fault‘ which returns from a remote past. The question doesn‘t ask how to bury the fault 
itself, but the ‗memory of a fault‘. Rather than a loss of memory, what is remembered is 
a fault or a lack, a deficiency, flaw or imperfection. And when this ‗memory of a fault‘ 
does return, burying it is imperative: ‗C‟est l‟aube, elle revient encore, il faut 
absolument l‟enfouir [It is dawn, it is back again, it is absolutely necessary to bury it].‘7  
What is most necessary is burial, what cannot be denied is the necessity to inter the 
‗memory of a fault‘. There is a certain power here, one which demands that the narrator 
bury. With the return of the ‗memory of a fault‘ comes an obligation; the power of the 
‗il faut‘ – of what is necessary – seems to overpower all other commands. This 
obligation, to bury ‗the memory of a fault‘, will be both experienced and interrogated in 
Le jour où je n‟étais pas là. 
 
To bury is to conjure away, to summon the magic which allows one to make something 
disappear before their very eyes. The narrator will conjure away the ‗memory of a fault‘ 
in an ‗improvised coffin‘ which is itself buried:  
 
Then I shoved it – a pot about as big as a little quart kettle – into the ground 
– and I covered it up again for a long time with earth, with ice, in spite of the 
presence of passersby and children who had no idea what I was ridding 
myself of [je faisais disparaître] in the little improvised coffin.
8
  
 
The ‗memory of a fault‘ calls for a conjuring trick, for the making or the production of 
disappearance, the making, production, or appearance of disappearance. The burial is a 
dissimulation of forgetting, the burial of a burial, a feigning-absence which remembers 
to forget the ‗memory of a fault‘. Cixous‘s text will make any opposition between what 
is acknowledged and what is denied, between what is kept and what is lost, tremble. 
Indeed, Le jour où je n‟étais pas là sketches an acknowledgment of what is buried; it 
suggests the safekeeping of what is lost. Moreover, this burial scene takes place despite 
passersby; they have no idea what is being buried here; this is a making disappear in 
view of everyday life – paradoxically, an open secret. Here, then, the double operation 
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which addresses the ‗memory of a fault‘ immediately opens onto the aporia which 
structures the text: how to suffer and survive what both returns and is abandoned, what 
is both kept and lost, both acknowledged and denied. 
 
Le jour où je n‟étais pas là opens with the burial of what keeps returning (‗elle revient 
encore‘). That the ‗memory of the fault‘ has returned ‗again‘ suggests a previous burial 
has failed or is incomplete, or perhaps that what it means to bury is not to be thought of 
through the oppositions of forgetting or remembering, of failure or success, completion 
or incompletion. Indeed, what it means to bury will be a central question for this text, a 
question which also concerns the notions of abandonment, repression, loss and denial, 
as well as attachment, acknowledgement and responsibility. Le jour où je n‟étais pas là 
stages this question from the beginning; as the text opens by asking how to bury the 
‗memory of a fault‘, and then proceeds to describe a burying of that memory, it also 
forms the very recollection it is asking how to bury, whilst burying it. Through a strange 
intertwining of denial and acknowledgment, memory and forgetting, this text will go on 
to experience the ‗fault‘ which it is burying, whilst at the same time asking how to bury 
it. 
 
It is impossible to completely identify such a ‗fault‘, firstly because we only have the 
‗memory of a fault‘ – its trace – and consequently because what is alluded to through 
the ‗fault‘ is both a happening or an event, and a failure, lack, deficiency or 
unaccountability. In the context of Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, this ‗event‘ appears to be 
the death of the narrator‘s son, and the circumstances, chances and responsibilities 
which surround it. The ‗fault‘, then, also signifies guilt; it suggests that a culpability or 
blame is there to be assigned, accepted or taken responsibility for. The ‗fault‘ has been 
committed, but it is yet to be accounted for. Le jour où je n‟étais pas là concerns the 
narrator‘s relationship with her son, who, born with Down‘s syndrome, dies in the care 
of her mother, a midwife. This act of abandonment – and subsequent guilt – is a central 
concern for the narrator. Transferentially extending into associations impossible to 
reduce to the limits of the book, the difference between what is kept and what is lost is a 
fault-line which divides every element of the text. Le jour où je n‟étais pas là is almost 
too personal to read, but at the same time it belongs to no-one; this is a text which 
recounts an impossibly intimate event, an event which is at the same time irreducible to 
those who encounter it. The otherness of the event punctuates this story from the 
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beginning; it haunts the ‗memory of a fault‘, a burial which is at the same time a 
recovery, as well as the question of how to recover. 
 
Le jour où je n‟étais pas là is the return of a day ‗I‘ wasn‘t there. The day in question is 
most likely to be the day of the child‘s death, a day the narrator was elsewhere. But as 
the members of the narrator‘s family are reluctant to speak of the events of that day, the 
title of this text could equally refer to both the narrator‘s mother (the midwife) and 
brother (himself a doctor, and who may have also been present at the clinic on that day). 
Yet, as ‗là‘ can also mean ‗here‘, ‗Le jour où je n‟étais pas là‘ can also refer to the ‗the 
day I wasn‘t here‘. Moreover, ‗où‘ [literally, ‗where‘] refers to a spatial dimension, 
therefore ‗le jour où…‘, although an everyday idiomatic phrase in French, also 
combines both temporal (jour) and spatial (où) dimensions: ‗the day where I wasn‘t 
here/there‘. On the day in question, therefore, somewhere between here and there, the 
‗I‘ is irreducible to a definitive space-time. Thus the text also asks what happens when a 
spatio-temporal position cannot be relied upon to situate and structure our experiences 
of the most significant events. Cixous‘s text is a meditation on what it means to never 
have been there – or here – where one ought to be or have been, on what it means to 
suffer and survive the irreducible gap between life as living on and a being-there where 
an ‗I‘ should have been, there where an ‗I‘ could have done justice to, account, or take 
responsibility, for a ‗fault‘ – the memory of which has once again returned. 
 
——— 
 
This chapter reads Derrida‘s H. C. pour la vie, c‟est à dire… in order to ask how Le jour 
où je n‟étais pas là addresses the radical unknowability of the arrivant.9 It will read 
how Cixous‘s text gestures towards the wholly other, how the arrivant is welcomed in 
the text without arriving ‗as such‘. I want to argue that Cixous‘s text is the very 
happening of what it nevertheless remains at a distance from; that it is both an 
                                                 
9
 As Chapter Two discussed (see §2.3 onwards), the arrivant is what – or who – must remain wholly 
unexpected and unpredictable; irreducible to any determinable identity or place, and awaited without 
waiting. It is interesting to note that the word arrivant came to Derrida as an uncanny figure, as 
something which became – only after the fact – a strangely familiar notion. The text in which this 
uncanniness had been in hibernation is Cixous‘s La, and its adaptation, the play L‟Arrivante: ‗I was 
recently taken by this word, arrivant, as if its uncanniness had just arrived to me in a language in which it 
has nonetheless sounded very familiar to me for a long time.‘ Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. Thomas 
Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p.33 and p.86, fn. 14. 
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experience of the event and a considered study of that event. The doubling of this 
intimate experience with a distanced commitment would render the text‘s study of the 
event as the possibility of the impossible; that is, the study of the event would always-
already be compromised by the very experience of that which it purports to stand at a 
distance from. Such an intimate distancing might be the definition of a ‗trauma study‘; a 
collision of experience and study as that which could never be reduced to a definitive 
position on the subject, nor to a field, a discipline, science or theory. In turn, I want to 
suggest that a ‗trauma study‘ could not be a concept in advance of the text; rather, a 
‗trauma study‘ could only take place as an essentially experimental gesture.  
  
3.1 Faute de langue 
In Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, the ‗memory of a fault‘ is impossibly overdetermined. 
Though the ‗fault‘ can be thought of as the abandonment of the child, or the guilt over 
not being present at his death (the narrator‘s ‗fault‘), it could also refer more literally – 
as Cixous suggests – to the boy himself, to a child born with Down‘s syndrome and 
therefore to a child who might be thought of as manifesting a deficiency, lack, or ‗fault‘. 
This double structure of the fault means that, when the narrator faces the child, the 
notions of being and having, or leaving and returning, are overtly problematic. Indeed, 
facing the child results in a linguistic collapse: 
 
With him [Devant lui] I thought, all the words of being, of having, of being 
able, of going, all of them wavered and collapsed [vacillé et plié]. That‘s 
why it was always hard for me to talk about it, for want of a language [il me 
fut toujours difficile d‟en parler, faute de langue].10   
 
‗Faute de langue‘ can mean the fault of language (the insufficiency or deficiency of 
language) as well as a lack of language, for want of language. Language cannot 
comprehend the fault, but, as that insufficiency, it is that which produces the fault; thus 
language also describes the fault. And for this, language is guilty – it is ‗at fault‘. The 
‗faute de langue‘, therefore, is both irreducible to language and produced by language; 
language says there is a fault/deficiency/lack of language in order to describe that 
fault/deficiency/lack; language says there is something beyond language whilst 
producing that very thing which nevertheless remains beyond it. To complicate matters 
further, that the ‗faute de langue‘ is a lack of language suggests that where there is a 
                                                 
10
 Hélène Cixous, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.6 [translation modified]; Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, p.12. 
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fault of language there is no language; paradoxically then, there is no fault of language. 
Thus there both is and is not a fault, and that fault is both inside and outside of 
language.  
 
Here then, Cixous‘s text produces the fault (it writes the fault so as to make it appear 
available to study), thus suggesting that there is no fault, whilst maintaining that the 
fault remains irreducible to language. Writing is and is not responsible for this fault, it 
is and is not guilty of a ‗faute de langue‘; it produces the fault as something yet to come 
to language, it marks the very point where what is irreducible to language – the 
deficiency, lack or mistake of language – comes to language. Essentially unstable, 
language is at once able to comprehend and account for the fault and that which 
sustains the fault as the absolute other of language, as well as that which says there is 
no fault. Language is both adequate to the event and that which sustains the event as an 
otherness which remains to be thought. In this sense, language is the very marker of its 
absence or its inadequacy. This is the logic which gives us the ‗memory of a fault‘; Le 
jour où je n‟étais pas là will demonstrate that the memory of a fault will always suggest 
there is more to be remembered, that the ‗fault‘ has not yet arrived in language ‗as 
such‘, and so in some sense, memory and language still remain adequate to the fault, 
still remain the possibility of recalling what could never be remembered once and for 
all. Both adequate and insufficient, language marks the ‗memory of a fault‘, the trace of 
a lack as no lack. The question of how one might think the occurrence of the fault is, 
therefore, a question which concerns a deficiency which language denies in its very 
affirmation of the fault. 
 
The ‗fault of language‘ occurs at the very point at which language touches on the event, 
upon the other. The narrator considers her relation to the child through this strange 
logic of the fault. Though destined to forever remain the ‗memory of a fault‘, a trace of 
a lack forever fossilized in language, the ‗unfledged‘ child rubs itself against language 
as though it has no idea it has been denied, or that denial, forgetting or abandonment 
are even possible; this ghost (of language) has no concept of absolutes:  
 
 Feather-headed fossil of an unfledged child [Fossile de faucon niais], that‘s 
what it is; but still it shifts around there and it rustles softly without violence 
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the way a spectre gropes for the latch that‘s been changed in the meantime, 
rubbing itself against the door, never suspecting it‘s been denied.11  
 
Throughout the text, the narrator refers to the child as ‗niais‘. As an adjective this word 
means ‗silly‘ or ‗inane‘, as a noun it refers to a ‗simpleton‘. Its homophonic relation is 
‗nier‟, which is the verb ‗to deny‘. Hence ‗le niais‘ (the simpleton) echoes le nié (the 
denied). Furthermore, ‗un faucon niais‘ refers to a young falcon which hasn‘t yet left 
the nest, hence Beverley Bie Brahic‘s translation: ‗unfledged child‘.12 We find, 
therefore, that the word ‗niais‘ can refer to both a simpleton and an unfledged bird, as 
well as to what has been denied. When the first sentence of the main body of the text 
states: ‗Tu te gardes du niais [You keep (yourself away from) the unfledged/denied 
simpleton]‘13 what is denied in the ‗memory of a fault‘ is also and at the same time, 
acknowledged: 
 
Did I know when I turned away [Est-ce que je savais moi lorsque je me 
gardai de le regarder partir], denying everything, denying the necessity, 
denying the event, denying the prediction, denying the error and the truth, 
denying the cruelty, denying the innocence, denying the patient, the hopeful 
words, denying each and every fault, denying the facts, the features, the 
eyes, the mouth the tongue the hands the nose, did I know I was denying 
who I was denying [est-ce que je savais que je niais qui je niais], did I know 
I kept him in me out of me [est-ce que je savais que je le gardai dans moi 
hors de moi], from then on in the out of me [dans le hors de moi] which 
makes, in the mined hollow of my nights, a nest where my little nestling 
forever broods? [un nid où couve pour toujours mon petit niais ?]
14
 
  
 
What the narrator cannot bring herself to acknowledge – to see leave – is the denial of 
the fault. What leaves, or what is denied, is also kept and watched over – ‗in me out of 
me‘. The untranslatable phrase ‗tu te gardes du niais‘ thus performs this double 
structure of denial and acknowledgment; what can be read as ‗you keep yourself away 
from the unfledged/denied simpleton‘ might also be translated as ‗you keep the 
unfledged/denied simpleton‘. Nestled in the ‗out of me‘, what is denied is also 
preserved. Jacques Derrida‘s introduction to Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok‘s 
                                                 
11
 Hélène Cixous, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.6; Le jour où je n‟étais pas là; p.12. 
12
 See ‗Translator‘s notes‘ in: Hélène Cixous, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.101-03. 
13
 Hélène Cixous, Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, p.11 (translation mine). Beverley Bie Brahic suggests: 
‗You are warding off the dim nestling the nestled dimling‘, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.5. 
14
 Hélène Cixous, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.5; Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, p.12. 
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Cryptonymie: Le Verbier de L‟Homme aux loups speaks of a similar instance of 
impossible incorporation in relation to their notion of the crypt.
15
 Abraham and Torok‘s 
text explores the psychoanalytic elaboration of a crypt effect in relation to one of 
Freud‘s most intriguing cases, the ‗wolf man‘. Abraham and Torok suggest that the 
wolf man encrypts a ‗magic word‘ of immense signification around which he must 
construct a security system capable of touching upon it whilst never revealing it. Such a 
movement allows him to indulge in the illicit pleasure which the word symbolizes 
without ever having to speak or reveal that word. Derrida‘s deconstruction of this 
notion of encryption can be seen in his use of the phrase ‗sauf en moi‘, which can mean 
both ‗safe in me‘, and ‗save in me‘ (except in me).16 Though I do not want to read Le 
jour où je n‟étais pas là in terms of Abraham and Torok‘s Cryptonymie (if anything Le 
Jour is a meditation on the impossibility of ever reducing a ‗magic word‘ to theoretical 
knowledge, and therefore a profound challenge to both psychoanalysis and ‗theory‘), 
the incalculability of ‗sauf en moi‘ is helpful in allowing us to think the essential 
spectrality of the (linguistic) partitions between what we keep and what we keep 
ourselves from, in that it marks an undecidable threshold between keeping and losing, 
acknowledgement and abandonment, denial and acceptance. 
 
For the narrator of Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, denying the fault is the denial of the 
mistake/lack/deficiency, and therefore an acknowledgment of what is denied. But the 
narrator is unsure if she knew about this double operation:  
 
[…] did I know I was denying who I was denying, did I know I kept him in 
me out of me, from then on in the out of me which makes, in the mined 
hollow of my nights, a nest where my little nestling forever broods?  
 
[…] est-ce que je savais que je niais qui je niais, est-ce que je savais que je 
le gardai dans moi hors de moi, dès cet instant dans le hors de moi qui fait, 
au creux miné de ma nuit, un nid où couve pour toujours mon petit niais ?
17
  
 
                                                 
15
 See: Jacques Derrida, ‗FORS: Les mots angles de Nicolas Abraham et Maria Torok‘ in: Nicolas 
Abraham and Maria Torok, Cryptonymie : Le Verbier de L‟homme aux loups (Paris : Editions Aubier 
Flammarion, 1976), pp.7-73. The English translation by Barbara Johnson: ‗Fors: The Anglish Words of 
Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok‘ in: The Wolf Man‟s Magic Word: A Cryptonymy, trans. Nicholas 
Rand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp.xi-xlviii. For further work on Abraham and 
Torok, and Derrida‘s reading of their work, see: Mark Dawson (ed.), Inscr(i/y)ptions, Parallax, issue 50, 
vol.15, no.1 (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, January-March 2009). 
16
 Jacques Derrida, ‗FORS‘, p.17. 
17
 Hélène Cixous, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.5; Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, p.12. 
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The narrator remains unclear as to what happened in the ‗aftermath‘ of this event; the 
return of a ‗memory of a fault‘ is not reducible to a knowledge of the event; 
(knowledge of) the event remains to come, and the narrator must in the meantime learn 
to live with this ambiguity – an experience which the text also performs. Here, then, the 
narrator keeps the unknown, keeps the denied, in an uncanny relationship with the other 
‗sauf en moi‘; this requires both an infinite distance from, and intimacy with, the other, 
at once the complete abandonment of what one keeps most safe. What it is important to 
remember is that this experience remains incalculable because it is an experience of 
writing, of the trace, of ‗the book‘. Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, therefore, is a text 
whose narrator experiences the event through a writing to which neither the authority of 
the narrator, nor a knowledge of the event ‗as such‘, can be reduced. From the moment 
that what is abandoned is also kept, that what is denied is also acknowledged – ‗dès cet 
instant dans le hors de moi‘ Ŕ what comes to the text as the ‗memory of a fault‘ 
presupposes an essential disjointing of time and space. I return to this below.  
 
For the narrator, thinking is indirect, in that it comprises detours and delays, as well as 
transferential circuits:  
 
 I never think of my son the dead, I thought towards my cat who was smiling 
at me with her minimissimal overwhelming smile, while she watched me 
think on her, bearing the unspeakable mess of my mental images with the 
compassion that comes to her aid with my convulsions.
18
 
 
Je ne pense jamais pas à mon fil le mort, ai-je pensé vers ma chatte qui me 
souriait de son sourire minimissime bouleversant, tandis qu‟elle me 
regardait penser sur elle, supportant le brouillon innommable de mes 
images avec la compassion qui lui vient au secours de mes convulsions.
19
 
 
Such a movement takes time; the cat – with her ‗minimissimal overwhelming smile‘ – 
forms an enigma upon which the narrator casts her thoughts. This projection of thought 
can also be seen in the construction of the verb itself: ‗I could say that it‘s all the fault 
of the verb to think [penser]; it is because of the way it is constructed, its manner of 
taking an indirect object, by which it means to signify its circuitousness and precaution 
to us, it is a verb that roams [rôde], a dreamy sort of action.‘20 The ‗fault‘, then, may 
                                                 
18
 Hélène Cixous, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.25. 
19
 Hélène Cixous, Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, p.45. 
20
 Hélène Cixous, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.25; Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, p.46 (translation modified). 
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come down to this verb, a verb which wanders, and a verb which goes via enigmas and 
aporia. Even when her son is foremost in her mind, the narrator cannot ‗budge toward 
my son the dead‘21: ‗And even at this moment when my son the dead was the direct 
object of my thoughts, indirectness reigned and I did not try to curtail it.‘22 Here, the 
stasis of not thinking her son is thought; the impossibility of thinking what would be the 
direct object of her thoughts is thought indirectly towards her cat. With this stasis in 
movement, the ‗fault‘ is acknowledged – thinking towards her cat recalls the object she 
cannot contemplate directly. An impossible logic of transference, this thinking towards 
her cat allows her to (not) think of her son, and the enigma of the cat bears this 
approach as its unreachable destination. In moving towards the cat, then, what is 
unthinkable – her son – is recalled as the ‗fault‘ of the verb ‗to think‘. 
  
Via its classical Latin root ‗ponderāre‘ [ponder], the narrator compares penser (the verb 
‗to think‘), to ‗peser‘, which means ‗to weigh‘, ‗to weigh up‘, or ‗to lie heavy on‘. For 
the narrator, ‗peser‘ refers to a direct weighing up of a problem. Although the narrator 
never thinks directly of her son, their relation remains within the wanderings of penser; 
though she thinks she never directly thinks of him, a dream-roaming towards the other 
– her dream-roaming towards the enigma of the cat – also means their paths will be 
held together in suspension: ‗One must go towards the dead son and that takes time in 
my case it is going to take decades‘; ‗when it comes to my son I have always been 
indirect and vice versa, we were fated. Fate is what we have in common.‘23 To weigh 
the son, therefore, would be to decide upon him, something the narrator is unable to do: 
 
I was never able to weigh [peser] my son, I could not weigh him, without 
being caught up and overcome by an invincible terror, with the result that 
after a few months three or four I believe I‘d given up weighing him, 
because weighing him for me it was as if each time I was sentenced anew, 
weighing him was to hear the pitiless word of the scales all over again why 
bother consulting them, they prophesied to me in vain.
24
  
 
 
To measure his life would be to prophesize the future death of this sick child. In turn, 
the narrator would also be sentenced. To weigh the child would be to sentence them 
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 Hélène Cixous, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.25; Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, p.45. 
22
 Hélène Cixous, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.25; Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, p.45. 
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 Hélène Cixous, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.25; Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, p.46. 
24
 Hélène Cixous, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.26; Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, p.46-7. 
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both to a calculated death. As if in defiance of this sentence the narrator begins to 
weigh her son indirectly: ‗perhaps that‘s when I began weighing him indirectly and 
without noticing it became perpetual‘.25 It is through this perpetual indirectness that the 
‗memory of a fault‘ will continually haunt the narrator‘s dream-roaming. 
  
An indirect weighing would be the distancing, or deferral, of the final decision of the 
scales, of what is prophesized by them. This ‗indirect‘ weighing, then, might be 
considered the complication of what is thought of as fate. Fate, necessity, and death 
would take a circuitous path via a dream-wandering. What is inevitable, what cannot be 
avoided and/or is beyond our control is somehow manipulated – if only ever so slightly 
– by the indirect path of an indirect thought. Although I will come back to this 
(im)possiblity of producing what is deemed beyond our control, it is enough to mark at 
this point that the narrator‘s gesture both acknowledges and denies what is deemed 
necessary or inevitable: death. As the child reaches four and a half kilos, the narrator, 
‗terrorized‘ by the ‗word of the scales‘, finds she must hand him over to her mother 
‗[i]n order to set between us a space for thought [la pensée].‘26 As if in an attempt to 
defy his inevitable death, the narrator seems to need the space to dream-roam towards 
her son, to weigh/think him indirectly without the direct prophesying of the scales. In 
turn, the narrator hands the job of weighing directly to her mother; the final word will 
now remain with her: ‗I gave him to my mother to weigh, without consciously knowing 
that I was giving my mother the whole child including the final act, exit, and 
epilogue.‘27  
  
The narrator‘s handing over of the final act is just one instance of how Le jour où je 
n‟étais pas là considers the relation between destiny, fate, death and end.  As the 
narrator tries to discover what happened to her son after she had unknowingly handed 
over his final act – that is, the circumstances surrounding his death – the contradictions 
between how her mother recounts this time, along with the testimony of her brother, 
suggest the possibility that the end might never be reached. Moreover, in Le jour où je 
n‟étais pas là, ‗the book‘ also has a certain stake in this outcome; ‗the book‘ is itself 
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 Hélène Cixous, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.26; Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, p.46-7. 
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 Hélène Cixous, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.26; Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, p.47. 
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 Hélène Cixous, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.25; Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, p.47. 
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searching for the facts, weighing things up, and eager to decide things.
28
 Indeed, the text 
suggests that ‗the book‘ has an unimaginable power, it is a figure of unimaginable 
authority: ‗the authority of a book is unimaginable: It is a judge [On ne peut pas 
imaginer l‟autorité d‟un livre: c‟est un juge].‘29 The power of ‗the book‘ is unthinkable, 
its capacity to decide knows no limits, and it drives the narrator on in her search for 
answers. Yet Le jour où je n‟étais pas là must also exceed ‗the book‘, it must exceed the 
jurisdiction of ‗the book‘ at every step. If it is impossible to imagine the book‘s 
authority, that book must also have the capacity to remain open even after it has been 
closed, hence any resolution, any imaginable decision, is at the same time the promise 
of one yet to be imagined. An unimaginable authority exceeds itself at every point at 
which ‗the book‘ seems to assert its authority; at every point that it attempts to weigh up 
the event and decide (to close the book on the event), ‗the book‘s‘ unimaginable power 
demands that it also remain open to the possibility of another explanation, another 
decision, another reading. 
 
Le jour où je n‟étais pas là is a writing which both forms the book and survives ‗the 
book‘; this writing has the capacity – the power or might – to both comprise and exceed 
‗the book‘. Such an essentially double movement would mean that Le jour où je n‟étais 
pas là stages the possibility of decision as that which is always-already exceeded by 
what remains unimaginable. Yet, as it is written on the horizon of the unimaginable, the 
text‘s impossibility – its ‗unimaginable‘ authority – would be the very possibility of 
imagination and decision. Le jour où je n‟étais pas là is at once both the impossibility 
and possibility of ‗the book‘s‘ authority; it is the possibility of decision as the imagining 
of the unimaginable, or the possibility of the impossible. Moreover, this double 
structure is the condition for thinking the event without being able to reduce it to any 
fixed categories or concepts of knowledge. It is an engagement with the event (its 
tracing or marking), which, through that engagement, ensures that the event remains to 
be thought ‗as such‘. Cixous‘s text, therefore, might be thought of as the eventness of 
the event, or the coming of what remains to come; it is both the ‗happening‘ of the event 
– its record, archive or trace – and a mark of its radical excess (an excess which cannot 
be reduced to a ‗happening‘). In the sense that the event is an otherness which cannot be 
reduced to the text, the text‘s addressing of the event is the very act which means the 
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 Hélène Cixous, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.99; Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, p.188. 
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 Hélène Cixous, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.99; Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, p.188. 
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event will ‗survive‘ it. The text‘s experience of the event, then, is not one of the event 
‗as such‘, rather, it writes the very ‗eventness‘ of the event, a writing which sustains an 
irreducible distance from the event as that which is always ‗to come‘. 
 
We might think this (im)possible tracing of the event as the narrator does, through the 
verbs penser [to think] and peser [to weigh], verbs which, in sharing ponderāre [to 
ponder] as their root, are haunted by each other. Hence the indirect dream-wandering of 
penser is also the weighing up of peser, and the juridical scales of peser recalls a giving 
oneself over to the fate of penser. We might say that ‗the book‘ weighs, that ‗the book‘ 
wants answers from the mother in order to decide on events surrounding the child, 
whilst Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, as a text, lives on; it survives the decision upon the 
event as the indirect dream-wandering of a thinking given over to fate. It is important to 
remember that the border between closing and opening, decision and fate, or ‗the book‘ 
and its excess, remains precarious at every moment; this excess demonstrates the logic 
of the supplement which resides in all textual dimensions, a logic which suggests the 
trace cannot be reduced to itself, but presupposes an other which is both essential to it 
and more than it can account for. Le jour où je n‟étais pas là is rendered precarious by 
‗the book‘s‘ desire to decide, a desire conditioned by the unimaginable surplus which 
always-already exceeds it. It is a text that both describes and performs this impossible 
manoeuvre. Moreover, it is important to stress that the notion of an excess which lives 
on or survives suggests that Cixous‘s text is the very stuff of life as living on. The 
capacity to decide once and for all between writing and living is eradicated by this text; 
rather than life-writing, we might think of this text as writing which lives on. That the 
text is the very return of the ‗fault‘, that it marks or suffers this return as the 
(im)possibility of deciding upon it once and for all, indicates that the text is the place 
where memory, experience, and the promise of the future are irreducibly intertwined. 
  
The writing of the book, the irreducible being-in-writing of the book means that it 
cannot be fully closed or fully open to the event it will nevertheless experience. For the 
narrator this results in her impossible relation with the ‗faute de langue‘, where what is 
at once both the liability of language and the lack of language means that her child is 
(im)possibly ‗sauf en moi‘: ‗did I know I kept him in me out of me, from then on in the 
out of me.‘ This (im)possible encryption/inscription of the child can also be read in 
relation to his destiny. The narrator unwittingly gives her ‗whole‘ child over to her 
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mother: ‗I gave him [Je le remis] to my mother to weigh [à peser], without consciously 
knowing [sans savoir sciemment] that I was giving my mother [que je remettais] the 
whole child including the final act, exit, and epilogue.‘30 As remettre can also mean ‗to 
postpone‘, the narrator‘s handing back of the child to her mother ‗to weigh‘ both hands 
back and postpones the conclusion to his story. In handing back the child, she also 
unwittingly hands back the ‗whole child‘ [tout l‟enfant]; unwittingly, the whole child is 
given back to the mother, whose responsibility it is to weigh up, to decide, to conclude. 
The final word is given back to the mother; and in this handing back there is a handing 
over of control. But this is also the postponing of decision, of an end or conclusion; the 
giving back of fate and the postponing of fate. The relinquishing of what might once 
have been wished by the narrator is also the evasion of that surrender. As it is after this 
handing over that the child will die, this double manoeuvre is the surrender to, and the 
postponement of, that event, the surrender to and postponement of what has been 
decreed as necessity: fate, Anankē, or death.  
 
In relinquishing the child to the mother in this (un)conscious gesture, the narrator both 
allows and postpones what is predestined. There is an oscillation of fate and volition 
here. Such a gesture is both a knowing and unwitting handing back of the child to the 
mother (the child is knowingly given over to ‗weigh up‘, but unwittingly handed over in 
its entirety), as well as the postponement of this handing back. Fate/death/necessity, 
therefore, is a gift which is both knowingly and unwittingly relinquished to the 
(m)other, as well as the postponement of that handing back. Moreover, this double 
manoeuvre results in the fact that the mother receives what she can never be sure she 
has (as there is no sure way of accounting for – or weighing up – what may just be 
fate). The fate of the fault is given (un)consciously (back) to the other who can never be 
sure they can determine it – as that handing over has also been postponed. Destiny, the 
will of the gods, necessity, Anankē, death, fate, is what is made to/let happen, and 
deferred.  
  
If this is thought in terms of the absolute authority of ‗the book‘, fate is a gift which is 
(un)consciously and (im)possibly given, and (un)consciously and (im)possibly 
received. Such an incalculable writing can be read in the gesture of the narrator as she 
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gives back to the other the absolute authority it can never have. The narrator gives over 
the authority to decide as well as delaying that handing back. An act of giving which 
always exceeds the jurisdiction or accountability of the ‗the book‘, the unimaginable 
authority of ‗the book‘ is to never know what it might have, to never be able to imagine 
its unimaginable power. The unimaginable authority of ‗the book‘ receives that 
authority as the gift of writing; it is its own unimaginable authority. But as that 
authority is unimaginable, it cannot manifest or wield such power – it is powerless in 
relation to its unimaginable power. ‗The book‘, therefore, is incapable of being reduced 
to its unimaginable authority, of being read ‗as such‘. The book which is written, which 
weighs up or decides, is also and at once the deferral of what cannot be written, 
weighed up, or decided upon.  
 
3.2 Arrivance/happening 
With this section I want to work on a particular thread in Derrida‘s H.C. pour la vie, 
c‟est à dire…, in which he reads how Cixous‘s work encounters what 
arrives/occurs/happens to/in/as writing; that is, how her writing figures its relation to 
what he will refer to as both the ‗experience‘ and ‗experiment‘ of writing. Derrida 
refers to this encounter as ‗the event of what comes [l‟événement de ce qui vient], the 
arrivance of the arrivant.‘31 He states that Cixous, ‗the great magician of the letter, 
knows how to allow the letter to be made to arrive [s‟entend à laisser faire arriver la 
lettre] – or what arrives in general‘.32 I want to follow Derrida‘s reading of Cixous‘s 
unique power to make/let the event happen in/to writing. This will involve a detour 
through Freud‘s work on the ‗omnipotence of thoughts‘ in Totem and Taboo, as it is 
with this text that Derrida reads Cixous‘s all-powerful literature as both the most 
intimate of experiences and the most critical of studies. In turn, this will allow me to 
suggest that Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, a meditation on death and loss, is a study 
traumatized by the event to which it is devoted.  
 
When Derrida refers to ‗what arrives in general‘, we might translate this as ‗the event 
that comes to writing‘, or ‗the event that is writing‘. With the apparently contradictory 
‗laisser faire arriver‘, then, literally a ‗letting making arrive‘, Derrida suggests that 
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Cixous‘s writing has the capacity to eradicate any opposition between ‗making‘ and 
‗letting‘ the event arrive. The seemingly paradoxical ‗laisser faire arriver‘ is an 
important notion to think in relation to Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, because in this text 
the narrator suggests a distance between occurrence and happening, where the 
happening of the event (as distinguished from its ‗actual‘ occurrence) resonates with 
Derrida‘s ‗event of what comes‘, or the ‗arrivance of the arrivant‘:  
 
―Deceased in Algiers‖ perhaps but not dead at all not yet, no. It takes time. 
Things don‘t happen on the days they occur [Les choses n‟arrivent pas aux 
jours où elles se passent], neither events, nor the people. My son didn‘t 
happen to me when he first arrived [Mon fils ne m‟arrivait pas lorsqu‟il est 
advenu] neither he to me nor I to him, he happened to me but later, already 
later. The day I wasn‘t there.33 
 
What arrives – or happens – is not what occurs. What arrives – ‗already later‘ – is the 
coming of what is yet to come. For the narrator, the coming of the event is what 
happens ‗already later‘; this is the happening of the occurrence. Following Derrida, I 
will refer to this coming of what is yet to arrive as the ‗arrivance‘ of the arrivant. 
Moreover, what does happen happens ‗to me […] The day I wasn‘t there‘; what can be 
thought of as the arrivance happens to the narrator on the day she is not present. The 
arrivance, therefore, happens as an essential disjointing of time in which an ‗I‘ is 
always somewhere else. What happens, ‗already‘ happens to a ‗me‘ or an ‗I‘ which is 
not present at the moment of the happening. What happens always-already happens at a 
distance and at a delay, a distance and delay which rents happening from occurrence, 
arrivance from arrivant. What happens cannot be reduced to what occurs; arrivance 
cannot be reduced to the arrivant. We might say that arrivance addresses, but can never 
deliver or determine, the arrivant, a suggestion which echoes the messianicity without 
messianism with which Derrida is increasingly concerned in his later texts.
34
  
  
For Derrida, Cixous‘s writing makes/lets this arrivance happen, it says ‗come‘ to what 
remains ‗to come‘, a making/letting come via a unique ‗might‘ which cannot be 
reduced to either activity or passivity: 
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If I manage to make you hear what the mighty power of this ‗might‘ [la 
puissance de ce « puisse »] is, then you will see the difference between make 
come [faire venir] and let come [laisser venir] vanish at infinite speed. 
Between what one glibly calls activity and passivity, provocation and 
expectation, work and passion, power and receiving, giving, taking, and 
receiving. And this miracle would come about in the writing of her own 
language, whose coming, event, and arrivance would lie precisely in this 
effectiveness, in this coup, which abolishes the difference between making 
come and letting come. The grace, the address, would lie in making while 
letting, in making come while letting come, in seeing come without seeing 
come.
35
 
 
In ‗seeing come without seeing come‘, Derrida suggests that Cixous makes/lets what is 
wholly unexpected arrive. On the one hand, Cixous sees what cannot be predicted or 
allowed for, or what is unforeseeable, arrive. On the other hand, in not seeing what she 
sees come, what arrives is also yet to come. Cixous sees that not everything can be 
accounted for, and that what happens might also happen otherwise and again as the 
very condition of the future. We might say that what happens in/to her writing cannot 
happen any other way, though it still might happen otherwise. What is destined or fated 
to happen, may still be otherwise; destiny, what comes to pass, might also be volition, 
what is willed or made otherwise. Derrida appears, then, to be suggesting that the 
power of Cixous‘s work resides in a writing which addresses the event in such a way 
that the unbridgeable gap between fate and volition – between what is let come and 
what is made come – is made precarious. Moreover, the (im)possible border between 
fate and volition means that what may be the very experience of the event may also be 
the possibility of it being thought otherwise. 
  
When Derrida suggests that this ‗miracle would come about in the writing of her own 
language [ce miracle adviendrait dans l‟écriture de sa langue]‘, he is referring to at 
least two things: on the one hand, that Cixous‘s writing is the ‗coming, event, and 
arrivance‘ of her most intimate and idiomatic language, on the other, that this absolute 
intimacy is also the language of her most intimate other:  
 
Naming thus the writing of her language, I ask myself whether I am not 
already summoning, before her father, her mother, whose presence radiates 
over all of us here – and not her mother tongue, which was French, but her 
mother‘s language [la langue de sa mère], which she knows like no one else, 
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and in which, as you well know, the difference between making come and 
letting come remains at times indistinguishable: kommen lassen means at 
once letting come and making come, letting arrive and ordering to come.
36
 
 
The ‗writing of her language‘ is therefore her most personal and singular intimacy, as 
well as what she inherited from her most singular and intimate (m)other. Neither the 
French of her ‗mother tongue‘ nor the German language of her mother (both of which 
she ‗knows like no one else‘), Cixous‘s ‗writing of her language‘ is a singularly double 
coup of self and other, of absolute idiom and cultural inheritance, of most familiar and 
absolutely other; an (un)heimlich writing which Derrida demonstrates in the 
indistinguishable difference between making and letting come in the German phrase 
‗kommen lassen‘. Cixous‘s writing of her ‗mother‘s language‘ refers to an irreducible 
otherness to Cixous‘s writing, an originary foreignness, which haunts all writing and to 
which we are all foreigners, but of which Cixous‘s address is the most intimate and 
singular making/letting come. 
  
Of course, Cixous‘s writing incorporates several other languages than French and 
German, but again, these inflections make it impossible to reduce ‗the writing of her 
language‘ to a native or mother tongue. Rather, this writing is the pure idiom of an 
infinite inheritance, the affirmation of a double tongue – of both self and other – whose 
all-powerful authority is exceeded in advance by its omnipotent (m)other. Thus ‗the 
writing of her language‘ marks an incalculable threshold between pure idiom and 
inherited culture, where what may be the all-powerful authority of the writer might also 
be the most impotent of submissions to the language of her (m)other. That this 
impotence can be thought on the same side as omnipotence is essential to Derrida‘s 
reading of Cixous: ‗just as the possible is not on the other side, on the side opposed to 
the impossible, impotence is equally not the opposite of might or potency; it is 
impotence itself that makes the impossible and that becomes omnipotent [c‟est 
l‟impuissance elle-même qui fait l‟impossible et qui deviant toute-puissante].‘37 Here, 
impotence makes the impossible; thus impotence is also a productive force, an 
inactivity which makes not what is possible – a possibility that a regular activity would 
produce – but the impossible. Hence the undecidable making/letting come of the 
(im)possible: the arrivance of what is yet to arrive. And this impossibility is that which 
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Cixous makes/lets arrive on the same side as the possible. Such alchemy gives us a 
writing which is at once formed, sculpted, ornate, whilst also being the most originary, 
primordial, prehistorical and unrefined of utterances; a writing in which each 
beautifully crafted element, syntagma or sentence is always-already haunted by its 
barely formed other. A writing, perhaps, in which what are thought of as life and death 
survive on the same side; a writing which survives (as) the other, where ‗surviving the 
other‘ would mean at once both to live on after the other and to make/let the other live 
on. 
  
For Derrida, to make or let come involves the ‗homonymic address [adresse] of the 
letter in language‘38; this homonymic – and therefore untranslatable – ‗adresse‟ 
(referring to a notion of deftness, readiness, adroitness, finesse, as well as to the 
destination of what or who is addressed) addresses the other with a dexterity of gesture, 
a gesture which destines the other to the letter (destining the arrivance of the arrivant). 
Derrida suggests this ‗homonymic address […] forms a powerful tautology [une 
puissance tautologie], an effective magic, a tautology that makes or lets happen/arrive 
what happens/arrives [qui fait ou laisse arriver ce qui arrive].‘39 This powerful 
tautology suggests a gesture which addresses – at infinite speed – what arrives at/as that 
very address: 
 
This is everything but a formal tautology that would spend itself in 
reiterating the identical. This tautology engenders the event, it is even, as if 
the same, might itself [la puissance]. The mighty power to make or let come 
about [La puissance de faire ou de laisser advenir], graciously to accord 
[d‟accorder] the event with letting/making come about [laisser faire 
advenir].
40
 
  
The grace, skill, dexterity of the adresse destines the arrivance of ‗what comes about‘. 
This is a mighty and irrational tautology which grants [d‟accorder] the happening of 
what remains radically unforeseen. As an ‗effective magic‘ which ‗engenders the 
event‘, Cixous‘s writing is a mighty and magical life-force, a writing which gives birth 
to what remains to come, which makes/lets come as the arrivance of the arrivant. 
Derrida will trace such a ‗might‘ in Freud‘s Totem and Taboo, in which a quasi-
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originary life-force will be the magical dimension all religion, science and theory must 
presuppose. 
 
3.3 Belebtheit; art, study, arrivivance 
As it is critical to a thinking of arrivance, of how Cixous makes/lets the arrivant arrive, 
it is necessary to follow Derrida‘s reading of this ‗infinitely active and infinitely 
passive‘ might.41 Though a great deal of Derrida‘s H. C. pour la vie, c‟est à dire… 
discusses the notion of a mighty power to Cixous‘s work, I‘m going to concentrate on 
an instance where it is discussed in relation to Freud‘s Totem and Taboo, because it is 
here that Derrida goes via Freud to touch on the relationship between the power to 
engender the event – to make/let the event ‗happen‘ – and our complex and paradoxical 
relations to death. Returning to Derrida‘s reading of Freud will show how the latter 
associates a relation to death with the birth of theory, a theory of death which will 
acknowledge it whilst also appearing to deny it. This double operation demonstrates a 
contradictory relation to death, in that death is both produced (theorized) and – as the 
unthinkable opposition to life – deferred. Derrida will read how this apparent 
contradiction is made/let happen on the same side of life, and what is more, how Freud 
indicates this in his reading of the various anthropological studies concerning magic, 
animism, and the omnipotence of thoughts. Concentrating on Derrida‘s reading of 
Totem and Taboo will take us back to Le jour où je n‟étais pas là and allow me to read 
the relation between death, arrivance and the possibility of thinking Cixous‘s text as 
both the experience and the study of what must remain wholly other. 
  
Whilst reading Totem and Taboo, Derrida catches himself on a half-buried ‗snag‘ 
[‗arête‟], a half-formed, half-buried moment in Freud‘s work on animism and the 
‗omnipotence of thoughts‘. Indeed Derrida will stumble across three such snags in 
Freud‘s text. The first snag concerns the point at which Freud discusses the exception 
of art in the evolutionary stages of human civilization. For Freud, art has slipped out of 
the progression which sees an animistic ‗omnipotence of thoughts‘ develop into a 
religious phase which then – with a resignation to death‘s inevitability – assumes a 
scientific phase. In contrast to this development, Freud states that, ‗[o]nly in art does it 
still happen that a man who is consumed by desires performs something resembling the 
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accomplishment of those desires and that what he does in play produces emotional 
effects – thanks to artistic illusion – just as though it were something real.‘42 Freud 
suggests, then, that it is only in art that the animistic residue of an ‗omnipotence of 
thoughts‘ persists as the narcissistic desires of the artist-magician. Derrida asks why 
Freud fails to explain the fact that art has remained, and why he seems to hesitate in his 
reduction of this survival to the remnants of an infantile narcissism:  
 
There are at least two signs which testify to this failure: on the one hand, the 
inability to account for the residual persistence of what would only be a 
remnant and a survival in the evolutionism; on the other hand, an utterly 
insufficient and inconsistent, traditional concept of art, which would be at 
once an ―illusion‖ (it is Freud‘s word: an ―illusion‖ that produces effects of 
the affect [Affektwirkungen] ―as if it were something real‖ [―als wäre es 
etwas Reales‖]), and, as an illusion, purely and simply a representational and 
reproductive mimicry.
43
 
  
For Derrida, then, this first ‗snag‘ concerns the relation between Freud‘s notion of art as 
a residual ‗omnipotence of thoughts‘, and the mimicry or illusion of ‗effects of the 
affect‘. As my argument concerns Freud‘s apparent opposition between a resignation to 
death as the beginning of theory and research (the scientific phase of civilization), and 
an ‗art‘ which insists upon the residual persistence of an ‗omnipotence of thoughts‘, it 
is important to spend some time with Derrida‘s reading here. Following him, I want to 
argue that Cixous‘s work marks the collapse of this distinction, and suggests a point at 
which a literary creation – what Freud might reductively read as the ‗illusion‘ of art – is 
also the most analytic and scientific study of what is made/let arrive; a point at which 
the borders between science, theory, religion, magic and art collapse into a (im)possible 
writing where each of these terms haunt, and are haunted by, the other. I want to think 
of this ‗collapse‘ as an essentially precarious ‗study‘, where the most vivid, intimate, 
and perhaps traumatic experience of what is made/let arrive is also its most scientific 
and critical analysis. Such an incalculable line between science and omnipotent magic 
is perhaps what was most uncanny for Freud, and why he leaves art alone, or at least 
tries to confine the notion of ‗art‘ to the residual element of an equally reductive 
conception of desire and narcissism as an animistic – and infantile – omnipotence of 
thoughts. 
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Moving on to the second of the three snags, Derrida suggests that: 
 
Whereas he has just reduced the phantasm of the omnipotence of thoughts to 
narcissism, to infantile megalomania, to animism and its technique, magic 
(Die Technik des Animismus, die Magie, he says), Freud thinks it necessary 
to specify that the presuppositions (Voraussetzungen) of magic are more 
originary and more ancient (ursprünglicher und älter) than the doctrine of 
spirits (the theory of ghosts: Geisterlehre), which forms the kernel of 
animism. There would therefore be a pre-animism.
44
 
  
For Freud, the axiom which most lucidly describes the principle of magic is the 
association of ideas, the mistaking of an ‗ideal connection for a real one‘. Of course, the 
capacity to suggest such an axiom relies upon a clear opposition between ideational and 
real content. What Derrida refers to as the ‗presuppositions of magic‘ are what Freud 
terms its ‗imitative‘ and ‗contagious‘ systems: acts of magic which depend upon a 
similarity to the result desired (Freud gives several examples, such as ‗the fertility of 
the earth [being] magically promoted by a dramatic representation of human 
intercourse‘45), and those which demand contiguity, ‗or at least imagined contiguity – 
the recollection of it‘46 (examples of this might include the idea that by ‗incorporating 
parts of a person‘s body through the act of eating, one at the same time acquires the 
qualities possessed by him‘47). Of course, what Freud is reading here will return at 
various points in his psychoanalytic science; indeed, the metaphoric, metonymic and 
homonymic ‗principles of processes of association‘ that imitative and contagious magic 
employ appear in the structure of the unconscious as revealed by dreams – a ‗magic‘ of 
the unconscious which Freud will attempt to theorize.
48
 These ‗principles of processes 
of association‘ are what Freud umbrellas under the term ‗contact‘, though when he 
states that ‗use of the same word for the two kinds of relation […] no doubt accounted 
for by some identity in the psychical processes concerned which we have not yet 
grasped‘49, we get a hint of how difficult it will be to rid even theoretical language from 
its own ‗contact‘ magic. 
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Following R. R. Marret‘s essay ‗Pre-animistic Religion‘, Freud names these pre-
animistic ‗principles of association‘ as an instance of ‗animatism‘, which he describes 
as a general theory of living – the ‗doctrine of the universality of life‘ [‗Lehre von der 
allgemeinen Belebtheit‘].50 Derrida is interested in this term ‗Belebtheit‘ – in the sense 
of a ‗being-alive, of livingness [vivance], of universal being-for-life‘ – and suggests 
that this ‗reviviscence of life would be the element, the only one, a universal element, 
since it has no limits or no other side.‘51 For Derrida, Belebtheit would be such a 
complete ‗livingness‘ that there would be ‗no side for nonlife‘52; everything would be 
comprised of this ‗universal element‘ of Belebtheit, and therefore both life and death 
would be capable of being thought on the same and only side (which is also a non-side 
as it has no opposite). There are echoes here of Freud‘s suggestion that the unconscious 
‗does not believe in its own death; it behaves as if it were immortal. What we call our 
‗unconscious‘ – the deepest strata of our minds, made up of instinctual impulses – 
knows nothing that is negative, and no negation; in it contradictories coincide.‘53 
Indeed, this comparison with the unconscious is helpful in thinking Belebtheit. Though 
its one-sidedness might seem to align it with Freud‘s notion of the unconscious – and 
indeed there does seem to be a series in Freud which runs: primitive man/infantile 
narcissism/omnipotence of thoughts/unconscious, with each stage relating to his 
evolutionist notion of progression – Belebtheit cannot be reduced to any part of this 
series. Rather, each presupposes an originary Belebtheit of which even the latter stages 
of evolutionary progression – scientific theory for example – could not imagine itself 
free. Indeed, Derrida reads Cixous‘s texts as experiments in this life-force, texts which 
let/make this most primeval of forces arrive in the midst of the most refined of theoretic 
or scientific discourses. Cixous‘s texts call, therefore, for the most radical re-thinking of 
what notions such as ‗primitive‘, ‗infantile‘, ‗narcissism‘, ‘omnipotence‘ and  the 
‗unconscious‘ might mean. 
  
What Freud refers to as ‗Belebtheit‟ is derived from Marett‘s search for evidence of a 
pre-animism, evidence of what Marrett describes as a ‗fundamental Religious 
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Feeling.‘54 For Marett, this ‗feeling‘ is one of ‗Power‘, of ‗Awe‘, or the ‗Awful‘, and if 
its ‗true nature‘ is to be found, it will be found ‗not so much in the shifting variety of its 
ideal constructions as in that steadfast groundwork of specific emotion whereby man is 
able to feel the supernatural precisely at the point at which his thought breaks down.‘55 
It is important to note that, though Marett sees an opportunity for experiencing this 
‗Power of Awfulness‘ at the point at which thought collapses, the notion of 
‗Awfulness‘ must be thought of as an emotion more complex than one deriving from 
fear alone: 
 
Of all English words ‗Awe‘ is, I think, the one that expresses the 
fundamental Religious Feeling most nearly. Awe is not the same thing as 
‗pure funk‘. ‗Primus in orbe deos fecit timor‘ [‗Fear first made gods in the 
world‘] is only true if we admit Wonder, Admiration, Interest, Respect, even 
Love perhaps, to be, no less than Fear, essential constituents of this 
elemental mood.
56
 
 
 
A ‗Power of Awfulness‘ is, for Marett, an ‗elemental mood‘, an fundamental ‗awe‘ 
which is also reverence, but a reverence which is also respect and interest. It could 
tentatively be suggested that such an ‗Awe‘ is both the experience of this ‗religious 
sense‘ as well as its consideration, a thinking which takes place at the point at which 
thought breaks down. In Freud‘s reading, Marett‘s pre-animistic ‗Religious Feeling‘ 
(what Marett thinks of as a ‗loose sense‘ of animism, or animatism), has become a 
‗doctrine of the universality of life‘ [‗Lehre von der allgemeinen Belebtheit‘]. But 
‗Lehre‘ can also refer to a ‗lesson‘ or ‗teaching‘, or even a ‗profession‘ or 
‗apprenticeship‘. There remains in Freud‘s description, then, a sense of ‗Animatism‘ as 
both an unthinkable experience of Belebtheit and its consideration, its experience as an 
experiment or quasi- or proto-theorization. In relation to animatism, the ambivalence 
between experience and experiment has survived from Marett‘s essay, through both 
Freud‘s reading of Marett, and Derrida‘s reading of Cixous via Freud. 
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We might also note Derrida‘s insistence on the fact that Freud sees Marett‘s notion of 
animatism as a ‗sense‘ of the ‗Power‘, ‗Awe‘ and the ‗Supernatural‘ which has not yet 
resulted in a theory or doctrine of ghosts. Death has not yet been considered as the 
precipitating reason for a theory of ghosts. The latter would, for Marett, suggest the shift 
from animatism to animism, and therefore to the system of thinking which provides a 
theory of ghosts as the attempt to account for the death of a loved one. Freud‘s ‗doctrine 
of the universality of life [Lehre von der allgemeinen Belebtheit]‘, then, would be an 
experience and experiment of the supernatural, of awe and awfulness as ‗Wonder, 
Admiration, Interest, Respect, even Love‘ in which the unthinkable – the point at which 
‗thought breaks down‘ – cannot be analogous to death, but the encounter with an all-
powerful livingness. Marett‘s animatism, then, might be thought of as the study and 
experience of life, the study and experience of the awe of the awful, of a ‗Power of 
Awfulness‘ which is also a ‗Wonder, Admiration, Interest, Respect, even Love‘ for that 
super-natural livingness which cannot be reduced to thinking as such, but remains 
within the vicinity of the thinkable. If the unthinkable provokes traumatic effect and 
affect, to think the unthinkable in terms of an encounter with an all-powerful livingness 
might lead to a re-consideration of what the term ‗trauma‘ might mean.  
  
By relating Derrida‘s reading of Belebtheit to Cixous‘s homonymic power of adresse, it 
might be possible to think of Freud‘s ‗doctrine of the universality of life [Lehre von der 
allgemeinen Belebtheit]‘ as a making/letting come of what could never arrive to 
thinking. Such an experience would be an originary and interminable apprenticeship, 
where what is learnt is at the same time unlearnt by its experience being irreducible to 
thinking. Hence the ‗doctrine‘ of a universal life-force would always-already be 
traumatized by the experience of that life-force; this ‗trauma study‘ could only be an 
affirmation of what remained irreducible to it. This would resemble the arrivance of the 
arrivant, a making/letting come of the eventness of the event, or – following Derrida‘s 
allusion to ‗reviviscence‘ – a quasi-originary reviving which does not presuppose death; 
at once the series arrivance/vivance/reviviscence or, what it might be possible to refer to 
as arrivivance.  
 
Derrida is also concerned with what Freud does not say about Belebtheit, for it is this 
(in)capacity to speak of this ‗universal being-for-life‘ which will determine what Freud 
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finds to be the limits of experience as determined by anthropo-ethnological practice. 
Freud says nothing about Belebtheit, or at least: 
 
He says there is nothing to say, or that there is very little to say about this 
pre-animism, almost nothing else (wenig mehr), at least from experience 
(aus der Erfahrung, a point forgotten by the French translation). What 
experience is he speaking of? It is very simple in his mind: of anthropo-
ethnological experience. One has yet to encounter a people lacking any 
representation of spirits (Geistervorstellung), that is to say, a people that has 
not determined pre-animism or animatism as religious animism.
57
 
 
As far as experience (Erfahrung) is concerned, there is no evidence of a people or 
culture which has not determined Marett‘s animatism as religious animism. For 
Derrida, Freud is suggesting that ‗any people, as a people, any culture known and 
determined by experience, has its own Geistervorstellung, a theory of revenants‘.58 The 
very condition of positively or empirically identifying a culture or people presupposes, 
therefore, that Belebtheit has been rationally determined as a religious animism. By 
implication, this suggests that Belebtheit is irreducible to ‗anthropological, culturalist, 
or ethnological experience‘, that the potential of what Belebtheit might have been is 
irreducible to such empirical and/or positivist sciences. Derrida describes this as  
 
 a Belebtheit of which we can say nothing by anthropological, culturalist, or 
ethnological experience, and which is not even a philosophical doctrine (as 
is hylozoism, which the French translation talks about), but a quasi-originary 
Belebtheit that must, if not present itself, at least announce itself to some 
pre-empirical or pre-positive experience.
59
  
 
Freud has little to say about what cannot be reduced to the experience of empirical, 
positive or culturalist science and/or philosophical doctrine. Indeed, Freud wants to 
believe that his project of psychoanalysis will itself be a theoretical or doctrinal 
reduction of ‗contact‘ magic‘s ‗telepathic disregard for spacial distance [a disregard 
which] also treats past situations as though they were present [wie gegenwärtigen 
behandeln].‘60 
  
                                                 
57
 Jacques Derrida, H. C. for Life, That Is to Say …, p.113; H. C. Pour la vie, c‟est à dire…, p.98-9. 
58
 Jacques Derrida, H. C. for Life, That Is to Say …, p.113; H. C. Pour la vie, c‟est à dire…, p.99. 
59
 Jacques Derrida, H. C. for Life, That Is to Say …, pp.113-14; H. C. Pour la vie, c‟est à dire…, p.99. 
60
 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, p.85; Totem und Tabu, p.105. 
 165 
There is one further point to make here before going on to how Derrida reads this 
notion of Belebtheit in relation to Cixous, which is that what Derrida is suggesting to be 
Freud‘s intimation of a pre-animistic theory of life cannot be reduced to the 
megalomaniacal head of the subject. If animism‘s magical technique is an omnipotence 
of thoughts reduced to ‗narcissism, to infantile megalomania‘, then admitting Belebtheit 
might allow for another way to experience and experiment with this all powerful 
thinking; a theory which is not reducible to the thinking subject as such, but, is instead 
an experiment in, and experience of, a ‗might‘ which survives the categories, concepts 
and rationalities of cultural-anthropological theory, empirical science, and 
philosophical doctrine. In turn, this allows us to ask what might be thought of as theory, 
science and doctrine, if they were to acknowledge their relation to the all-powerful 
desires which Freud reduces to the residues of an animistic ‗omnipotence of thoughts‘ 
or infantile narcissism. And as this residue is only found in the ‗field of our civilization‘ 
where ‗the omnipotence of thoughts [has] been retained‘, that is, the field of art, 
Freud‘s brief digression via Belebtheit might be a point at which ‗the presuppositions 
(Voraussetzungen) of magic‘ refer to an ‗art‘ which survives any reductively simple 
definition, an ‗art‘ which cannot be aligned with an infantile or megalomaniacal 
narcissism as Freud suggests. 
 
3.4 On narcissism 
Derrida refers to the narcissism which ‗blocks off love for the other‘ as a ‗petty 
narcissism.‘61 However, though he suggests we should not get carried away by thinking 
we know what narcissism ‗is and means‘, he also suggests that Freud was on the right 
lines when he associated narcissism with omnipotence. As an all-powerful might, 
‗[n]arcissism has no contrary, no other side, no beyond, and love for the other, respect 
for the other, self-denial in favor of the other do not interrupt any narcissistic 
movement.‘62 Here, the ‗omnipotence of thoughts‘ which Freud will confine to 
primitive, neurotic or infantile heads, a narcissism which demands an ego-centrism as 
its principal source, is exceeded by its very omnipotence. Narcissism‘s all-
powerfulness, therefore, would be capable of generating a surplus of unimaginable 
power to the extent that an omnipotent love for the self would also be the most humble 
privileging of the other. 
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For Freud, ‗a human being remains to some extent narcissistic even after he has found 
external objects for his libido.‘63 Narcissism actually allows for the projection of a self-
love onto the other, a stage of Freud‘s theorization at which the amount of libidinal 
energy used to cathect the other is inversely proportional to that which cathects the ego. 
Before the point at which an external love-object is chosen, however, narcissism‘s first 
love-object is found in the cathexis of the ego:  
 
At this intermediate stage, the hitherto isolated sexual instincts have already 
come together into a single whole and have also found an object. But this 
object is not an external one, extraneous to the subject […] it is his own ego, 
which has been constituted at about this same time.
64
  
 
Narcissism is here the identification of an internal love object, an object which, in the 
process of that identification, becomes the ego.
65
 Therefore, the ability to conjure the 
ego lets or makes the other arrive as the very experience of the ego. As Belebtheit 
would be the omnipotent theory of life from which an ego-centric omnipotence is 
wrought, we might say that one particular instance of our experience or experiment 
with this ‗omnipotence of thoughts‘ is its rationalization and reduction into an ego-
centric narcissism. 
 
For Derrida, Freud‘s brief reference to Belebtheit is enough to read that its pre-
animistic omnipotence of thoughts is a narcissism which, though reduced to the 
animistic and ego-centric narcissism of Freud‘s infantile/primitive/artist psyche, in fact 
survives that reduction at every turn: ‗Belebtheit is narcissistic, life lets itself be lived 
and outlived [survivre] in accordance with originary narcissism.‘66 As ‗originary 
narcissism‘ Belebtheit survives life; it is irreducible to a lived life, but at the same time 
it is what lived life presupposes in its living. Belebtheit is a sur-living or hyper-living 
which outspeeds, doubles and overtakes life at every moment. Earlier, whilst reading 
Cixous‘s O R, les lettres de mon père, Derrida comments that her ‗address outspeeds 
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the letter, well, the absolute speed is in some way gained a priori.‘67 Here the 
suggestion is of a complex doubling of speed and address, where her address (the 
gesture which both addresses and destines the event, writing, or the letter) is at once 
overtaken and overtaking. Here is another instance of what Derrida sees as her power to 
make/let happen, her power of arrivance. Cixous‘s address makes or lets the letter 
arrive without arriving; this is the ‗arrivance of the arrivant‘, which itself requires 
‗contact‘ magic‘s ‗disregard‘ for the logic of space-time:  
 
The address outspeeds the letter, but the letter outspeeds time, it goes faster 
than time, if one may say so and if one can make this impossible thing 
happen or arrive: to outspeed time, to go faster than speed itself, to outspeed 
speed, thus to overtake space and time, to pass or ―double‖ space and time, 
as one says about passing a vehicle in French.
68
 
 
The event of writing is therefore the reception of the letter before it arrives. For 
Derrida, Cixous‘s work is the adresse which generates this gain, the homonymic 
doubling which overtakes and is overtaken in advance, that which makes/lets arrive 
what remains to come.   
  
For Derrida, it is in the work of Cixous that a ‗quasi-originary‘ Belebtheit announces 
itself ‗to some pre-empirical or pre-positive experience.‘69 Cixous‘s address makes or 
lets arrive an all powerful excess which is irreducible to an ego-centric omnipotence of 
thoughts. Her magic is to make/let come the quasi-originary narcissism of Belebtheit, 
the omnipotent theory of life which survives, doubles or overtakes all petty narcissisms. 
The experience of this writing would refer to the ‗performativity of a writing that 
travels and crosses the continental distances at full speed and on all possible rhythms 
(which ―experience‖ or ―experimentation‖ or even ―expertise‖, or Erfahrung, 
means).‘70 With this expertise, we are returned to the untranslatable homonym 
‗adresse‘, a word which, whilst suggesting a gesture towards the other, is also the very 
experience of what it addresses. Such is the expertise of Cixous‘s writing, a writing 
which, for Derrida, performs an experimental adresse which goes via a quasi-originary 
Belebtheit in order to make/let happen the very experience of that livingness [vivance]:  
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This signed experience does what it says; it puts this Belebtheit to work and 
to the test, tries it out: to see, out of a living desire and an experimental 
curiosity, by provoking the event, by making-letting it happen [en le faisant-
laisant arriver], before any philosophical, scientific, or cultural thesis on 
being as life or on the essence of the living.
71
  
 
It is at this navel of experience and experiment that the positivist and empirical 
sciences, as well as philosophical doctrine and theory, collide and collapse half-sunken 
into the lava of their pre-history. This is a point at which what is considered, studied 
and experimented upon is revivified – arrivivified – through an experience which 
shatters that study. I want to suggest that this navel represents the nodal point at which 
any border between study and experience would be rendered precarious, the point 
where the experience of experiment and the experiment of experience makes/lets 
happen the eventness of the event. Following Derrida‘s reading of Cixous, this 
experiment and experience  – ‗Erfahrung‘ in the language of her (m)other – would be 
the arrivance of the arrivant, the making let come of what is always yet to come. I want 
to argue that it is possible to read such a navel of experience and experiment as the knot 
of a trauma(tized) study, a study/experience which is tied to an event from which it 
could never be untangled, but a knot which also maintains that event at an infinite 
distance.  
 
3.5 Acknowledging denial – an ‘undecidable gesture’ 
For Derrida, the third ‗arête‘ in Freud‘s text concerns a gesture which denies whilst 
acknowledging. This gesture is identified when Freud reads what he refers to as ‗man‘s 
first theoretical achievement – the creation of spirits‘.72 As we shall see, what Freud 
reads as man‘s surrender of his omnipotence – the construction of a theory of spirits to 
account for death – is in fact a denial of that loss of power. Hence the assigning of 
power to an external spirit or ghost is in fact a safeguarding of that power; the thought 
that one might have desired or willed the death of a loved one – due to the ambivalent 
attitude towards that loved one (a reaction to them always remaining ‗partly 
strangers‘73) – is projected as the whim of a spirit which one can then avoid or assuage, 
with that spirit remaining within the control of those who encounter it. Thus, man‘s first 
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theory of death, indeed, man‘s first theorization of trauma, is also a denial or deferral of 
that unthinkable event. It is this paradoxical relation to death that Derrida finds most 
interesting, in that Freud‘s reading of ‗man‘s first theoretical achievement‘, the 
acknowledgement of the necessity of death, is also the appearance of its denial; 
acknowledging the death of a loved one, therefore, requires a fiction which seems to 
deny it. Derrida will read this combination of theory and fiction in relation to Cixous‘s 
texts, and to their adresse, which makes/lets come what is thought of as fate. As 
experience and experiment, the text makes/lets come the events which might 
nevertheless seem beyond our control. However, and as I will demonstrate, whilst 
man‘s first theory of ghosts reveals a desire to deny death in its very acknowledgment, 
Cixous‘s omnipotent texts make/let the other come; thus affirming a quasi-originary 
narcissism – or Belebtheit – through which the desire to contain and control the other is 
exceeded by a mighty passivity which gives itself over to it. 
  
For Freud, the surrendering of our control over death is intertwined with the prohibition 
against incest: ‗man‘s first theoretical achievement – the creation of spirits – seems to 
have arisen from the same source as the first moral restrictions to which he was 
subjected – the observances of taboo.‘74 An omnipotent desire – as would be fulfilled 
by the killing of the (primal) father – results in the construction of a law against it, as 
well as the denial of that death (the erection of a totemic god to symbolize the father). 
The limits of omnipotence and desire are self-prescribed, with what appears to be a 
handing over of power or curbing of desire – the intervention of the law – remaining 
within the control of a ‗fraternal‘ omnipotence.75 With man‘s theory of ghosts echoing 
the development of an Oedipal law which circumscribes the possession of women, it is 
easy to see how ‗man‘s first theoretical achievement‘ is in fact the denial of what it 
appears to acknowledge. Thus it is also easy to see why what appears to be the 
surrender of narcissistic desire to the supremacy of the other is in fact the reinforcement 
of control:  
 
If the survivors‘ position in relation to the dead was really what first caused 
primitive man to reflect, and compelled him to hand over some of his 
                                                 
74
 See: Sigmund Freud, ‗Return of Totemism in Childhood‘, Totem and Taboo, p.144; Totem und Tabu, 
p.174. 
75
 See: Sigmund Freud, ‗Return of Totemism in Childhood‘, Totem and Taboo, p.144; Totem und Tabu, 
p.174, passim. 
 170 
freedom of action, then these cultural products would constitute a first 
acknowledgment of Ανάγκη [Necessity], which opposes human narcissism. 
Primitive man would thus be submitting to the supremacy of death with the 
same gesture with which he seemed to be denying it.
76
 
  
The acknowledgment of the inevitability of death – the necessity of Anankē – also 
sustains a power over it. This double gesture, however, results in an increasingly 
complex notion of narcissism: on the one hand, what seemingly opposes ‗human 
narcissism‘ is in fact a product of it, on the other hand, what might be thought of as 
narcissism – the denial of anything beyond our control or power – can also result in an 
absolute surrender to the other. For Derrida, it is that Freud ‗allows a double, apparently 
contradictory or undecidable gesture‘77 which proves most striking here, for it is a point 
at which both fiction and omnipotence survive even in the apparent renunciation of 
power to – and subsequent theorization of –  the other. The omnipotence which Freud 
tried to confine to the residues of an ‗infantile‘ art is in fact essential to the institution of 
theory and the law. Moreover, the sustenance of that omnipotence demands an art of 
the ‗as if‘, something which, paradoxically, may also allow for that excess of 
narcissism which gives oneself over to the other. The very possibility of the latter 
seems to point towards why Freud saw it necessary to try to confine omnipotence to a 
reductive notion of both the infant and art, and further, why theory and the law find it 
necessary to act as if they were untouched by fiction. 
  
For Freud, the act of handing power over to spirits or ghosts ‗prepares the way for the 
construction of a religion‘78, in that religion is the subjectification of oneself to an all-
powerful god. In turn, the shift from this religious animism to a complete acceptance of 
the absolute and uncontrollable necessity of death would mark the move into a 
scientific phase, a phase in which ‗men have acknowledged their smallness and 
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submitted resignedly to death and to the other necessities of nature.‘79 However, though 
Freud suggests it is only in art that a residue of a primitive omnipotence of thoughts has 
persisted, he also states that ‗some of the primitive belief in omnipotence still survives 
in men‘s faith [Vertrauen] in the power of the human mind, which grapples with the 
laws of reality.‘80 Indeed, this short statement is the admission of a residue of 
‗primitive‘/infantile omnipotence (what Freud conceives of as the omnipotent desire to 
create art) in religion, and, in turn, a residue of that religious ‗Vertrauen‘ [trust/faith] in 
science. Indeed, it is this return of an omnipotent power, a power which both takes in 
and questions the notions of art, religion and science, which interests Derrida in his 
reading of Cixous. 
  
Freud‘s claim that primitive man submits to the ‗supremacy of death‘ [Übermacht des 
Todes] is read by Derrida as a submission to ‗la surpuissance de la mort.‘81 For Freud, 
death is an overpowerful power, an unimaginable excess of power to which no power 
can conceivably be equal. Any acknowledgement of this power would always be 
inadequate to it; one could never fully acknowledge what one cannot fully conceive of, 
and thus any acknowledgement of this power would also figure its denial. At the same 
time, any denial of death must in part be its affirmation; as one cannot fully deny what 
one cannot fully conceive of, a denial of death would also sustain an acknowledgement 
of death‘s all powerful otherness, a surrender to or acceptance of death‘s unimaginable 
excess. Derrida notes that Freud appears to pick up on the necessity of this pretense (or 
fiction) when he states that ‗[p]rimitive man would thus be submitting to the supremacy 
of death with the same gesture with which he seemed to be denying it‘82: 
 
Freud did not say that this gesture consists in acknowledging and denying at 
the same time, but that the acknowledgement of Anankè, of what is effective, 
takes place in the same gesture through which the first man seems [my 
emphasis (M.D.)] to deny it. He does not deny, since he acknowledges, but 
he seems to deny; it is as if he denied what he acknowledges. This same 
gesture comes to the same thing without doing so, and it is in the direction 
of this ―as if‖ that we should have the courage to continue.83 
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For Derrida, it is on the threshold or limit of necessity, of (Anankē) as death, that this 
denial (which is also an acknowledgment), performs an ‗undecidable gesture‘, a gesture 
which generates both its own power and an excess. Such a gesture would generate a 
narcissistic omnipotence of thoughts (Allmacht der Gedanken), which is also an 
absolute surrender to the superior might of its deathly excess (Übermacht des Todes). It 
is on the precarious border between omnipotence and its excess that Derrida wants to 
situate the work of Cixous; a work which both is and is not all-powerful; a work which 
generates a mighty omnipotence/narcissistic power which at the same time is the 
conjuring of its excess, an excess which is necessary if it is at all possible to put the 
other before oneself:  
 
The mightier narcissism is, the more it loves the other. And in order to love 
the other as oneself more than oneself (introjection and incorporation), this 
surplus of might is needed, always more of it, this more than possible that is 
the most impossible.
84
 
 
Plus le narcissisme est puissant, plus il aime l‟autre. Et pour aimer l‟autre 
comme soi-même plus que soi-même (introjection et incorporation), il y faut 
ce plus de puissance, un toujours plus de puissance, ce plus que possible qui 
est le plus impossible.
85
 
   
  
Derrida‘s ‗plus de puissance‘ – as ‗surplus of might‘ and ‗no more might‘ – would here 
perform the essential undecidability of a gesture which acknowledges what it seems to 
deny. Cixous‘s all powerful address would be the omnipotent/narcissistic power to 
think death which, with that same gesture, would also be the absolute surrender of 
power to the other. Such is a gesture which, at once, makes and lets come the arrivance 
of the arrivant. Derrida works on this undecidable gesture through the notions of 
connaissance, re-connaissance and méconnaissance (knowledge, re-cognition and 
misunderstanding), as well as the term ‗dénégation‘, which might refer to both denial 
and, as dé-négation, a denial of denial. Here, the gesture of acknowledgment and denial 
is at once an acknowledgment of the necessity/Anankē/death which provides the source 
for ‗man‘s first theoretical achievement‘, and the very lack of that threshold; it is a 
gesture in which both the limit and the border are encountered and dissolved: 
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To acknowledge is to deny [dénier] or to renege [renier]. To acknowledge is 
not to acknowledge. Conversely, not to acknowledge, to deny, to renege, is 
to acknowledge, I will say de-negate [de-renier]. In the enigma of this 
acceptance of death, of this knowledge that acknowledges (Anerkennung) 
death, but of this re-cognizing knowledge [connaissance re-connaissante] as 
negation and of this negation as denial [dénégation], Verleugnen, in this 
acknowledgment that denies and misunderstands [méconnait] what it knows 
and re-cognizes [re-connaît], well, this is where the side, the other side of 
the life without sides, precisely takes itself away [justement s‟enlève].86
  
 
  
Of course, Freud works on the duplicitous notion of denial or disavowal (Verleugnen) 
at several points in his psychoanalytic project. In ‗Studies on Hysteria‘, Freud states 
that ‗[t]he deeper we go [into the stratification of psychical material] the more difficult 
it becomes for the emerging memories to be recognized, till near the nucleus we come 
upon memories which the patient disavows even in reproducing them.‘87 However, 
what Derrida is pointing out in his reading is that, on the one hand, the gesture which 
acknowledges what it also denies presupposes an element of the ‗as if‘; the gesture 
which acknowledges the limit is also its apparent denial, what affirms the absolute 
supremacy of death also acts as if it did not. On the other hand, the gesture which seems 
to deny death also sustains its supreme power. The element of the ‗as if‘, then, 
generates the omnipotent power which also submits to an all powerful other; it both 
makes and lets come as the arrivance of the arrivant, the mighty power of what might 
come. Fiction generates what it has no control over; its genius is the generating gesture 
which gives birth to the eventness of an event to which it cannot be reduced, and as 
such, which it cannot be assigned or confirmed as its source or origin.  
  
A further point to take from Derrida‘s reading is that at the moment at which the 
‗undecidable gesture‘ denies/acknowledges the limit, at the point at which that limit is 
self-administered, where ‗creation creates the revenant and phantasmatic theory by 
subscribing, by subordinating itself to its own limiting prescription‘88, that limit is 
spirited away. At the point of theory – and as we‘ve seen, the fiction of the ‗as if‘ – that 
which is deemed irreducible to thinking is the very place of thought. In other words, 
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theory acts ‗as if‘ it denied what it acknowledges, thus, theory thinks death (denies its 
otherness to thinking) with the same gesture that it defers it (acknowledges its radical 
otherness); theory acts ‗as if‘ death were thinkable whilst acknowledging its otherness 
to thinking. With this gesture, however, ‗the other side of the life without sides, 
precisely takes itself away [justement s‟enlève]‘; thus the gesture which seems to deny 
what it acknowledges, which makes/lets come the arrivance of the arrivant, makes/lets 
that other side of life vanish, as if it were never there. Here, the ‗undecidable gesture‘ of 
denial and acknowledgement not only thinks what is irreducible to thinking, it also 
suggests that there is nothing which is irreducible to thinking. Cixous‘s ‗faute de 
langue‘ returns here, language marks that which is irreducible to it, that for which there 
is a lack of language, language is both responsible and not responsible for this fault, 
both guilty and not guilty of the ‗fault‘. There is no other side to the living on which 
survives the opposition between acknowledgement and denial, or life and death. For 
Derrida, Cixous‘s work affirms this ‗undecidable gesture‘ as that which both marks and 
submits itself to the radical otherness which it makes/lets come.  
 
Before returning to Cixous‘s work, we should note the questions and possibilities which 
this thinking of/at the limit has for what I am referring to as a ‗trauma study‘. For 
Derrida, Cixous‘s work is a gesture of ‗experimental experience‘; in its complex 
encounter with a limit which Freud described as the source of ‗man‘s first theoretical 
achievement‘ – that is, death – Cixous‘s work requires a much more nuanced 
consideration of both experience and theory. As an experiment, her work would be both 
experience and theory, or, the point at which theory is the very experience of what it 
purported to stand at a critical distance from. Derrida engages with this complexity 
when he discusses the varying implications of her ‗gesture‘ and her ‗experience‘, a 
gesture which is at once an infatuation for the other (gestio), the very possibility of the 
other (gesto), and a movement of the other (gestari): 
 
 […] her gesture and her experience, a double and coordinated gesture, 
capable of doing things with words, of carrying with a gestation that is also a 
gestation and a birth: gestio means to be carried away with desire, to burn 
with desire, and gesto means to carry, and gestari to be carried, to travel; 
and her experilous, experimental experience, the dangerous journey (Gefahr, 
Fahren), the expert crossing of her experience (Erfahrung), her 
experimentation, her test of originary Belebtheit, are gestures and an 
experience, operations and an opus, a putting to work, which hold together 
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and are held by the tight dovetailing of experimental technique (always a bit 
ironic: one must do it just to see, to try it out) and of magic, knowledge, 
know-how, and enchantment, at the point where, for the oppositionless 
narcissism of Belebtheit, there is no longer any contradiction between the 
experience of magic and the experimentation of the most objective techno-
science.
89
 
 
Cixous‘s ‗undecidable gesture‘, as experience and experiment, is the making/letting 
come of a quasi-originary Belebtheit, the all-powerful production of what exceeds and 
outspeeds that production in advance. Such an address, such a gesture, one which says 
‗come‘ to the absolutely unpredictable other, would subject (or subjunct) itself in 
advance; such a command would always-already be the most powerless of advances, 
the most unexpected of experiences.  
 
I want to take Derrida‘s suggestion that in Cixous‘s work ‗there is no longer any 
contradiction between the experience of magic and the experimentation of the most 
objective techno-science‘ in order to ask how Cixous takes up what was, for Freud, the 
first trauma theory (the theory of revenants and spirits as an acknowledgment and 
denial of the death of a loved one). By reading Cixous via Freud‘s ‗undecidable 
gesture‘ of acknowledgement and denial, Derrida‘s text might help us to think her work 
as an instance of this ‗undecidable gesture‘ which, rather than assume some theoretical, 
doctrinal or juridical control over the event, gives itself over to the all-powerful fiction 
which is at the heart of its thinking. We might say that Cixous‘s work returns to this 
‗undecidable gesture‘ at an almost primordial point where art, religion, science and 
philosophy are only half-formed; a point, then, at which a theory or doctrine of trauma 
might also be an experience of living. What might constitute art, religion, science or 
philosophy, therefore, is yet to be decided, as is what determines the concepts of fiction 
and reality. Moreover, as the ‗undecidable gesture‘ makes/lets the event come, this 
arrivance – or arrivivance – may engender the most narcissistic of fictions, the most 
incisive of theories, as well as the most unexpected of others. I want to suggest that 
what is at once the rawest of experiences and the most objective of theories, is also an 
experiment in the might which exceeds it. As the word ‗experiment‘ can also mean to 
feel or suffer something, such an experiment would feel or suffer – as experience – the 
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possibility, potentiality or might of the impossible.
90
 I want to suggest that, on/at the 
threshold between experience and theory, Cixous‘s work produces an ‗experimental 
experience‘, a trauma study which is also the most magical of arts. 
 
3.6 To be almost – the story of ‘o’ 
The final two sections of this chapter will return to Le jour où je n‟étais pas là in order 
to read the birth and the death of the narrator‘s son, or more precisely, how the son‘s 
birth and death occur, but are yet to arrive. This will demonstrate how Cixous‘s text 
might be read to function in terms of arrivance, how it makes/lets the ‗event of what 
happens‘ come to/as writing. Arrivance is the coming of the arrivant, not the arrivant 
itself. Yet Derrida‘s suggestion that Cixous‘s texts are encounters with this arrivance 
does seem to mark her work as an experience of, and experiment with, the arrivant 
which is distinct from most other literary works. We might say that although the 
arrivant must remain to come, Cixous‘s texts are most welcoming to this absolute 
unexpectedness. 
 
Le jour où je n‟étais pas là might be thought of as the story of what almost arrives, 
what is almost finished, almost present, almost born. The narrator asks if such a state 
exists, if it is possible that one might be ‗born without being born yet? [Est-ce que cela 
existe d‟être né sans être encore né ?].‘91 She asks if one can be ‗almost‘: ‗D‟être 
presque‘92; for this is how she experiences her son: as the one who has arrived 
‗incorrect‘. Her son is the event which has arrived without arriving ‗as such‘, occurred 
without happening, or happened but still to come: 
 
What has happened is that the child in the cradle has not arrived yet, at least 
he hasn‘t been informed of his arrival. He believes he is drifting, he hasn‘t 
yet landed. ―What has come to pass.‖ How to describe it, how to describe, 
this to come which has already come and which is still on the way, which 
hasn‘t finished, which isn‘t finished, which doesn‘t commence, which is all 
mixed up. Because if this happened, it has happened but if it is still coming 
it‘s that this hasn‘t happened [Parce que si ce est arrivé, c‟est arrivé mais si 
ça vient c‟est que ce n‟est pas arrivé], which is what renders the child still 
intangible though in the cradle. Morphologically it is a present, but curved 
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[fléchi], melting, receding [fuyant]. Missing. The child has arrived, 
incorrect.
93
 
 
Neither present nor absent the child is ‗almost‘. Both still to come and fleeing [fuyant], 
yet to be formed but ‗melting‘, the child arrives on a double trajectory: thrown from 
what is ‗still to come‘, it also recedes towards that incalculable horizon; both 
approaching from and receding into a wholly other future. This passage in the text asks 
‗how to describe‘ whilst describing what it is not yet possible to describe. Writing 
makes/lets come what remains ‗to come‘, whilst asking how to make/let come. Here we 
have the ‗faute de langue‘, both the impossibility of description and the very arrivance 
of the ‗fault‘ – the making/letting come of the ‗incorrect‘ child.   
  
Cixous writes the ‗faute de langue‘; what is at once the narrator‘s fault – the guilt over 
abandoning her child as well as the fact that this incorrect child remains hers – is also 
that of language (the inadequacy of language). The faults of language and life coincide 
with a writing which makes/lets them arrive without arriving. This is the experimental 
gesture which combines experience and theory with the magic of a ‗fiction‘ it is 
impossible to oppose to reality. The passage above is the experiment of what is still to 
come; it is the eventness of the event, the arrivance of the arrivant. The text generates a 
narcissistic omnipotence which is so powerful that this all-powerful literature – a 
literature which can say anything – is also subjected to the wholly otherness of a secret 
which is yet to be told. What has happened here, what is referred to as ‗this‘ [‗ce‘], also 
refers to what is still to come [‗ça‘]; the liaison between ‗ce‘ and ‗est‘ has not yet been 
made – it is not yet joined to the verb to be, it is not yet ‗c‟est‘ but an undecidable 
ce/ça. What has happened might also be still to come; therefore, ce/ça remains both 
coupled to, and detached from, the order of being, it is not yet finished, incorrect, there 
remains the trace of a fault. Furthermore, this sentence does not refer to the child as ‗il‘ 
[he]; the child remains a ‗this‘ rather than the ‗he‘ which might be expected. Here the 
child is referred to indexically and ambiguously rather than determined by the sexually 
determined personal pronoun.  
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What has arrived is a ‗ce‘ which remains in the process of coming, an undecidable 
ce/ça which is almost, an almost-being, an almost-knowledge. Ce/ça is what may still 
be coming with the ‗morphological‘ presence of the missing, unfinished and receding 
child, yet it is also what is recalled to writing; thus what remains to be is made to arrive 
as this undecidable ce/ça. Ce/ça marks a memory of the future here, the very arrivance 
which reserves a space for what has happened and is always to come. In turn, ce/ça 
marks the point at which memory and being are made to arrive without arriving; both 
are written, both arrive/happen [arrivé], but they remain to come, to be written, to 
arrive, to happen. The text‘s undecidable ce/ça also marks a return to Derrida‘s reading 
of ‗Belebtheit‘, as that which ‗is not a position on the essence of being as life‘: ‗The life 
of this Belebtheit is not, it is not an ―entity‖ [étant]; it is a mighty power of the ―might‖ 
without another side [c‟est une puissance du « puisse » sans autre côté], without a 
contrary.‘94 We could say that the ce/ça of Le jour où je n‟étais pas is of the order of 
Belebtheit, that it marks a differential of power, a differential of might in which what 
might have arrived might also be to come. There are always, therefore, at least two 
degrees of might, two speeds in which one always outruns the other: what might ‗be‘ is 
overtaken or gained on in advance by what might also be to come. Such is the 
„puissance du « puisse »‘, a great subjunctive might in which what might be all 
powerful might also submit to a power which outspeeds and overpowers it. As this 
‗might‘ could be the (im)puissance of a ‗quasi-originary‘ Belebtheit, what is called life 
could not be reduced to being, or to an ontology; rather, both life and death would be 
traces of this mighty differential, a differential in the order of which what we think of as 
presence and knowledge might be better thought of in the vicinity of almost, nearly, 
hardly [‗presque‘].  
  
When the narrator decides that such an undecidable ce/ça must be written more clearly 
– that is, when she attempts to name her half-finished child – she finds she must attempt 
this from his incalculable side, the ‗side of the vague [le parti du flou].‘95 The narrator 
assumes the ‗side of the vague‘ in order to call him from it: ‗Now she takes sides, the 
side of the child. The side of the vague.‘96 The narrator seeks to call her child from his 
side, from the wave – vague – which oscillates towards and away from any stable 
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shore. The narrator does not assume she can call him from the side of the vague to a 
side on which all is clear, rather, she puts her faith on his side, and if he is to exist at all 
– even ‗almost‘ – he must be called on his side. For the narrator, this side is the side of 
life; the ‗side of the vague‘ is the side on which she will call her child from the waters 
in which he is both receding and approaching, waters in which he is floating, but barely 
[presque]. For her, this ‗slippery fish‘ must be caught in the ‗net of very old, strong, 
safe, faithful names, her secret and sacred names‘; with this net the narrator will 
attempt to ‗pull him gently out of the water he has drawn around himself up to his 
chest.‘97 The narrator must here enter the waters of his side of the vague in order to 
draw him from it. Hence the text must also be on his side; the text is a naming of the 
child which plunges into the undecidable waters from which the child is pulled. The 
text enters the water as it pulls from the waters. The text is itself this waveform, 
oscillating both towards and away from the child. The naming of this child will allow 
him to gain in might, yet this gain can only occur through the differential weave – or 
net – of a text which must remain on the side of the vague – a vague side, ‗almost‘ no 
side at all. 
  
So how does the narrator name this half-sunken child? With half-sunken names. The 
names she will choose for her ‗unfinished‘ child are names which themselves may be 
thought of as unfinished. Of course, these names remain ‗very old, strong, safe, faithful 
names, her secret and sacred names‘98; these are names of great power, mighty names. 
Yet as secret names they will mark something that is yet to be brought to the surface; 
these names sketch a secret, a secret yet to be told, still to come. What these names 
mark is a certain arrivance, in that they name, and indeed engender, the absolute 
singularity which has occurred and yet is still to come: 
 
First she calls him Adam; second she calls him Georges the name of her 
dead father who had been waiting for years to be called back among the 
living [parmi les vivants]. Third she calls him Lev for the complicated, 
inexplicable Prince.
99
 
 
These three names recall three immense texts; the first appears to be a biblical reference 
to Adam, Eve‘s partner. Naming him ‗Georges‘ recalls the narrator‘s dead father, which 
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in turn points to Cixous‘s undecidable weave of life and text as Cixous‘s mother is 
called Eve, and her father Georges. This is an obvious point at which the narrator and 
author of Le jour où je n‟étais pas là become entwined, entwined in the same 
transferential relationships which are also netting the child. Here we find a point at 
which the notions of maternity and memory combine in writing, a writing in which 
what is recalled is given birth to as if for the first time. The third name, Lev, is taken 
from Dostoyevsky‘s The Idiot, the reference being to his protagonist, Prince ‗Lev‘ 
Nikolayevich Myshkin. The narrator had been reading Dostoyevsky‘s text ‗on the eve 
of the day she gave birth‘100; this act, then, is itself a magical or telepathic prophecy of 
what is about to come: the arrival of an ‗inexplicable‘ Lev as much at the heart of 
Dostoyevsky‘s text as it is Cixous‘s.  
  
Each of the names the narrator assigns the child catches the child in the text it recalls, 
yet the weave of them together divides and defers the moment of naming: ‗It‘s that now 
he‘s called. Now Adam, now Georges, now Lev [C‟est que maintenant il s‟appelle. 
Tantôt Adam, ou Georges, ou Lev].‘101 Each of these names snag themselves on a secret 
they could never name absolutely, because this secret is also that of the other. The 
naming of the child recalls the dead father (Georges), the partner of Eve 
(Georges/Adam), as well as Dostoyevsky‘s enigmatic prince – all three surfacing on the 
side of the vague. Each name arrives but is divided by the other; a male lineage battling 
to inherit the secret. Yet the narrator‘s net is a weave of this history, a re-writing where 
each name stands for the other and none are reducible to themselves. This is a maternal 
text, history rewritten for the first time, a magical gesture and gestation of what comes 
to an essentially divided ‗now‘, a now which is also yet to come, to be written again. 
Her child/text is the return of this secret history, a history which is made to/let arrive as 
if for the first time – a maternal fiction, a ‗writing of her language‘.102 
                                                 
100
 Hélène Cixous, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.30; Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, p.55. 
101
 Hélène Cixous, The Day I Wasn‟t There, p.30; Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, pp.56-7 (my emphasis). 
102
 Gill Rye suggests that ‗Le jour où je n‟étais pas là serves to recontextualise Cixous‘s 1970s work in 
which maternity is a metaphor for writing itself. In those texts, maternity was always more than a simple 
creation metaphor, taking in, in Cixous‘s usage, the full extent of both the extreme pleasures (jouissance) 
and the pains of maternity and of writing.‘ Rye also suggests that Le jour où je n‟étais pas là takes this 
recontextualisation further, ‗enabling us to understand how the metaphor [of maternity] also potentially 
includes tragic loss‘. Gill Rye, ‗‗Maternité rendue, maternité perdue‘: the return of/to the past in Le jour 
où je n‟étais pas là‟; Parallax, vol. 13, no. 3, July 2007, ed. Eric Prenowitz, pp.104-111 (p.107). I would 
suggest that Cixous‘s work complicates loss in two interrelated ways: it renders what is wholly 
incalculable, and, as such, marks the notion of loss as the promise of a secret which remains to come (also 
see §3.7 of the current chapter). 
 181 
 
It is clear that the three half-sunken, sacred and secret names allow the narrator to 
recount a history which is irreducibly both literary and familial. Life and text are woven 
together in this naming to form a net with which she almost pulls the ‗slippery fish‘ 
from the unfathomable waters. But we remain on the ‗side of the vague‘ here, though 
netted in a vast, strong literary weave the child still ‗makes no sense.‘103 Here the child 
remains as ‗inexplicable‘ as Dostoyevsky‘s prince: ‗He is smooth, abstract. As if he 
hadn‘t risen. Pale, as if he hadn‘t finished baking [Il est lisse, abstrait. Comme s‟il 
n‟avait pas levé. Pâle comme s‟il n‟avait pas foncé].‘104 Though landed, the child 
remains unfinished; he/it is abstract, a ‗fault‘ without flaw, unmarked and yet 
inexplicable, the very essence of the secret. The child has been swept up in a literary 
net – a net into which Le jour où je n‟étais pas là is also woven – but that net has also 
augmented a secret; though arriving to the letter, the inexplicable child remains to be 
delivered or finished – his smooth, abstract, unlined face remains to be written. The 
book, the child, and the event intertwine here. As this drifting child allows the narrator 
to recall drifting names, and the drifting names allow her to recall her drifting child, 
each marks the arrivance of the other; each marks the arrivance of the irreducibly 
secret event as the possibility that the arrivant might arrive (or the might of the 
arrivant). As the possibility of the ‗im-possible‘ (Derrida‘s hyphenated and ‗non-
negative‘ use of the term105), this is an experience, or experiment, of/in the subjunctive 
might which, with the power of a mighty address, generates an excess of might which 
rubs itself against the text as the promise of what remains to come. 
  
We can read this promise of the text with the figure of ‗o‘. This ‗slippery fish‘ of a 
child, who glints on the surface of the text, mouths the figure ‗o‘ as if gasping to be 
returned to the depths from which he‘s almost been pulled: 
 
What a surprise this child, this child which doesn‘t seem to be hers, who 
differs, who doesn‘t look like, this fish gasping as if it needed to go back in 
the water, one expects a surprise but instead of the expected surprise it‘s an 
entirely different one, o mysterious power of the new arrival who evades the 
millions of expectations of millenniums of images [ô mystérieuse puissance 
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du nouveau venu qui déjoue des millions d‟attentes des millénaires 
d‟images], o eternally astonishing natural phenomenon forever never seen 
before.
106
 
  
The ‗o‘ can be seen as the mouth of the gasping fish-child; moreover, it remains a 
figure of the text – ‗o mysterious power‘, ‗o eternally astonishing natural phenomenon‘. 
The ‗o‘ marks what remains to be pulled from the waters, what remains to be pulled 
into the safety of secret names. Alternatively, it pleads to be returned to the depths 
which lie beyond this aquarium-clinic, the depths where the narrator also stands with 
her face pressed against the window, her ‗mouth round with curiosity.‘107  
 
With a passage of the text which is infinitely complex, the narrator is describing what 
did and did not happen at the time. What is described here is what the woman who has 
just given birth ‗doesn‘t think‘. Indeed, the passage which describes this event is itself 
punctuated by the gasping ‗o‘, an ‗o‘ which is yet to be thought. Moreover, the narrator 
finds herself outside the aquarium-clinic, looking in with her mouth forming the same 
‗o‘ that the child gasps as he hesitates on the threshold between naming and evasion. 
The narrator is here a similar half-rendered figure; neither the actual author, nor the 
author‘s fictional invention, this figure is only half-caught up in these inadequate 
literary terms, and the ‗o‘ overflows from the child to the narrator as she gasps and 
gapes between motherhood and the waters of indeterminacy. As the narrator – ‗tipped 
out of‘ her aquarium-clinic – looks in through the window onto herself the day she was 
not ‗there‘, mouthing the ‗o‘ between mother and other, she is placed en abyme by a 
scene staged in a temporality which also gasps ‗o‘, an ‗o‘ which trembles between an 
‗ill-attached‘ and ‗ill-detached‘ present: 
 
She, that‘s me that day who just got tipped out of myself [vient de basculer 
hors de moi] and no way to climb back into the house of me from which I 
have fallen. Time pivots and falls. There is no more past. The future not yet. 
What remains is a hesitation of ill-attached ill-detached [mal-attaché mal-
détaché] present hanging over the two beds the big one and the little. 
Outside the fish swim round the aquarium.
108
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Ill-attached and ill-detached can be thought of as what is inadequately kept and badly 
abandoned. A dis-jointed present structures time: there is no past, or there is nothing in 
the past, and the future is still to come [‗Le futur pas encore‘]. What is seemingly 
forgotten, or considered to be remembered, is badly done so; forgetting is half-
remembered and memory is half-forgotten, nothing is completely forgotten and nothing 
completely remembered. Rather, the disjointed present which hesitates over the two 
beds – the mother‘s and the child‘s – also gasps between memory and oblivion. Here, 
the text marks time in the same oscillating frequency of ‗o‘; a frequency between 
arrival and the unfathomable depths of the secret.  
  
As the narrator tries to read – and therefore also write – this moment that she ‗doesn‘t 
think‘, the ‗o‘ which gasps for its determination is the same figure which secretes 
oblivion. Such is writing‘s augmentation of the secret; as Cixous has stated elsewhere: 
‗the secret is not a diamond, it is in a state of continual secretion, it constantly augments 
itself: never can an author reach its heights.‘109 For Cixous, ‗[a]s soon as one writes to 
exhume one secretes secrets‘.110 For her, as soon as one attempts to uncover the secret, 
or the truth of the event, that secret is also buried. The text both secretes and secrets the 
secret away, the secret both hides from and shows itself in/to/as writing. Thus the act of 
calling what gasps ‗o‘ – the act of naming or producing it – is also that which secrets it 
away; thus the act which attempts to think the event is always-already compromised by 
the secreting away of that event. As fast as one can think the event it is always-already 
overtaken and outsped by its secreting away. In this sense, a writing to exhume is 
always-already at the threshold of what is ill-attached and ill-detached; an essentially 
ambiguous present with no past and a future which is always yet to come, a future 
whose im-possibility is the very condition of the secret.  
 
But to secrete is also to extract life, it is to separate life from life, for example, to 
secrete milk from blood. If writing secretes the secret then it gives life to the secret. 
Therefore, as writing also keeps the secret hidden, it secretes an excess of life which 
resists being shown. What exhumes also buries, writing gives life to what resists 
coming to light; writing is all powerful to the extent that it generates the very thing 
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which is stronger than it, the very thing which resists it. Yet it is because these two 
radically heterogeneous powers function as an omnipotence which can overpower itself 
in advance, that it is possible to make/let arrive what can never arrive ‗as such‘. Freud‘s 
Belebtheit again returns here, as a vivance whose all-powerful and originary survival of 
the opposition between life and death is the very condition of submitting to the other, 
and therefore of making/letting the other come via a mighty subjunctive power. Such a 
quasi-originary survival of life and death – a suffering as the bearing or marking of the 
other – would be the only possibility for thinking what is im-possible to think, for 
making/letting come what remains to come. 
  
Bearing this in mind, the passage from Le jour où je n‟étais pas là which marks the 
arrivance of the child is both the coming to terms with what was (not) experienced at 
the time, and the experience of not being able to come to terms with it. Power and 
impotence collide here; the text is punctuated – punctured by ‗o‘ – in its movement 
towards the im-possible, it traces what is irreducible to thinking, it experiences and 
experiments on the threshold between memory and forgetting, keeping and 
abandonment, possible and impossible. The passage marks a point at which the ‗I‘  of 
‗the day I was not there' is also ‗there‘ in its ‗ill-attached ill-detached present‘; the text 
is where the ‗I‘, as the subject of experience, is both there and not there. Moreover, the 
text itself is also there and not there, the text is both the very experience of the event – 
the interruption of the ‗o‘ is just one instance of this – as well as remaining at a distance 
from it, a distance of delay and difference as generated by the differential inscription of 
the trace. Memory, experience and oblivion irreducibly intertwine as what is 
experienced is also remembered, but what is remembered is also forgotten, what is 
remembered is punctured and punctuated by the return of its essentially secret 
experience. Such a spectrum of undecidability takes place as the differential field of 
(im)puissance, a mighty omnipotence which also generates an absolute submission to 
the other. This non-negative experience of the im-possible suffuses the text on all 
levels: the condition of memory is that which it is im-possible to recollect, the condition 
of writing is a secret which it is im-possible to exhume once and for all, and the 
condition of study is that which it is im-possible to devote oneself to in advance. 
 
At the point at which the narrator finds herself watching herself tipped out of herself, at 
a point after a woman who is and is not the narrator has just given birth to a child which 
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hasn‘t yet arrived, the ‗narrator‘ states that the child ‗evades her absolutely, she doesn‘t 
remember him at all. She doesn‘t conceive of him. She has come to a stop. Where? At 
the stop [Elle ne le pense pas. Elle est à l‟arrêt. Où ? À l‟arrêt].‘111 The woman who 
has given birth finds herself stopped at the point where she cannot conceive of [penser] 
the child, where – recalling that penser is ‗a verb that roams [rôde], a dreamy sort of 
action‘112 – she cannot think/roam/dream towards her child. In a sense this ‗arrêt‘ is a 
weighing up, in that the word can also mean a ‗decision‘ or ‗judgement‘. To be ‗à 
l‟arrêt‘ would see the woman stopped at the point of decision, as opposed to wandering 
in thought. She cannot think the child as she must decide upon him, but this point of 
decision is devoid of both thought and memory; she can neither remember nor think the 
child at the point of decision, suggesting a radical heterogeneity between these two 
notions. At the point of decision both memory and thought fail, and therefore, what 
must be decided upon, the child, evades the decision ‗absolutely‘.  
  
At this point of decision, however, a point where what is to be decided upon evades 
memory and thought, there is a dance of undecidability, a space where both woman and 
child are being-almost. Described here is a point where an earthly text – a terrain of 
commonality – is being slowly shared out, slowly negotiated, shared or sketched out 
between two cats, two beasts who are not yet mother and son: 
 
I see the woman do silent battle with the child, this is in one of those worlds 
where on the threshold a spell is cast over whoever strays or ventures in, 
where the laws of metamorphosis reign, where one never knows who 
pursues whom for dozens of light-years, where one cannot not hunt as one 
breathes. I see the woman and child beasts, held alive in the burning frost of 
a face-to-face the way two cats caught in the last two meters of a kingdom 
stand still for hours guarding the last two meters with the patient tenacity of 
gods measuring out between them their last chance at immortality. 
  
The way two heroes advance towards the final instant slowly sharing [en 
partageant lentement] the taste of each inch of white sand, which is what 
they have in common, this morsel of earthly fabric [tissu terrestre] which 
kisses their feet, they do not run they revel together in what unites them in a 
loving hostility [ils jouissent tous les deux de ce qui les rassemble dans une 
hostilité aimante], this space which is not going to last, which they are going 
to cut, unequally, this solemn diminution.
113
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With the arrêt, then, at the stopping and the decision, we also find a world where magic 
and metamorphosis reign. At the very point of decision we are returned to what is 
undecidable.  
 
This is a world where what evades memory and thought is also the jouissance of a face-
to-face which unites woman and child beasts in a ‗loving hostility‘. A space, then, 
where ‗they stare at one another, distractedly‘114, where the most intense fixation is also 
a looking away, a world in which negation and opposition are read on the same side of 
a kingdom whose last two meters marks the difference between two omnipotent gods. 
On the one hand this space suggests that the most intense, devoted, critical or accurate 
inquiry is also a misrecognition; this is an ‗ill-attached ill-detached present‘ in which 
what is seen face to face is also veiled. On the other hand, however, there remains a 
myopic clarity of vision, a space in which what is almost, barely or hardly sketched is 
perhaps most accurately rendered. These two gods are locked, paradoxically, in a battle 
between two omnipotent forces; each an all-powerful force which happens to share the 
same common ground with the omnipotence of the other. What is shared, then, is also 
in the process of division, where a common terrain will be woven into a text which will 
separate them forever. Moreover, these ‗white sands‘, in which the ‗laws of 
metamorphosis reign‘, are themselves generated by the text. In other words, this battle 
did not exist before the text, the commonality of its earthly fabric is always-already 
transported metonymically – and at a speed faster than light – to the scene of writing, a 
scene which keeps forever secret the magic world it has just revealed. The text which 
marks the return of this secret world is the only possibility of thinking and experiencing 
the promise of its common fabric, the only possibility of welcoming or making/letting 
this im-possible world arrive at our shores.  
 
The child which is caught up in the net of names is brought to a single shore; he arrives 
(il est à-rivé, he is shored). But this is an undecidable shore where he is cast as one of 
the literary characters of the narrator-author‘s very real life. The child arrives on a shore 
already half-sunken with the half-living half-literary, ill-attached ill-detached names of 
Adam, Georges and Lev. The child doesn‘t arrive once and for all; this landing is 
instead an arrivance; or, with the borrowing of his half-life from the other, an 
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arrivivance. But this arri(vi)vance will remain gasping for survival; no matter how 
much oxygen he can swallow, the tiny hole at the very heart of Georges will see to it. 
 
3.7 Eve – her might… 
Though never arriving completely, the child dies in the care of the narrator‘s mother. A 
meditation on the child‘s birth, Le jour où je n‟étais pas là is also the attempt to think 
the events surrounding his death. Whilst doubting the right to ask her mother what 
happened on the day he died, the narrator is drawn towards rendering the secret of that 
day in the same manner that she attempts to net her son in the weave of life and 
literature.  
 
There are at least three generations of mothers in the text: the narrator, her mother 
(surrogate-mother to the narrator‘s child), and the narrator‘s grandmother, Omi. As the 
narrator tentatively broaches the subject of the child‘s death with her mother, the 
mother describes the possibility (or not) of her considering euthanasia:  
 
I was afraid you‘d ask me questions, says my mother, asking me when he 
died or of what how and that I would get all muddled up in your questions 
which always tack another question on to the question, I was afraid to the let 
the cat out of the bag, I was afraid you‘d blame me for it one day, something 
I‘d done wrong meaning to do right, kill, die, or on the contrary that you 
wouldn‘t ask any questions which would have kept me hanging 
indefinitely.– Besides I wouldn‘t have done it because a child that‘s alive 
one can‘t just do away with it, says my mother, therefore I didn‘t have the 
possibility, only the idea might have crossed my mind, added my mother, as 
if years had gone by while she was talking and brought everything she might 
have thought sliding down like sand.
115
 
 
Freud suggests that it was in considering the death of a loved one that ‗man‘s first 
theoretical achievement/performance [Die erste theoretische Leistung des Menschen]‘ 
took shape. An ambivalent attitude towards the death of a loved one gave rise to a 
gesture which accepted the necessity of death whilst seeming to deny it. This gesture 
was demonstrated in a theory or doctrine of spirits. What is necessary or inevitable (a 
‗natural‘ death), is seemingly denied with the same gesture that acknowledges it. In 
turn, one‘s belief in omnipotence – that the death of a loved one might have been willed 
– is kept in the renunciation of responsibility for that death to the spirits. An excess of 
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omnipotence is made to/let arrive in a submission to the necessity of death (what Freud 
calls death‘s ‗supremacy‘ [Übermacht], its surplus, its ‗more than‘ power). The 
acknowledgement of death‘s supremacy, then, is also the narcissism which denies it. I 
want to suggest that this making/letting come of what is wholly unknowable and to 
which one is in complete submission – what Derrida sees in Cixous‘s (im)puissance to 
make/let come the arrivance of the arrivant – is the very (im)puissance that the 
narrator‘s mother experiences with the death of her loved ones. With an ‗undecidable 
gesture‘, the mother makes/lets come the supremacy of a death which is wholly beyond 
her control. As Le jour où je n‟étais pas là is our only evidence for this arrivance, it 
addresses the precarious border between ‗originary‘ and ‗recollected‘ experience, 
between the event ‗as such‘ and its arrival in/to writing. The text, therefore, is both an 
experience and the most devoted study (or theory) of an excess which remains resistant 
to thinking; the text is a sketch of the secret to which it cannot be reduced. We might 
say that, like the mother, the text will let the cat out of the bag with the same gesture 
that it keeps that bag closed.  
  
The mother states that she was afraid of being blamed for the child‘s death, but also that 
there would be no opportunity to account for it: ‗I was afraid you‘d blame me for it one 
day, something I‘d done wrong meaning to do right, kill, die, or on the contrary that 
you wouldn‘t ask any questions which would have kept me hanging indefinitely.‘116 
There remains, however, a question over what actually happened; with the next 
sentence the mother begins to complicate the account of what she was thinking at the 
time: ‗Besides I wouldn‘t have done it because a child that‘s alive one can‘t just do 
away with it, says my mother, therefore I didn‘t have the possibility, only the idea 
might have crossed my mind‘.117 As the narrator suggests, it is as if years have passed 
with these two sentences, years in which what should have seemed firm decisions, slide 
into the shifting sands of doubt and uncertainty. Rather than a forgetting of what really 
happened, what is rendered is the complexity of the event, a sketch which allows itself 
more strokes of the pen, seeking to describe accurately, but in fact going via the 
inviolable secret of the event. Le jour où je n‟étais pas là is a sketch book, a collection 
of sketches which approach an event that requires – as Cixous describes the slow 
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process of rendering what will always outrun her – ‗two years and two hundred pages 
in order to recount it‘.118 The text secretes the secret of ‗the day the I wasn‘t there‘ – it 
is the study and the experience of the mother‘s undecidable gesture, the experiment of 
what she keeps as she reveals, and of how she makes/lets happen what is beyond her 
control. 
  
It becomes clear that the mother‘s reactions to the child‘s deteriorating condition may 
have been informed by what she did or did not do for her dying mother. Omi‘s faltering 
health resulted in an impossible situation the mother could hardly bear: ‗I go up to the 
bed and hear Omi moaning, it‘s a crime, to hear the moans of one‘s own mother and not 
hear them is also another crime.‘119 As if in response to both her own and her 
daughter‘s suffering, Omi asks of her the impossible: ‗Give me something and don‘t 
tell me about it.‘120 With this phrase the daughter is asked to give something to her 
mother of which she will know nothing. The daughter asks how to think this when the 
only person she can confide in is the person asking for this unspeakable gift, when the 
only one to whom she can say everything is the one who asks her not to tell:  
 
Give. But what? Who to ask? Ask to give what? You have no one to confide 
in. You haven‘t confidence in anyone. There‘s no one. I never have anyone 
to talk to. And that‘s why I didn‘t answer Omi. She would have been spared 
two falls and two operations which were totally useless to arrive at the same 
point. The only person I had confidence in.
121
 
 
Omi asks her daughter to give her what she can‘t acknowledge as being given; this 
would be a gift of death which, in not giving it, is also the gift of life. From this point 
on, both life and death are undecidably wrapped in a gift it is impossible to 
acknowledge. Even if she didn‘t give her anything, and had let death come ‗naturally‘, 
this instance of fate would also be the gift of not giving an earlier death. What is 
thought of as fate, then, is made/let come by the radical (im)puissance of not acting at 
the request of the other (which is also, of course, an acting on that request). The power 
to engender what is wholly beyond one‘s control is of an order of narcissism so mighty 
that it gives itself over to the other. Here, the mother‘s act is of this order of narcissism, 
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it is an instance of the quasi-originary Belebtheit which makes/let death come on the 
side of life; what is irreducible to life is made/let arrive on the side of life – death 
arrives here as a gift of life. The narrator suggests that Omi may have thought that her 
daughter had given her the death she wanted without telling her, but for her mother 
‗this hypothesis is to be ruled out, Omi never thought that my mother had given her 
something because she wanted not to know.‘122 Here the mother gives without giving; 
Omi asks for the impossible because the possible ‗something‘ would be knowable, Omi 
would know that her daughter had given her ‗something‘ and she precisely asked to not 
be told, that she didn‘t want to know. Death would be ‗something‘ that it would be 
possible for her daughter to give; rather, she asks for a gift more powerful than that, a 
gift in the order of the im-possible, a gift which exceeds the opposition between life and 
death. In a sense, the mother understands this demand for the im-possible as, according 
to her, ‗that is what [Omi] wanted because she wanted to stop living but without this 
being dying [parce qu‟elle voulait arrêter de vivre mais sans que ce fût mourir].‘123  
  
The narrator has her own reading of this situation: ‗Omi might have thought that my 
mother would never tell her and she could have received without acknowledging what 
my mother hadn‘t given her, so that even without having given anything, my mother 
had nonetheless given Omi something.‘124 The narrator believes that Omi knew that she 
was asking for the im-possible, and that this would make it possible for her daughter to 
act in that same order of the im-possible and give her a death without doing anything; 
to give her an end to life which remained on the side of life. For the mother, however, 
this hypothesis is purely the narrator‘s invention: ‗According to her Omi knew that my 
mother wasn‘t going to do it otherwise she would have ordered her to do it, but she had 
only asked for her to keep it secret.‘125 Yet these two readings are not in opposition, 
indeed, they make/let the eventness of the event come to writing. The mother‘s 
(non)action could only be thought via the difference between these two hypotheses, 
between possibility and impossibility, an im-possible ‗might‘. With a might that 
exceeds the impossible, which functions in the order of a non-negative im-possible, the 
event arrives without arriving to the text of Le jour où je n‟étais pas là; an event which 
returns as the secret of a text which – at once – will experience, study and secrete it 
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away. Cixous‘s text makes/lets come the mother‘s secret, which is in turn an experience 
of, and experiment in, Omi‘s undecidable gesture – a gesture which said ‗give but don‘t 
tell‘. Hence the secret is an effect of Omi‘s im-possible phrase, a phrase which made/let 
come the gift of death as a surplus of life, a death on the side of an originary Belebtheit. 
From the mother to the daughter to the text, Le jour où je n‟étais pas là inherits the 
secret at the point where it is experienced as the most singular and originary event. This 
recalls what Derrida referred to as the ‗writing of her language‘, where ‗sa langue‘, her 
‗language‘ and her ‗tongue‘, is neither her ‗mother tongue‘ (French) nor her mother‘s 
language (German), but the most singular and originary gesture which affirms both in a 
writing that makes/lets come what is at once intimately familiar and wholly other. In Le 
jour où je n‟étais pas là, it is this ‗writing of her language‘ which marks the arrivance 
of what remains secret and to come.  
 
There are two versions of what happened on the day of the child‘s death; one from the 
narrator‘s brother (a doctor who may have been at the clinic where the child was being 
cared for), and one from the mother (a midwife at the same clinic). The brother‘s story 
is that, on the day of his death, the child grew very ill, and rather than let him 
administer a shot of digitalis which might prolong his life, the mother stops him and 
lets the child die. At least two deaths haunt the mother‘s actions on that day: that of her 
husband, named Georges also, and that of Omi. The mother has already intimated that 
she thought her husband might have lived longer had he fallen ill during a different 
stage of medical history: ‗all the same it‘s a shame at the time of Georges yourfather he 
had to die whereas these days they keep the old ladies going who are not all there 
anymore.‘126 Therefore, the decision as to whether to keep Georges the son alive or not 
is informed by both the possibility of prolonging her husband‘s life, and a regret over 
the belief that she did not give Omi the ‗something‘ that she asked for: an earlier death. 
As with the death of Omi, however, the mother gives more than it is possible to 
acknowledge, and the strength of her gesture is that it demonstrates an all-powerful 
might which makes/lets come what it submits to in advance. The mother‘s gesture – to 
stop the brother from saving the child – is of a might which denies destiny in the very 
gesture which makes/lets it come, an im-possible might which overtakes thinking, 
acknowledgement and perception in advance: 
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  –She‘s a strong woman says my brother. It is summer. We are 
barefoot. 
  For me the strongest is that she didn‘t say it. Never. Forty years she 
managed to conceal her strength. Quite the contrary in my brother‘s opinion. 
  –She didn‘t say tell you because she didn‘t even realize it says my 
brother, you think? I say, realize what? I say, it wouldn‘t have surprised me 
says he, the extent to which she doesn‘t realize has always astonished me, 
she didn‘t realize that it was a strong action, for me yes for her no, for her it 
was not even a strong action says he, that‘s precisely her strength say I, and 
afterward she doesn‘t even remember and yet he was astonished, for my 
mother never stopped surpassing our thoughts [ne cessait pas de dépasser 
notre pensée], without even knowing it and for that very reason, because she 
doesn‘t realize it, it wasn‘t an action, it was her way of following life‘s 
thread, right to the very end.
127
 
  
The mother‘s might is that she acts without acting, that her strength exceeds or 
overtakes – ‗dépasser‘ – the thoughts of her son and daughter, both of whom cannot 
catch up to her, a chase which is at the very heart of the text as they try to name what 
astonishes them about her radically incomprehensible strength: ‗[…] she didn‘t even 
realize it says my brother, you think? I say, realize what? I say, it wouldn‘t have 
surprised me says he […]‘. The mother‘s might is found in following ‗life‘s thread [le 
fil de la vie]‘ to the very end; her strength lies on the side of life, even if that leads to 
death, and even if it means keeping that strength secret to the point of not realizing it. 
Whilst the brother is on the side of medical knowledge, a knowledge which would 
almost involuntarily demand that he race against the child‘s death, the mother is on the 
side of an (im)puissance which makes/lets death arrive on the side of life: ‗[…] mother 
stopped me saying you have to let him die to my astonishment she stopped me saying 
let him die saying let Georges go she stopped me in my race with death, it was a very 
close fight and mother stopped me choosing her side she told me let him go […].‘128 
The mother acknowledges destiny – Anankē, death – whilst denying it; her (non)action, 
her im-puissance, makes what is beyond her control arrive. Such is her impossible gift, 
a gift she gives without giving; and it is here that the narrator realizes that this 
undecidable gesture once again responds without responding to Omi‘s request for the 
im-possible: 
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And it comes back to me Omi‘s phrase when she still had her wits about her: 
―Give me something and don‘t tell me,‖ she said, my mother would say. 
And I didn‘t give her and I didn‘t tell her and I blame myself for that. But 
this phrase, isn‘t it also my phrase? Didn‘t I say that but not in so many 
words? I didn‘t even tell her give me and hearing what I did not say she gave 
me and didn‘t tell.129 
  
The mother hears what is not said, she hears a request that remains unspoken, and 
therefore she gives without giving, and without realizing that her ‗strength‘ is her secret 
gift, her power to make/let death and destiny arrive without arriving. The mother is 
silent around this strength because it isn‘t something that could ever be acknowledged 
as being possible. Nothing has been consciously given with this gesture that makes/lets 
come the child‘s destiny; indeed, it is the very im-possibility of the gift – that it is 
impossible to be reduced to an economy of accountability and/or exchange – which 
makes this impossible gesture ‗possible‘.130 The mother cannot account for what she 
makes/lets arrive; she makes/lets happen what might also be fate or destiny. She knows 
she had ‗to take the death that Destiny handed her.‘131 The mother knows how to 
submit to a destiny with an all-powerful address that also makes it arrive. As an act of 
arrivance, death is made to/let arrive on the side of life. This is not death ‗as such‘, 
death is both here (on the side of life) and yet to come: essentially divided as that which 
occurs, but also as what remains to be thought. 
  
But the mother has her own version of the event; she claims that the brother wasn‘t 
present on the day of the child‘s death. The mother describes how she had left the child 
in the staff‘s care, and upon returning, found that ‗he had that high fever I found it 
strange just the day I go out he catches his death and of course if he has a raging fever 
like that the heart can‘t keep up […] right away I understood that Destiny had knocked. 
I go out. Destiny enters.‘132 This version of the event suggests that both the brother and 
the mother are absent at the point the child ‗catches his death [attrape la mort].‘ 
However, the mother makes space for destiny to arrive; as she leaves, ‗Destiny‘ – the 
capitalization of the word naming a very real character in this story – enters. Destiny 
comes in with the exit of the mother; the mother makes space for the other as a gift 
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which is given without giving, as the arrivance of the arrivant. The mother makes way 
for Destiny as it enters the stage, and with this gesture Destiny is made/let arrive as the 
gift which is irreducible to any ‗I‘ which gives or receives it; indeed, this gift is given 
without giving on the ‗day I wasn‘t there‘. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
It is possible that this project stemmed from a reading of a play by Hélène Cixous. That 
play was L‟Histoire terrible mais inachevée de Norodom Sihanouk roi du Cambodge.1 
It might even have originated from a passion for the title, indeed for the word ‗histoire‘, 
with its capacity to signify both ‗history‘ and ‗story‘. Cixous‘s text concerns a terrible 
but unfinished histoire of Cambodia as figured through one of its most enigmatic kings. 
It takes in the turbulent twenty years leading up to 1975, a period which saw the fall of 
Phnom Penn and the ascendancy of the Khmer Rouge, a period which is most 
immediately associated with genocide. Reading this text led me to ask how it might be 
possible to write on such unthinkable events, and in turn to consider what a study of 
trauma might resemble if it could touch on these immense histories, stories, events, 
languages, others – how it might be possible to make all this come to writing. In a 
sense, the title of Cixous‘s play tells us all we need to know, in that what are at once 
terrible events are also ‗unfinished‘, still to come, still to be thought. It is, therefore (and 
what I didn‘t realize at the time), a question of ‗might‘, of a writing which addresses 
what might remain beyond writing, or a writing which suffers and survives – which is, 
indeed, wounded by – this ‗might‘ as the force and potential of what remains to come. 
What is remarkable, then, is that the very title of Cixous‘s play demonstrates this; it 
marks a histoire as that which, however terrible and traumatic, is a story which remains, 
and which remains to be written (on). 
 
The question of how to write (on) trauma opened onto questions concerning the 
academic phenomenon of ‗trauma studies‘, of its relation to writing, to literature, to the 
North American humanities‘ amalgamation of deconstruction, psychoanalysis and 
literary theory from which it emerged, and to its position in the ‗university‘. I wanted to 
ask if it might be possible to reconsider trauma studies as something which could 
survive the label of a discipline, or the ties of an affiliation, and instead be read in terms 
of something which experimented with what appeared to be a particular relation to 
writing. This would not be a search to identify trauma in writing – of which there are 
innumerable remarkable encounters and studies – but to ask if it might be possible to 
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 Hélène Cixous, L‟Histoire terrible mais inachevée de Norodom Sihanouk roi du Cambodge (Paris: 
Théâtre du Soleil, 1985); The Terrible but Unfinished Story of Norodom Sihanouk, King of Cambodia, 
trans. Juliet Flower MacCannell, Judith Pike, and Lollie Groth (London: University of Nebraska Press, 
1994). 
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think of trauma studies in terms of what marks, wounds, or inscribes what remains 
irreducible to its study ‗as such‘. I suggested, then, the distinction between Trauma 
Studies, as a particular field or discipline, and a trauma study, as that which would 
always-already disrupt or make precarious the limits which might circumscribe it in 
terms of a field or discipline. This notion of a ‗trauma study‘, then, might be in each 
instance a singular experiment in study, each time an affirmation of reading and writing 
otherwise on and through trauma, each time an experiment in studying and experiencing 
trauma.  
  
An attempt to reconsider Trauma Studies might also prompt the question of what it 
might resemble in the UK, or in Cambodia, if each time – with each trauma study – this 
quasi-discipline was written as if for the first time. What could be structured or 
programmed by the university – and particularly the North American university – might 
instead be expressed otherwise, each time the writing – or histoire – of another 
universe, or the universe of the other, one perhaps terrible and unfinished, but each time 
a writing in the hope of doing justice to the other, a writing marked or wounded by the 
‗might‘ of the event, marked or wounded by what exceeds the text at every step. I hoped 
that this thesis might be able to consider a trauma study – and in turn the im-possible 
possibility, or quasi-discipline, of Trauma Studies – as that which affirmed such a 
might. Such a might would, paradoxically, always outrun or exceed that which it 
marked or which inscribed it. Such writing, then, might always be too late, the after-
effect of what has always-already happened, the mark or wound of what has been and 
gone too quickly to be perceived, experienced or studied. And yet as that which touches 
on what exceeds and outspeeds the text, such writing might also touch on what is still to 
arrive, a potential which is yet to come to writing. A writing which appears to move too 
slowly, then, is also moving too fast; if what outruns or exceeds the text might also be 
on the verge of arriving, perhaps in being too late we are also a little too early. Too fast 
and too slow, too early and too late, this writing, these histories and stories, which 
recount what remains to come, would function as memories of the future. I hoped that it 
is as the possibility of this im-possibility that the notion of a trauma study might live on. 
——— 
Chapter One of this thesis suggested that Chris Marker‘s film La Jetée is ‗essentially‘ 
marked by what returns from the future. Following Jacques Derrida‘s reading of cinema 
as an art/science/séance of ghosts, an art/science/séance which engages with a certain 
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‗something‘ of psychoanalysis, I argued that La Jetée can be read as a text which 
welcomes the ghost, which allows what has never been present ‗as such‘ to return. With 
its premise of a man both experiencing and witnessing his own death, I suggested that 
the film experiences the traumatic event as that which inscribes and exceeds it, that the 
traumatic event marks or wounds the text as a memory of the future. In this chapter I 
suggested that the impossibility of reducing the traumatic event to a logic of the present 
is the condition of its thinking, and therefore that La Jetée suffers, survives, or lives on 
by bearing the mark or might of what remains to come. I argued that, although this 
paradoxical structure is the possibility of all film – indeed of any attempt to mark or 
inscribe the event – La Jetée attempts to affirm such an impossible logic, a logic which 
makes the borders between fiction and reality, life and text, precarious from the 
beginning.  
 
Derrida‘s notion of a theoretical ‗jetty‘, a structure which extended into and 
incorporated the other in order to ‗speak‘ before it, also provided an uncannily prescient 
reference for this chapter. Such a structure would, by coming before what nevertheless 
marks it, speak of or on the other as that which remained to come. By suggesting that 
this structure could be read in terms of both the plot and the composition of La Jetée, 
Chapter One suggested that, in order to ‗be itself‘, the film was marked by the might of 
what exceeded it. As Marker‘s text shares many thematic concerns with the work of 
Alfred Hitchcock, particularly his film Vertigo, Tom Cohen‘s reading of Hitchcock‘s 
films allowed me to demonstrate this incorporation of the other in La Jetée. With a 
reading of the scenes in La Jetée and Vertigo which feature the cross-section of a 
Sequoia tree, I suggested that the repetition of this image pointed to a ‗spectrographic‘ 
textual dimension in which each film extended into the other, rendering precarious any 
border between the two. I argued that, though apparent in both films, this ‗jetty-effect‘ 
permeated both the plot and – with its incorporation of still images – the structure of 
Marker‘s film.   
 
Focussing on the Sequoia scenes also allowed me to read the relation between trauma 
and sexual difference which is apparent in both films. Both Vertigo and La Jetée figure 
death through the image of woman. Although this is a common trait of phallogocentric 
narrative, I suggested that, as a film which can be read to welcome the ghost, a film 
which is ‗essentially‘ marked by the other, La Jetée might provide an opportunity to re-
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consider the relation between trauma and sexual difference, a suggestion I demonstrated 
by reading how La Jetée redeploys the notion of castration as an essential marking, 
interruption or cut as the very condition of the future. 
 
If, as Derrida suggest, all events are traumatic,
2
 if all events are the markers of what 
cannot wholly be reduced to thought, and thus remain to come, Chapter One 
demonstrates how a text might live on with this force and potential of the future. Rather 
than taking the conventional idea of survival, in which a traumatic event is suffered, 
survived, and recovered from, Chapter One argued that La Jetée is essentially marked or 
wounded by what remains to come. Referring to Derrida‘s reading of the term 
‗survivre‘, this chapter suggested that La Jetée can be thought in terms of a quasi-
originary dimension of survival, or living on. In turn, it suggested that La Jetée is 
traumatized from the beginning, that it survives or lives on as a text marked, traced or 
wounded by the ghost of the future. Moreover, Chapter One argues that if we are 
maintain the possibility of a trauma study, the possibility of writing (on) trauma, that 
study must also affirm this essentially textual dimension as its point of departure. 
   
Whilst Chapter One considered La Jetée in terms of a text essentially marked by what 
remains to come, Chapter Two takes this up in terms of imminence. This chapter asked 
how we might await without awaiting – without predicting or pre-programming – what 
remains to come, and how a trauma study might be the site of this im-possible arrival. 
Here I considered Roland Barthes‘s reading of Stendhal, a reading which suggests a 
shift in Stendhal‘s work between the early travel journals and later novels. I argued that 
Barthes saw in this shift a transition in Stendhal‘s relation to the lost and loved object: 
whilst Stendhal‘s early travel journals attempted a reconnection with what had been lost 
through capturing the figure of ‗Italy‘ (an overdetermined figure of woman as maternal 
loss and maternal love), his later novels situated ‗Italy‘ as a space reserved for what 
must remain wholly other. Stendhal‘s ‗Italian‘ imaginary, therefore, shifted from one 
which tried to recall and preserve the presence of a lost other, to one which lived on as 
its very promise. I argued that, through a reconsideration of the imaginary, Barthes 
begins to sketch a writing which reserves a place for the other, a spectral imaginary 
which, rather than being reduced to the head of the subject, was in fact an effect of the 
                                                 
2
 See: Jacques Derrida, ‗Typewriter Ribbon‘, p.159, and the Introduction to this thesis.  
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text. I argued that such an imaginary, an imaginary which reserved a space for the 
wholly other, was wounded, and thus traumatized, by what remained a radical 
unpredictability. Through this, Chapter Two suggested that Barthes was approaching 
what I term a trauma study as a suffering of the ‗might‘ of the im-possible. 
  
As in Vertigo and La Jetée, the relation to the feminine is central to the work of both 
Barthes and Stendhal. As Stendhal‘s fantasy of ‗Italy‘ is overdetermined by the fantasy 
of his mother (who died when he was very young), Barthes‘s reading of Stendhal is also 
overdetermined by the loss of his own mother. Both Barthes and Stendhal are 
attempting, therefore, to write about their relation to a maternal love. And yet what 
Barthes reads in Stendhal, and what he himself is attempting to develop, is a writing 
which, rather than attempting to account for loss (to reduce absence and death to an 
economy of knowledge), instead expresses a passion for the (m)other. What Barthes 
reads in Stendhal, therefore, and what I suggest is attempted in several of Barthes‘s later 
texts, is a writing in which an expression of the (m)other is figured in terms of what 
remains imminent to the text, a writing which, rather than trying to recollect an 
originary loss, promises that to which it cannot be reduced. The shift Barthes reads in 
Stendhal is from an attempt to capture the lost mother, to live again in the security of 
her presence, to a writing which welcomes the (m)other, a writing whose very 
experience is structured in terms of what remains imminent. In reserving a place for the 
(m)other, then, Stendhal‘s ‗Italian‘ imaginary allows for the expression and experience 
of what remains to come. The chapter concluded by reading the relation between 
Barthes‘s re-reading of the imaginary and my notion of a trauma study in his Fragments 
d‟un discours amoureux, a text which I claimed was a study imminent with – and thus 
marked, wounded and traumatized by – the arrival of what must remain wholly other. 
By concluding that Barthes attempts a writing of the (m)other in this text, I suggested 
that this is a text in which failing to speak of the (m)other makes way for their wholly 
unpredictable arrival.  
  
Chapter Three of this thesis reads Hélène Cixous‘s Le jour où je n‟étais pas là. It 
considers her text in relation to the notion of ‗arrivance‘, Derrida‘s formulation for how 
Cixous‘s writing makes/lets arrive that which nevertheless remains to come (the 
arrivance of the arrivant, the latter remaining the wholly other which is imminent or ‗to 
come‘). In doing this, I suggest that Le jour où je n‟étais pas là forms both an 
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experience and the study of the events which surround the death of the narrator‘s child, 
but that the writing of this traumatic event also maintains that the event remains in 
excess of the text. Cixous‘s text, then, makes/lets the traumatic event arrive without 
arriving ‗as such‘, a writing which touches on, or is touched by the traumatic event as 
the mark or wound of its potentiality to arrive (with this active/passive binary 
essentially undecidable). Following Freud‘s identification of – what Derrida refers to as 
– an ‗undecidable gesture‘ as the condition of ‗theory‘, I argue that Cixous‘s work 
affirms this undecidable gesture to such a degree that what might be read as a fictional, 
theoretical, or even biographical text, is also experiential. What might be thought of as 
fiction, theory, or biography, then, would also be a writing which experiences the very 
excess of these genres or categories.  
 
As Cixous‘s text is reducible to neither experience nor theory ‗as such‘, Le jour où je 
n‟étais pas là remains imminent with a might which exceeds it, an excess or power 
which remains to be decided or formulated, and is thus a highly experimental address. I 
traced this might or power through Freud‘s reference to animatism or „Belebtheit‘ in 
Totem and Taboo, a quasi-originary life-force – or omnipotence – through which even 
death is made to/let arrive. For Derrida, Cixous‘s work experiences and experiments 
with this side of life, her texts summon this might as the ability to address what remains 
wholly other, to make that other arrive to the text without arriving as such. 
Paradoxically, then, Cixous‘s text has the power to make what exceeds this power – the 
might of what might arrive – arrive. Hers is an all-powerful address which makes/lets 
what exceeds that omnipotence come to writing. Chapter Three argues, then, that 
Cixous‘s experimental address, her power to make what exceeds that power arrive, 
would resemble a trauma study, a writing which – as both the experience and study of 
the event – forms an experiment in the possibility of the im-possible. 
 
I concluded Chapter Three by focusing on Derrida‘s reference to Cixous‘s work as a 
‗writing of her language‘; ‗her language‘ being both her most intimate tongue, and the 
language of the (m)other. I demonstrated that, in relation to Le jour où je n‟étais pas là, 
it is with the ‗writing of her language‘ that Cixous makes/lets come her mother‘s 
undecidable and secret power, a ‗writing of her language‘ which acknowledges as it 
denies, exhumes as it buries, and confesses as it keeps the secret of what happened to 
her son on ‗the day I wasn‘t there‘. As the writing of her language, Cixous‘s text can be 
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thought of as a feminine text, which leads to the suggestion that Freud‘s reading of an 
‗undecidable gesture‘ as the condition of phallogocentric theory was itself pointing 
towards a ‗writing of her language‘. A ‗writing of her language‘, then, is a writing 
which exceeds ‗man‘s‘ theoretical achievements. Cixous‘s texts demonstrate this, in 
that, should they generate a ‗theory‘, it would be a ‗theory‘ which welcomes – or, in 
terms of Chapter One, incorporates – the other. What may at once be a theory, then, is 
also a fiction, but an experimental fiction, one which survives or lives on amongst the 
precarious borders between reality and fiction, theory and fiction, and theory and 
experience. This thesis must conclude, then, by suggesting that what remains is the 
question of how to affirm such experiments without reducing them to the formulaic, of 
how to countersign such texts without deriving from them the power to sustain theories 
or principles which would localize or contain them, how to suffer and survive the might 
of these texts as the force and potential of the other, the force and potential of the future. 
What remains, then, is the question of how to read and write (on) the im-possible, of 
how to countersign these texts as experiments in the im-possible, as experiments in the 
‗writing of her language‘. 
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